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PREFACE
This paper is a study of Britain's most significant
conciliatory effort during the American Revolution.

The

thesis presents a discussion of the North Conciliatory
Plan of 1778 and the obstacles which confronted Britain's
peace emissaries--the Carlisle Commission--during
negotiations in America.
In aiding in the completion of this paper, I am
indebted to numerous individuals.

The librarians of the

Virginia State Library in Richmond were of great assistance
in locating primary material within the library.

Through

use of the Norfolk Public Library's inter-library loan,
I was saved much time and expense.

I am also indebted to

Miss Joanne Smith for typing some of the rough draft.

But

most of all I thank my parents for their patience during
the months of labor on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION:

PRECEDENTS AND ALTERNATIVES

The British Carlisle Commission of 1778 was not an
innovation.

Even prior to the opening of hostilities at
Lexington, Lord Chatham had advocated reconciliation. 1 On
January 20 and February 1, 1775, he made appeals to
Parliament.

The first petition demanded the removal of

British troops from Boston to demonstrate good faith.
Parliament refused this request.

His February 1 proposal,

among other points, advocated approval of the Continental
Congress and no taxation without colonial consent.
Parliament, however, was unwilling to lose prestige by
bowing to colonial pressure. 2
The failure of Chatham's propositions did not deter
Lord Frederick·North, the Lord Treasurer and head of the
1For information on Lord Chatham, infra, Al• 16, 61-63.
2oscar Theodore Barck and Hugh Talmage Lefler,
Colonial America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958),
p. 566; Richara w. Van Alstyne, Empire and Inde endence
The International History of the American Revo ution New
York: John Wiley ana Sons,-rll"C7';" 1965), P• 62.

v1
Tory a1n1atl:y, fraa o[ferln1 bla own plan la 1775.

ff•

1aaued hla flropoaal ln hope• of qutetln1 the Chatham led
Ops>091tloo. 3 Parll... nt app10Y'ed >torth•a February 20,
1775 endeavor.

Yet th• colooiea rejected peace alnce hla

plan failed to reach th• con

ot

th• yrobl•.

Th• nvolu•

tioa.arl•• would not acknowledge any lrlctab right of
tax.at1oo or recogniu their . .1ntanance of an ansy ln the
c:oloni• 1.

anue 1 wn
alreAdy tvo o! the d-=anda of tho coloeliala. 4
AD end to

taxation and

1 t&ndlq

Coe• boatillti•• began, tho Br1t.1ab Dinl1try v.alted

a yur before of fer1ng a further conc1llatory policy.

To

act•• King C.orge Ill'• apeclal .Uaaarlea,the crovn
appointed Adalral Uch&rd Howe and hla brother, c.neral
Willlaa Howe, in Aprll, 1776.

ln addition to U..lr concll•

1atory power•, they took co=n1Dd of the f loot md tho ansy
1n ADerica.

They vaved th• "'olive branch ln ooe hand and

th• sword in th• other. •

5

Th• Kew Co:::a.111100 ot: 1776 agreed
vtth any town, colony, or lnd1vldual.

to

treat Mparately

A p&rdOft vould bo

3 ror lnfor:::.ation ca ttA t;>;>oa1tion and th• Torlea,
intra, P'P• l4•l9 and 61-62.
4 aardt C\d Lefl•r, Colcm.tal k:oerlca, P• Sb&.
Sclaude H. V&n Tyne, n..o ~ ~ lf'k!•ie:"..c!e-n.:o, A:M'rlcan
Ph••• (Boa too: hough tea H1fffin La:yany, l1j.t4i J, lf, Ict·oli.

vii
offered to any person who condemned the rebellion and
sanctioned the British cause.

But insistence by the Howe

brothers that the Loyalists overthrow the American revolutionary leaders stiffened colonial opposition. 6 Furthermore,
their June 20 and July 14 conciliatory offers came too late,
reaching Congress after it had declared independence.
Instead of independence, the Howe Commission also required
restoration of former "legal" governments and disbanding
of all troops under the "illegal" regimes.
British taxation end. 7

Only then would

In mid-1776, the British "hard" line peace offer
reflected their command of the military situation.
not lost a major battle.
not yet materialized.

They had

Complete French intervention had

The vast quantity of materiel was

just beginning to reach .America.

By 1778, however, the

English ministry, still under the direction of Lord North,
realized the ineffectiveness of its recent military efforts.
Thus the Carlisle Commission of 1778 offered more amiable
terms to America.

The Howe Commission had first required

the colonials to yield to certain British demands; in 1778,
6carl Van Doren, Secret History of the American
Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 194!')-;--p'p. 10-11;
Weldon A. Brown, Empire or Independence A Study in the
Failure of Reconciliatioll; 1774-1783 (Un!versity-;-LOUI'siana:
Louisiana-state University Preis-;-!'941), pp. 82-83.
7Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, pp. 600-601.

viii
the offer of conciliation was made without prior stipulations.

The war situation had changed completely, and

a Franco-American alliance was more and more a possibility.
The might of the British Empire had failed to subdue its
weaker possession.
The initiation of the British peace effort of 1778,
also reflected a change of attitude within the British
ministry and political pressures in England.
led by Lord North, finally realized that a
would not inevitably produce victory.

The ministry,
policy of force

The British seemed

willing to lose international pre-eminence by granting
almost all colonial demands.

If this peace plan failed,

then either destruction of America or colonial independence
would follow.

Each alternative was full of danger for the

British economic system.

To the ministry, the conciliatory

of fer was the least costly and the only logical means of
ending the war without destroying America or granting
independence.
The reason for the 1778 conciliatory effort, however, .
was not based solely on the Battle of Saratoga, October,
1777.

The fear of total French involvement also did much

to bring Britain's lethargic ministry out of its stupor.
On the surface French and British relations had seemed

amiable following the Peace of Paris in 1763.
each was suspicious of the other.

In ectuality

The French diplomats and

ix
courtiers eagerly supported any cause which lessened the
8
authority of their nemesis.
From the firing of the first shots at Lexington, the
French ministry had looked favorably upon the American
cause.

The work of Pierre Augustin de Beaumarchais, a

playwright and intimate in the French court, was noticeable
immediately.

Throughout the fall and winter of 1775, he

attempted to persuade Charles Gravier, the Count de
Vergennes, into supporting the sending of materiel to
America. French Foreign Minister Vergennes favored the
American cause but at first dreaded the possibility of
war with England.

9

Beaumarchais was even less successful

with Turgot, the Controller General of Finances.

In a

sound argument Turgot claimed that the French financial
system was too weak to allow it to aid America. 10
Finally in December, 1775, Vergennes admitted to Louis
XVI his endorsement of the American cause. 11 This acknowl-

8claude H. Van Tyne, "French Aid before the Alliance
of 1778," The American Historical Review, XXXI, 1 (October,
1925)' 29.9Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic Histo~ of !h! American
People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, ~64), P• 29;
James Reck Perkins, France in the American R~volution
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), pp; 79 and 542.
lOsamuel Flag Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American
Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Universitv Press,
1961), PP• 24·25.
11Perkins, France in the Revolution, pp. 52-54.
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edgement led to the shipment of supplies and funds to the
colonies in 1776. 12 Among reasons for aid, Vergennes
included revenge against England for the humiliating Treaty
of Paris.

He also believed the con:miercial assets of an
independent America would be numerous. 13
With the Paris arrival of Benjamin Franklin in

December, 1776, talks leading to a military alliance began
in earnest.

Vergennes again at first failed to

enthusiasti~ally

toward an dlliance.

re~pond

In January and March,

1777, colonial "militia diplomats" continued to prod the
French ministry into favoring a military-connnercial agreement.

Vergennes was willing to provide secret aid.

If

there were assurances that the colonials would remain true
to the cause for liberty, even if independence were offered
by Britain, then an alliance would be beneficial. The
French minister never received such a guarantee. 14
By the summer of 1777, the concentration of French,
Spanish, and British naval power in the West Indies further
12on May· 12, 1776, Turgot resigned leaving Vergennes
the dominant influence in the government. Bemis, Diplomacy
of the American Revolution, PP• 27-28.
13c1aude H. Van Tyne, "Influences which Determined the
French Govermnent to Make the Treaty with America, 1778,"
The American Historical Review, XXI, 3 (April, 1916),
"S!9"-3o.
14Edward s. Corwin, French Policx and the American
Alliance of 1778 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archoil'Books, 1962),
PP• 95 an'd'""9-r:--

xi

aided in forrm.ilating a change in British policy.15

By

July, the French navy seemed to be on equal terms with the
British.

Vergennes reasoned that if England maintained

control of North America she might menace the French West
Indies.

16

The basis of the French-colonial policy, there-

fore, was not at first contingent upon an American victory.
Weeks before the battle of Saratoga, Vergennes had admitted
17
the need for an alliance.
This increasing French interest in the New World
balance of power aroused the British ministry from its
lethargy.

In late October, for the first time, the ministry

advocated the interception of French vessels bound for
t\m.erica.

Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, and the British ambassador to France, Lord Stormont,
acknowledged also the likelihood of a Franco-American
.
18
Alliance.
Word of the British defeat at Saratoga, October 17,
1777, thus generated consternation in France as well as in
England.

The possibility of Britain's offering America

independence now worried Vergennes.

Franklin eagerly played

15 van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 132.
16 corwin, French Policy, PP• 101-02.
17van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 133.
18van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, PP• 133-34;
Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution, p. 78.

xii

on such fears.

Franklin held discussions with British
agents which increased the foreign minister's fears. 19 The
colonial nmilitia diplomatsn in France realized the dilemma
plaguing Vergennes and France.

To allow a British and

American reunification was to court the destruction of
France and her possessions in the West Indies.

To unite

with America would surely initiate war with England.
Vergennes wondered which was the lesser of two evils.
Either way France faced a dilemma.

Vergennes, however,

finally insisted that it was more logical to engage one
enemy, England, rather than two, America and England. 20
With continued accumulation of rumors concerning a
Franco-American alliance, Lord North and the miuistry
became more apprehensive.

The solution to Britain's

dilemma was, hopefully, a conciliatory effort.

Not only

did Lord North initiate the proposition in order to quell
the Whig Opposition at home but also to thwart the American
success at Saratoga.

More important, the conciliatory

endeavor was a reply to Britain's ancient nemesis, France.

19corwin, French Policx, P• 121; Van Tyne, "Influences,"
P• 538.
20Ruth F. Bartlett (ed.), The Record of American
Diplomacy Documents and Readings-rii the History of .American
Forei~ Relations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964),
pp. 2 -21; Van Tyne, 0 Influences,n P• 541.

CHAPTER

I

THE DECEMBER TO FEBRUARY PREPARATIONS
LEADING TO THE NORTH CONCILIATORY PLAN OF 1778
After nearly three years of fruitless warfare, the
chances of conciliation between England and her wayward
colonies became realistic.

General Burgoyne's defeat at

Saratoga in October, 1777, made conciliation an often
debated subject.

Not only had the colonials gained a

resounding military victory, but the possibility of an
alliance with France or some other friendly European nation
gained momentum as 1777 drew to a close.
The British ministry understood what might occur once
America and France became allies.

A Franco-American

military alliance would compel England to wage war on two
fronts.

The ability of England to maintain her control of

the sea lanes would be put to a severe test.

Even if

England should be victorious in any forthcoming hostilities,
the weakening of her authority on land and sea would provide

2
openings for other European states to claim a share of
British commercial and trading rights throughout the world.
An enfeebled Britain would thus be subject to harassment

by all those countries which had coveted Britain's dominance

of the seas.
The task for the North ministry, therefore, was to
discover a means of thwarting a French treaty with the
colonies.

To counteract any such move by the French, the

English government needed a sound and adequate peace plan
acceptable to leaders in the American Congress.

Perhaps

only then would the colonials reject the Gallic inducements
in order to return to the security of common language,
religion, and ancestry.
In order to achieve this reunion, Lord North's
ministry considered changing its objectives.

As Chancellor

of the Exchequer and First Lord of the Treasury, political
disappointments and military disasters had confronted Lord
1
North.
Edmund Burke and Charles James Fox irritated North
by pointing out to the Lord Treasurer his failings.

The

Opposition, the group of gentlemen in Parliament who were
critical of the North administration and its policies,
lsir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, The Histor~ of
Parliament: The House of Commons, 1754-179'0""'TNew Yor :~
Oxford Univerirty Presi; 1964), p.~.~

3

raised its voice in anger over the continuous inability of
the government to achieve a full or even partial military
triumph. 2
With such objections confronting the ministry in
1777, an immediate change in British policy seemed necessary.
For almost three years English forces engaged a weaker but
persistent opponent.

North's adversaries urged some

definite, positive strategy to eradicate the current
situation.

Under the joint command of Lord Richard and

General William Howe, British forces were less than successful.

Then the significant defeat of Burgoyne climaxed the

decline of British fortunes.

With the distinct possibility

of open, French-American cooperation, the North cabinet
seized upon any opportunity to obtain even a partial victory
with the colonies. 3
The military situation in December, 1777, therefore,
compelled certain governmental officials, such as Frederick
North and Under-secretary William Eden, to inquire into the
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the current hostilities.

Once ·news arrived of Burgoyne's defeat, William Eden,

2ttenry, Lord Brougham, Historical Sketches of Statesmen
~ Flourished .!!! the Time E£ George III (London: Richard
Griffin and Company, 1&5'ST, I, 52.
3J. L. Le B. Hammond, Charles James Fox, A Political
Studx (London: Methuen and Company, 1903),-p: 2I2.

4

a close friend of North and a person constantly striving
for a just and equitable peace, sketched his plan for a
peace negotiation.

Following the shock of Saratoga, the

young under-secretary in the Northern Department presented
his proposal for conciliation to Lord North. 4

In a December 7 dispatch to Lord North, Eden outlined two major proposals.

To be a success, he believed

conciliation must include the colonial right to revoke all
existing acts of Parliament considered to be a restraint
upon the colonies.

Secondly, he suggested appointment of

con:missioners to lay the foundations for America's restora5
tion within the Empire.
Such persons, according to Eden,
should "be nominated by His Majesty under the Great Seal of
England" and would "have full powers to meet • • • with such
Person or Persons" having authority to expedite matters. 6
This plan was the basis of further developments
during the forthcoming weeks.

Eden acknowledged problems

in any peace maneuver and conceded the need of a detailed
4van Alstyne, Empire .!Ef! Independence, p. 143.
5charles R. Ritcheson, British Politics and the
American Revolution (Norman, Oklahoma: University or:-Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 259.
6william Eden to Lord North, December 7, 1777, B. F.
Stevens, Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives
Relating to America !773-1783 with Descriptions, Editorial
Notes, Collations, References,-arui Translations (London:
Printed by Malby and Sons, June-ns9o), IV, No. 355. Hereafter cited as Stevens, Facsimiles.

5

study before the cabinet's formal presentation of any final
conciliation proposal.7
~ieanwhile,

preliminary discussions between British

and American envoys in France had developed.

Burgoyne's

defeat led Eden to seek American diplomats' opinions
concerning a negotiated settlement with England.

Under-

secretary Eden sent his agent, Paul Wentworth, a New
Hampshire Loyalist, to France on December 6, 1777. 8 At the
time of Wentworth's sojourn in Paris, Dr. Edward Bancroft,
formerly of Westfield, Massachusetts, was also in the
confidence of Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane. 9
Along with Wentworth and Bancroft were Thomas
Walpole and David Hartley.

Walpole, a merchant and banker

in England, had strong commercial ties in Ame7ica.

As a

follower of the Rockingham Whigs in Parliament, Walpole
7van Alstyne, Empire .!:!:!!2. Independence, p. 144.
8s. F. Bemis, "British Secret Service and the French.American Alliance, 11 The American Historical Review, XXIX, 3
(April, 1924), 484-483:" To compensate for his time in the
British service, Wentworth desired a modest position within
English society·. He hoped that the rebellion would fail so
that his New Hampshire estates would not be confiscated. Van
Doren, Secret History, P• 60.
9Bemis, "British Secret Service," P• 489. Edward
Bancroft. before the war, was confidential secretary of Silas
Deane. He played the role of double agent during the
discussions in France while remaining in the pay of the
British ministry. Bemis, Diplomacy of the American Revolution)
PP• 65-66.

6

expressed to Franklin a firm desire for a conciliation. 10
Unknown to Franklin, however, Walpole believed the key to
peace lay in a change in government at home. 11 Franklin
received other notes encouraging a peace settlement from
David Hartley, a political opponent of Lord North. 12 A
member of Parliament, Hartley gained therein additional
.
13
support f or condemnations of the North ministry.
Sympathetic to the American situation, Hartley on several
occasions expressed hope that a settlement would eventually
be forthcoming.

Although his correspondence never developed

into valuable negotiations, Franklin did hint that if such
distinguished and honest men as David Hartley had the powers
to discuss a treaty of peace, hostilities might cease. 14
During the time of the Walpole and Hartley corre10 van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, pp. 95 and 116.

11&ichard W. Van Alstyne, "Thomas Walpole's Letters to
the Duke of Grafton on .American Affairs 1776-1778," The
Huntington Library Quarterly, XXX, 1 (November, 1966r;-32.
12 Even though Hartley adhered to the policies of the
Rockingham Whigs, he upheld Chatham's colonial beliefs.
Chatham, also a· Whig, denounced all advocates of American
independence. Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 63.

13George Herbert Guttridge, David Ha1:tley, M. P. and
Advocate of Conciliation 1774-1783 (Berkeley, CaliYornia:-UniversitY-0£ California Pre'Ss, October, 1926), pp. 280-281.
14Benjamin Franklin to David Hartley, February 26,
1778, Albert Henry Smyth (ed.),~ Writings of Benjamin
Franklin (New York: The l'XlacNillan Company, 1906), VII, No. 855.

7

spondence with Franklin, Under-secretary Eden's agent, Paul
Wentwoxth, arrived .in Paris carrying a letter from Eden
expressing the latter's respect for Franklin and the ever
present wish for an end to the fighting.

To establish

favorable conditions for his plan, forwarded to Lord North
December 7, Eden needed to know the true sentiments of the
.Americans in Paris.
fervent hope.

An end to the conflict was Eden's

If Franklin's views were discovered, a

conciliation policy, such as the one formulated by Eden,
would have a guideline to follow.
Under instructions as Mr. Eden's private commissioner,
Wentworth was to obtain information concerning America's
relationships with France, Spain, and any other European
states interested in the current struggle.

If possible,

Wentworth was to report especially the thoughts of Arthur
Lee, Silas Deane, and Benjamin Franklin with regar.d to a
peace settlement. 15 As a private emissary with no official
authority, Mr. Wentworth could only hope to prove to the
Americans that England had much more to offer than France.
He had to demonstrate to the envoys that England wished to
16 .
begin legitimate discussions.
15Bemis, "British Secret Service," pp. 484-485.
16van i\lstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 145.

8

Following an uneventful voyage, Wentworth met with
Silas Deane in Paris on December 17.

Solely responsible

for the proposals conveyed to Deane, Wentworth assured
him that peace could be won if the two countries returned
to the status of 1763.

All laws since 1763 deemed harmful

to the colonies would be considered void and would be
repealed by Parliament.

Deane, however, rejected this

proposal and declared that he personally wanted nothing
less than an independent America. 17 After this reversal,
Wentworth learned of Franklin's similar interest in an
independent America.

Having no authorized power to alter

his offer, Wentworth thus achieved very little.

Throughout

December, Eden received no valuable information from his
emissary.

In fact, Wentworth failed to realize any progress
18
during these early stages of discussions.
Meanwhile, Paris rumors that the French government
would soon declare itself in favor of complete recognition
of American independence and in favor of a treaty of
commerce gained credence.

Even prior to Wentworth's arrival

in France, the Earl of Shelburne, on December 5, inquired
in Commons if such transactions between America and France

17Bemis, "British Secret Service," p. 486.
18van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 144.

9

were not being conducted.

No official in the govermnent

could truthfully answer such a query.

Later with Wentworth

in Paris as an observer, the British were still unable to
ascertain the course of Franco-American discussions. 19
Neither Wentworth nor Bancroft uncovered
strategy.

F~anklin's

Franklin, the shrewd agent that he was, had long

delighted in playing one power against the other.

To

increase indecision and confusion within the French court,
Franklin circulated exaggerated accounts concerning
America's desire for peace with England.

He had earlier

hinted that since General William Howe had captured
Philadelphia on September 26, 1777, the colonials might be
even more willing to relinquish their independent-minded
attitude and sue for peace.

He believed that in exciting tie

French with such propaganda they might be more inclined
toward serious negotiations for an alliance.

On

the other

hand, Franklin's hints of an innninent alliance with France
after Saratoga sought to capitalize on the uncertainty of
the British ministry.

This scheming tended to lessen the

effectiveness of the English emissaries in Paris.

During

the December talks, Wentworth and Bancroft were never
19Lord North, /J; ~ .2£. the History of Great-Britain
During the Administration of Lord North, To the Second
Session--o! the Fifteenth Parliament (London:-printed for
G. Wilkie; Ii82), PP• 297 and 299.

10

positive as to the intentions or sincerity of the American
commissioners, especially Franklin.

Count de Vergennes,

the French Foreign Minister, also became wary of the American
agents. 20
Franklin's shrewd mind enabled him to manipulate
Count de Vergennes.

Vergennes dreaded the possible effect

of Saratoga on the minds of the British ministr;.

America's

victory might generate enthusiasm within England for a peace
settlement with the colonies. 21 Once Franklin entered into
discussions with Wentworth, Vergennes appealed to Louis
XVI's fear of a united British empire.

While England and

the colonies remained separated, France could seek revenge
and would gain benefits from .American commerce. 22
On December 17, 1777, therefore, as Wentworth met
with Deane, Count de Vergennes also promised to commence
'

treaty discussions with the Americans.

23

With no evidence

of an independent-minded spirit within the British ministry
and with Vergennes' overture, Franklin in late December

20Barck ·and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 627; Van
Doren, Secret Histoz:, p. 61; Van Alstyne, Empire and
Independence, p. 13 •
2lsamuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the
American People (New York: Oxford University Press-;-1965"),
p. 254.
22Bailey, Diplomatic History, P• 32.
23Bemis, Diplomacy .2f. the American Revolution, p. 60.

11

worked harder for French assistance in America. 24

Always

a realist, however, he was not content to end his manipulations with the English.

Peace feelers were welcome, and

his Paris activities continued to increase British uncertainties concerning reconciliation.
Once the French had decided to support the colonials
completely, Franco-American contacts began in earnest.
Thereafter, rumors of an intended alliance became more
widespread.

Additional evidence of meetings between

representatives of the two countries came from George
Lupton, an associate of Eden, in Paris.

Writing to Eden on

December 31, Lupton reiterated the viewpoint that the
American envoys had begun to seal the alliance. 25 Never
providing the British with vital information, Wentworth,
Lupton, and Hartley failed to separate fact from rumor.
This did nothing to enhance the prestige of the English
ministry.

Indecision plagued nearly every facet of King

George's government, and irresolution furnished little
assistance in the formulation of sound, conciliatory
proposals.
Parliament exhibited a similar lack of initiative

24Morison, Oxi:rd History, p. 254.
25 stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 486.

12

by recessing for six weeks.

While rumors continued that a

Franco-American agreement was impending Parliament decided
to take an extended Christmas holiday. 26 Thus, it appeared
that the British Parliament remained unconcerned about the
probability of a menacing Gallic treaty with England's
former colonies.
Yet a few Englishmen did recognize the need for a
complete revision of policy and began to work toward that
end.

David Hartley, Charles James Fox, Edmund Burke, and

William Eden were eager to discuss the means by which a
change of current policy might be achieved.

North also

typified such reasoning and began to adjust his thinking.
Throughout the Christmas recess, Lord Fr.ederick
North toiled over a plan which he believed to be a positive
alternative to any European endeavors toward a colonial
.

agreement.

27

In devising his proposal, Lord North refused

to concede to liberal members of his sovernment.

Mr. John

Wilkes, a member of Parliament, advocated the revocation
28
of the Declaratory Act of 1766.
North condemned this
maneuver in a highly sarcastic manner.

If Wilkes was

26Morison, Oxford History, P• 254.
27Namier and Bm>ke, History of Parliament, III, 204.
28wilkes supported neither the Rockingham Whigs nor
the North ministry, taking sides according to the issue
rather than the faction. Ibid., P• 640.
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willing to repeal such an act which had bound the colonies
to England, then why not repeal all the laws since 1662-the navigation act, the hat acts, and the post office
acts. 29
Unwilling to yield so much, North wished to retain
the little remaining English bargaining power and thereby
avoid acknowledging to the world her diminishing authority
over the American colonies.

Fortunately for Lord North,

num.P-rous influential individuals proved to be highly
favorable toward at least a partial reconciliation, even
if they disapproved of North personally or of current
governmental policies.
As observed previously, William Eden had demonstrated
his aspiration for an equitable settlement by presenting a
plan for conciliation on December 7, 1777. 30 Eden's
proposals recormnended repeal of the Tea Act, the
Massachusetts Charter Act, and all acts since 1763, excepting
those enacted during the present conflict. 31 This plan for
a termination of hostilities received praise not only from
North but from .an equally prominent individual, the Duke of

29Brown, Empire and Independence, p. 173.
30supra, p. 11.

31w1lliam Eden memoranda, January, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, IV, No. 346.
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Marlborough.

In writing to Eden on January 8, 1778,

Malborough ms.intained that the colonies could hope for
nothing more than what Eden had offered.

The Duke realized

that the colonials would not be willing to adhere to such a
policy at that moment because of Saratoga and the FrancoAmerican negotiations.

Nevertheless, to Marlborough, it

seemed that the opening of any negotiations with the colonies
might "produce peace in the end by its operations on the
different feelings and minds of the Rebels.n 32
Every Parliamentarian did not sympathize with the
Duke of Marlborough's qualified faith in Eden's ideas on
conciliation.

Within Parliament, several political factions

offered various suggestions as to how to deal wi.th the
colonies and intensified their verbal barrages as the war
continued.

The Old Whig faction, dominated by Lord

Rockingham, Lord Richmond, Edmund Burke, and Charles James
Fox, desired to oust the North ministry and to establish a
ministry with a liberal colonial policy.

The Old Whig

group was just one faction of the opposition which opposed
the North led Tory administration.

Another faction of the

opposition led by Lords Chatham and Shelburne, also
disliked the thought of endorsing the Old Whig group which
desired to acknowledge an independent status for America.
32 Ibid., No. 350.
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Such failure of factions in the Opposition to unite enabled
the Tories to remain in control of the government.33
Besides, certain disagreement was apparent among
the Whigs.

Lord Rockingham advocated an immediate end to

the war and warned of the consequences of continued subjugation of the colonies. 34 Charles James Fox was even more
outspoken in his pacifism.

It would be best, he believed,

to grant the colonies their independence rather than to
continue the policy of conquest.

In fact, he doubted that

his country could ever defeat and control the colonials.
Thomas Pownall, an advocate of the Stamp Act of 1765, and
Henry

s.

Conway, a Parliamentarian, sided with Fox on the

subject of freedom and independence of America. 35

Like Fox,

they believed an offensive war against America was impractical.
But neither Conway nor Pownall considered themselves members
.
36
of any faction within Parliament.
Yet the opposition also contained a distinguished,

33Ritcheson, British Politics, PP• 129 and 244-45.
34George Bancroft, Historx of the United States, from
the Discove~ of the Continent (NeW-York: D. Appleton anc:r-Company, 18 )-;-v-;--2'82; Lord F1ahon, History of England from
the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles, 1713-1~
(London: Jonn Murray,-:Albermarle Street, 1853), VI, 21r:-35Bancroft, History .2.f. United States, V, 282-83.
36 van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 206;
Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 127.
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well-known figure completely opposed to the sentiments of
Fox.

Williru.n Pitt, like Charles, Lord Mahon, criticized

Fox and his followers for their willingness to release
this vital segment of the empire.

As Chatham's son-in-law,

Lord Mahon voiced his dislike of the ministry as well as
his disdain for those who supported independence of the
colonies.

Pitt, an aging but still influential member of

Parliament, considered that Britain must retain her colonies
even if war ensued with Frnnce.
the consequences of hostile

Mahon, unlike Pitt, feared

~elations

with the French.

}lahon wanted peace, but not at the cost of war with France.
He favored an

dependent upon the mother country for
protection and security. 37
~'\merica

Vigorously seeking constructive ideas for a plan
acceptable to all participants, North gained valuable
information from two different sources.

William Fraser, a

colleague of Eden's in the Northern Department, explained
that England must remain attentive to any colonial desire
to return to the 1763 situation.

All colonial laws since

then could be either repealed or modified.

If this seemed

too lenient, hs believed only designated acts should be
rescinded.

Regarding the tax issue, each colony would

contribute a portion of the total wealth contained within

37Mahon, History of England, VI, 211-12 ••
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its boundaries.

This proportion of each colony's wealth

would be used to defray some expenses of sustenance and
protection by the mother country.

The Committee on the

State of the Nation initiated a similar plan involving
taxation in January, 1778.

North's approved conciliation
proposition contained material from both sources. 38
While discussions on the rebellious colonies continued
throughout England, meetings between American and British
envoys occurred in Paris during January.

Acting under the

instructions of Eden, Wentworth and Bancroft remained
unaffected by their lack of success.

They stubbornly

refused to end their efforts with the American envoys. 39
On

January 18, 1778, Dr. Bancroft learned that the

French Foreign Minister, Vergennes, had received a rough
draft on the proposed Franco-American treaty.

In this

alliance America would not be required to grant the French
government any exclusive privileges.

Writing to Wentworth

in Paris, Bancroft also mentioned French preparations for
war.

Unofficial sources reported tl1e sailing of the fleet

from Toulon and. the movement of troops to the Normandy
38william Fraser, A Way for Peaceful Settlement with
America, January, 1778, and Committee on the State of the
Nation, Resolution on Taxation of American Colonies, January,
1778, Stevens Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 344 and 349.
39Bemis, "British Secret Service, n p. 489.

18

coast. 40

Although never authenticated by the British

agents in Paris, this material proved of value in the
further development of British policy.

The agents' failure

to discover the exact destination of Count d'Estaing•s
fleet proved of extreme importance during the ensuing
weeks. 41
With relations between England and France becoming
more strained with each passing day, Lord Stormont, the
British ambassador to the French court, reported to the
home ministry in late January that a rupture between the
two countries would occur within a :matter of days.~

Lord

Stormont's declaration of an impending crisis failed to
quicken the home ministry's validation of its representatives'
finding on the French fleet or the proposed treaty.

In

fac~

the British never discovered the exact substance of the
American-Gallic treaty, signed February 6, 1778, until the
43
middle of March.

40Dr. Edward Bancroft to Paul Wentworth, January 18
and 23, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 492.
41The Toulon fleet was to have eventual responsibility of breaking British seapower in the western Atlantic.
Van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 143.
42 The letter was contained in Stormont's correspondence of January 28 and following. Ibid., pp. 143 and
146.
43Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 653.
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During this period.of uncertainty and indecision with
England, American colonial leaders were as much in the
dark about the outcome of the French-American treaty
discussions as were the British.

Much of the news from

England was contained in letters to friends in the colonies.
One such correspondent dismissed the significance of the
Gallic and colonial negotiations by explaining that the
English were discussing plans for a settlement with
rebellious states.

The author of the preceding statement

was Mr. George Johnstone, a future member of the Carlisle
Connnission to America.

In his February 5 letter to Robert

Morris, a delegate to the Continental Congress from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Johnstone claimed that once a peace
proposition had been presented to Parliament a reunion
of the two countries, in all likelihood, would become a
reality.

America must do nothing to endanger the prospects

of peace.

In order to achieve a successful conclusion to

the bloodshed, Johnstone realized that .America must not
join forces with any foreign power but must wait until
the mother country presented a formal statement of policy. 4
On February 17, 1778, Mr. Johnstone's observations
44Francis Wharton (ed.),~ Revolutionarx Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States (Washington: Government
Printing Office-;-18"8"9"), II, 487-88.
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became a reality.

After weeks of laboring over the

numerous segments of the proposition, North was ready to
present it to the Parliament.

It was to be received by

England and the colonies with a mixture of contempt and
praise.

After weeks of vacillation, the British govern-

ment finally achieved a degree of unity due to the Lord
Treasurer's proposal for a conciliation.

It was an· attempt

in the right direction, but failure continued to plague
the North ministry.

CHAPTER

II

CONCILIATORY PROPOSAL
AND

COMMISSIONERS:

FEBRUARY TO APRIL 1778

After weeks of intensive planning during December,
1777 and January, 1778, Lord North prepared to lay before
Parliament a conciliatory proposal which he believed was
Britain's most significant bargaining measure.

Failing

to obtain valuable data within France during the winter of
1777-1778, North had relied primarily upon his own judgement and that of certain members of the ministry in
formulating a plan.

Yet in order to counteract the French

treaty, which was rumored to be in the offing, the Lord
Treasurer also had considered it essential to prepare a
bill which had prior colonial approval.
Furthermore, Lord North insisted that reliable data
from America would expedite discussions with his own critics.
A lack of creditable information from America hindered the
development of a peace plan, since the only reliable

22

reports on the conduct of the war came from the Howe
brothers.

The British had even less success in discovering

the true sentiments of colonials on the revolutionary cause.
Very little data, therefore, was even available to aid North
in evolving a workable conciliatory policy.
Some news from America originated with individuals
faithful to Britain.

They related that a majority of the

colonials favored the British cause.

One such writer,

George Collier of Halifax, Nova Scotia, maintained that
large numbers of New Englanders condemned the southern
colonies for their support of the war and were ready to
aid England by all the means at their disposal. 1
Not only was there a lack of knowledge of American
sentiment, but because of inefficiency within the ministry,
the English never obtained much inf onnation from their
agents in France.

The failure of the goverrunent to grant

Paul Wentworth, George Bancroft, and David Hartley
authority and, in turn, the lack of significant data
gained by them did nothing to assist Mr. North in his
endeavor.
involving a

Even-awareness of French and colonial discussions
probable alliance did not prompt England to

terminate its lethargic attitudes on the colonial war and

lvan Alstyne, Empire and Independence, p. 147.
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on the Franco-American meetings in Paris.
King George III

realize~

that a signed agreement

between America and France was inevitable and admonished
North for his delay in providing the Connnons with a peace
plan. 2

The Lord Treasurer, however, had his reasons for

delaying the issue.

North continued to be unwilling to

present his proposal to Parliament until he discovered
the feelings of certain key individuals within England.
George Germain, Secretary for Colonial Affairs, had to be
persuaded in order to increase support for the bill within
Commons.

Germain believed repeal of the Declaratory Act

would best induce the colonies to return to the fold.
Failure to repeal the Declaratory Act--that act which
"galled" the colonials most--would make any reconciliation
effort ineffective. 3

Germain, Lord Sackville, likewise

presumed that a repeal of all previous restraining acts
would either hurry France into a treaty with the .Americans
or make the colonials less inclined toward negotiations
2King George to North, February 9, 1778, w. Bodham
Donne (ed.), The Correspondence££ King George the Third
with Lord Nor~(London: John Murray, Albermarle Street,
18b7);-rf, No. 450.
3The Declaratory Act of 1788 claimed Parliament's
right to legislate to the colonies on all matters. Barck
and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 528; King George to Lord
North, n.d., Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV,
No. 2188.
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with the French.

4

could not gamble.

This was a situation upon which England
Sackville expressed resentment because

no one in the ministry conferred with him during the
earlier stages of the proposal's development.

He accepted
the final measure only because of political expediency. 5
Statements made by George Grenville in Commons

expressed a further lack of enthusiasm for a revocation of
the repressive acts.

6

Grenville claimed that loss of

prestige would be the outcome of relinquishing the right
of taxation, of yielding to America's continued pretensions
of her charters, and of declaring America to be free.
Grenville, like Chatham, refused to adhere to a policy
which advocated independence for the American people.
If there were to be any discussions with the colonists,
Grenville maintained in a statement of February 11, 1778,
Chatham was the proper person to treat with the colonial
leaders. 7
Lack of enthusiasm for his conciliatory plan,

4:Mahon, History of England, VI, liv-lv.
5Namier and Brooke, History

.E.f

Parliament, III, 395.

6Grenville traditionally voted independently. He
did not approve all steps that the North ministry had taken
and urged the British to recover its sovereignty over
America. Ibid., II, 544-45.
7Bancroft, History .2£. United States, V, 246-47 and 261.
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however, did not dissuade Lord North.

By February 11,

1778, with more than eight weeks of discussions and planning
behind him, Lord North had his measure for conciliation
ready for Parliament. 8

Presenting it to the House of

Commons on February 17, 1778, North conceded in a two
hour speech that England had three alternatives.

A

continuation of the bloody struggle to retain the colonies
was one possibility.

Under the second choice, the British

government could withdraw all military and naval forces
from America and acknowledge the latter's independent
status.

Support for this alternative came later from

Charles James Fox and William Burke, but only a few of the
Opposition adhered to such a course of action.

The third

policy hinged upon Parliament's acceptance of a peace plan
and appointment of a peace commission.

This final

alternative--the only solution to an intolerable dilemma-was Lord North's choice.

He maintained "that it is better

to offer a concession to the colonies now, which may end
the contest within the year, than to continue the war for

81ord John Russell (ed.), Memorials and
Correspondence of Charles James Fox (London: Kichard
Bentley, 1853),-Y, 174.
~
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three or four years longer." 9
Following these introductory remarks, Lord North
brought to the floor of Commons the bill eventually known
as the North Conciliatory Plan of 1778.

Parliament

acknowledged William Eden and Solicitor-General Alexander
Wedderburn, along with Lord North, as the creators of the
bill.lo

The first section of the plan included a draft

of a bill to enable England to appoint commissioners to
deal with all disorders remaining in the colonies.

The

final portion of the proposal pertained to the right of
taxation by the British.

It stated in part "that the King

9Frederick North, The Speeches of the Right Hon.
Lord North, in the Britisl.1House of ~onunons, on Tuesday the
I7tli of February, 1778, with drauifi'ts .2f ~Dills, pacirIC
ancr-conciliatory, moved !Or""~ his lordship, and ordered
to be brought .!!!· !2 WhICFi areannexed, .!! coty of the
same noble lord's conciliatory prorositions o the !mlh
of February, 1775, and .fill extractrom the ce!ebritecrMr.
Burke's pro,hetic oration in Harch-;-TI7nBaltimore: .H. K.
Goddard, 17 8), Charles Evans, Americail'Bibliography;
~ Chronological Dictionary of All Books, Pamphlets, ~
Periodical Publications Printecr-Ehe United States of
America from the Genesis of PrintI'iig !,!! 1639 ~ to and
Includin~ the Year 1820 (Cfiicago: Private printing--ror-the
author 1 O'!=I93Vf,'" ~2, 1 and 4. Hereafter cited as
Evans Bibliography. Spelling and punctuation changes
have been made in the original sources for clarity. Only
in Appendix A has the spelling not been altered.
lOAlexander Wedderburn, an outspoken advocate of
colonial domination by Britain, believed an independent
America·, could be avoided. Van Doren, Secret History,
p. 8; For mention of the Massachusetts Government Act
see Barck and Lefler, Colonial America (New York: ThP.
NacHillan Company, 1958), PP• 553-54; Van Alstyne, Empire
,!!!5! Independence, p. 148.
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and Parliament of Great Britain would

not impose any

duty, Tax, or assesment, for the Purpose of raifing a
Revenue" within the colonies.

Included within this final

section was a request for the rescinding of the
:Massachusetts Government Act of 1774. 11
After this initial presentation, North commenced
a detailed discussion of the proposal.
the only revenue

fr~m

the

colonie~

He explained that

under his plan, would

be from regulation of commerce between America and England.
The funds from this source were then to be returned to the
coloniE:s for use by the people to pay internal expenses.
North confided to the gathering that the lunericans in
return for such a magnanimous offer, would put aside all
thoughts of independence.

With no further fear of taxation,

valid flJnerican arguments for independence, he believed,
would no longer exist.
to continue

The colonials would have no reason
12
the struggle.

llTimothy Pitkin, A Political and Civil History .££.
the United States of America, from the Year 1763 to the
C!Ose of the Administration of"""PresidentwasiiTtiiton, in
l1arch, 1797T including .! Summary View of the Political
and Civrr-5tate of the North f..merIC'aii Colonies, Prior to
that Period (NeW1raven, Lonnecticut: Hezekiah Howe and
Dii'r'rie and Peck, 1828), II, 38; Draft of the Bill to
enable His Majesty to appoint Commissioners, February, 1778
and Bill for Declaring Intentions of Great Britain concerning
the Right of Taxation over the American Colonies, February,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 359 and 360.
12North, Szeech, February 17, 1778, Evans
Bibliography, 159 2, 6 and 8.
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Besides t:onvincing Parliament of the merits of his
plan, North acknowledged the problem of persuading
Americans to accept such a policy.

To reassure the

coloni~l

leaders that England's plan for an equitable settlement
was no hoax would be a formidable task.

The burden of

persuasion, therefore, would rest upon the shoulders of
the aforementioned commission.

Under Lord North's proposal

the commissioners were to utilize their authority to the
13
fullest.
Limitations, however, were placed upon the
commissioners' authority.
certai~

Because of the significance of

negotiations, matters involving independence and

the removal of anned forces were to be forwarded to
Parliament.

In discussions on lesser topics--taxation,

payment of the war debt, and the Loyalist problem--the
connnissioners were granted complete authority.

North,

however, insisted on the point that the British envoys
bargain only with those Americans who held prominent
14
positions in the government.
In other words, the envoys
were not to "make any public appeal to the inhabitants of
America at large" until they were satisfied that Congress
13 North, S~eech, February 17, 1778, Evans
Bibliography, 15 42, 5.
14Ibid., 5 and 6.
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and nthe Connnander-in-Chief of the American forces" refused
to proceed into treaty negotiations.15
Within the framework of the conciliatory proposal,
there was a hint of possible failure along normal
diplomatic channels.

To mention the possibility of an

appeal to the people demonstrated lack of faith by the
ministry.

Such an appeal to the colonials, furthermore,

admitted the ministry's recognition of the importance of
public opinion in helping to shape American policy.

A

declaration to the inhabitants would, hopefully, put
pressure on Congress and increase support for a reconciliation.

But, first, quiet and direct diplomacy must

be used.
The authority granted to the connnissioners was
quite adequate.

In keeping with points made in the bill

before Parliament, the British emissaries could grant
pardons to all who opposed the British and could act as
intermediaries for any future conferences. 16 Possessing
authority to propose a cessation of all hostilities, the
English commission hoped to gain the respect of the

15North's bills, February, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, IV, No. 440.
16 s1r George Otto Trevelyan, ~ American
Revolution (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1912),
IV, 356.
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American leaders.

If a treaty occurred following a respite

in the conflict, it might even affect only a small section
of America.

If either one or several of the colonies

accepted an end to hostilities and supported England, then
such colonies would receive commercial benefits and
protection within the Empire.

The official recognition

of such colonies was left to the discretion of the British
envoys.

17
During Parliamentary discussion, Lord North insisted

that the culmination of all hostilities with America was
the first point to be sought by the emissaries.

The French

threat had instilled in North the desire for a rapid
termination of the war.

But to enhance the return to

normalcy, North advocated that the colonies pay their
revolutionary war debt to England.

Colonial agreement

to pay the war costs, Lord North believed would assure an
end to hostilities.

His appeal was designed to attract

English political backing.

His continued insistence that

the Americans pay their debts gained support for his
proposal from those members of Parliament who believed
the British government had already yielded too much to the
colonists.

North offered several plans for payment of

17North, S~eech, February 17, 1778,
Bibliog~aphy, 159 2, 12-14.

Evans
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colonial war debts.

Each state might discharge its

obligation by means of lotteries.

A more practical idea

involved er.ection of a public treasury in America.

North

explained that such a treasury might be more acceptable
to both sides.

The treasury would receive its funds from

an assessment of each colony, with each state or colony
being allowed to

obtain the revenue by its own methods. 18

Lord North's proposal clearly yielded to more
colonial demands than any previous offers.
taxation·was promised.

An end to

The commissioners could suspend

all acts of Parliament since 1763 which affected the
colonists.

The British envoys could grant pardons and

restore colonial charters.

The proposal, however, strayed

from its placating attitude on two points.

It deman:led

that the colonials pay the total revolutionary war debt.
In this instance, the ministry's plan reverted to the prerevolutionary policy that America was subject to every
British whim.

Furthermore, although the proposal's

conciliatory points were numerous, they lacked what the
colonials wanted most--an independent status.
These then were the main points of the proposal
which North submitted to Connnons on February 17.
18North, S~eech, February 17, 1778, Evans
Bibliography, 159 2, 12 and 16.
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its subsequent debates, Commons weighed each segment
separately and then considered the parts within the framework of the complete plan.

All North could do was prod

some of the members and speculate as to tl1e final aecision.
His ministry was in a quandry, and he needed all available
assistance to prevent its collapse.

To increase support

for his ministry, North clearly realized the necessity of
a successful mission to .America.

He thus continued to

avoid discussions harmful to the ministry, knowing that
leading adversaries were always eager to expose his
19
faults.
Other political adversaries struck immediately.
Horace Walpole, for example, castigated the Lord Treasurer
in his journal for bringi_ng disgrace upon the ministry.
The British nation, he wrote, now must 11 stoop to beg peace
of America 1!.t any ~· ,, 2 o In a letter to Sir Horace Hann,
a British resident at ti1e Court of Florence, Walpole

19supra, pp. 14-16 and 24; ~egniald Lucas, ~ North,
Second Earl of Guilford, K. G. 1732-1792 (London: Arthur L.
iiumphreys, 1'913), II, Ia.- - 20Henry Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris (eds.),
The Spirit of 'Seventy-Six, The Sto(y of the American
iteVolution as Told Dl ParticI'j?ints Indianapolis, Indiana:
The Bobbs-herrITrcompany, Inc., 1958), II, 692. Walpole,
who left Commons in 1708, spent his remaining years writing
his journals and expressing his feelings about British
home ancl foreign affairs. NairJ.er and Brooke, History of
Parliament, III, 597.
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expressed an even more definite viewpoint.

The proposal,

Walpole believed, solicited peace with the Americans without even making an attempt at

a discussion

of terms.

Lord

North's stand seemed to acknowledge Congress as a legitimate
governing body and to concede the impossibility of an
English conquest.

Walpole concluded his denunciation by

maintaining that the disastrous bill condemned taxation
while allowing for the virtual freedom of the colonies. 21
Unlike Walpole, William Fraser, a colleague of
William Eden in the Northern Department, was less vehement
in his judgment of the plan.

He did not let the hope of

peace blind his judgment when discussing his own viewpoints.
He advocated that England return to its 1763 policy and
not attempt to coerce its colonies.

Yet he still remained

pessimistic about the outcome of future discussions, warning
the administration to expect .American, pro-independence
forces to oppose eve-pj suggestion which the connnissioners
offered.

Patience, he believed, would best indicate the
English desire for reconciliation. 22
2 1Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, February 18,
1778, Letters of Horace Walpole, Earl of Oxford, to Sir
Horace Mann (London: Richard Bentley, New Burlington Street,
1844), III, No. 279. Hereafter cited as Letters of Walpole.
North Callahan, Roykl Raiders, The Tories of the American
Revolution (New Yor : The Boobs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963),
p. 30.

22van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 150.

I

34

During late February, the discussions became even
more heated.

Some members of Commons held that Lord North

was guilty of being too lenient with those responsible
for so much grief and suffering.

The rumor spread that

the Lord Treasurer might even be willing to listen to the
advocates of

ind~pendence.

The Tory, Horace Walpole,

claimed that North had completely submitted to the
Opposition with the presentation of the conciliatory
effort. 23
Some members of Commons also speculated upon the
loss of. constitutional principles under which England had
traditionally prospered. 24 The Opposition, under the
leadership of Charles James Fox, believed it harmful to
condemn the pacification measure since the group, itself,
had for many months recommended such a maneuver. 25 Likewise, Tories in Cormnons were at first reluctant to accept
the conciliatory plan since it included too much of the
Opposition's beliefs.

Some Tories believed that this

reversal in policy by the North ministry amounted to a
gross deception· by their own minister. 26 Yet a Tory
23Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, February 18,
1778, Letters .2f. WalEole, III, No. 279.
24Trevelyan, American Revolution, IV, 357.
25commager and Morris, SEirit

.2f. 'Seventy-Xix, II, 692.

26Mahon, History of England, VI, 217.
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refusal of the proposal would obviously allow the Opposition
to gain favor at court.

In an effort to off set this

possibility, therefore, the Tories prepared eventually to
support the conciliatory measure. 27
The Opposition was indeed eager to grasp the leadership role within Commons while the Tory group remained in
a daze.

Charles James Fox, for instance, sought as much

of an advantage for the Rockinghamites, a group within
the Opposition, as the situation allowed.

He had learned

from Thomas and Horace Walpole on February 17, 1778, of
the signing of a French-American treaty.

In a maneuver

that stunned the members, Fox inquired of Lord North in
Parliament on the same day whether the administration
knew of such an agreement within the last ten days.

The

Lord Treasurer arose and replied that he had heard of such
a treaty but that he preferred not to give any definite
answer at that moment.

This evasive response confirmed
for many in Parliament the existence of the treaty. 28
Lord North's response was unqualified testimony
of the failure ·of his ministry.

The inability of the

ministry to obtain creditable information on the signing

I, 173.

27Russell, Memorials and Correspondence ~ Fox,
28 commager and Morris, Spirit of •seventy-§!!, II,

693.
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of the Franco-American alliance, which had occurred on
February 6, 1778, exposed the ministry's lethargic attitude.
The prestige and authority of North and those associated
with him declined to an even lower level than at any
previous time during his tenure. 29
The ministry's apparent setback, however, did not
force an abandonment of the plan by Parliament.

Now that

it was evident that the Americans and the French were in
complete agreement, the reconciliation measure actually
became more acceptable.

But one significant issue remained

in Connnons--discussion on the Massachusetts Government Act
of 1774.

This act had originally been adopted to increase

the authority of the Massachusetts governor.

Under the act

he could appoint and remove judges and other administrative
officials without approval of the Hassachusetts Council and
could dismiss all town meetings, except for election of
local officials.

In Commons Mr.

Thomas Powys asked for

the act's repeal believing such a move would increase
American support for reconciliation.

Instead, the

Massachusetts Government Act legislation was put aside and
passed as a separate bill.

30

29Perkins, France in the Revolution, PP• 238-39.
JOAs the war progressed, Mr. Powys became hostile
toward Lord North. The failure of the North ministry to
achieve any degree of success enabled Powys to support the
Rockingham Whigs. Namier and Brooke, History .2£, Parliament,
III, 320; Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, P• 554.
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With only this change, the conciliatory plan proceeded
to the Lords for approval after Commons had ratified it
without dissent on March 5. 31 In the House of Lords the
main condemnations originated with Lord Hillsborough and
Chatham's brother-in-law, Lord Temple. 32 These gentlemen
believed in Chatham's policies and deemed it an honor to
uphold them,

Lord Chatham and friends demanded a repeal

of all acts of Parliament since 1763 involving the American
colonies.

With a legitimate cease fire, the army was to

return to the mother country.

Chatham agreed to consult,

with the colonists on every issue but one.

As an empire

builder, William Pitt, castigated a colony's wish for
self-government. 33
Like Chatham and his disciples, Lord Shelburne
advocated a change in the British ministry as necessary
before acceptance of a conciliatory plan by the colonies.
His main objective was to force the resignation of the
North ministry and to establish a regime without the
stigma of failure upon it.

Shelburne ridiculed Lords

Richmond and Rockingham for favoring

311

independent

America as the only means to end the hostilities. 34

But

31Letters of Walpole, III, No. 280.
32Mahon, History

.2f. ~ngland, VI, 217-18.

33van Alstyne, Empire ~ Independence, p. 142.
34van Alstyne, Empire and Independence, pp. 149-aO.

38

his oratory was for naught, and due to the illness of Pitt,
much Opposition initiative dissolved.

Thus inadvertently

aided, the Duke of Richmond and Lord Rockingham succeeded
in prodding the bill through the House of Lords. 35
Passing in Parliament with relative ease, North's conciliatory plan received a large majority of supporters in
Parliament, a fact which testified to the general wish for
an end to the war.36
Necessity was the reason North's measure passed in
both houses of Parliament.

These gentlemen believed that

something had to be done immediately.

Even if the

commission failed, as many feared, it was better to try
this than to do nothing.
settled nothing.

The use of anned force had

Compromise and conciliation had to be

given their chance.

Failing to unite discontented members

of Parliament, the Opposition had little chance of defeating
the bill.

Instead, the Opposition allowed the measure to

achieve a successful journey through the legislature and
turned its wrath upon Lord Frederick North. 37
Even as the proposal awaited the Seal of George III,
35Mahon, History .Cl! England, VI, 217-18.
36 nancroft, History .2£. United States, V, 248.
37Brown, Empire .2!'. Independence, pp. 219 and 221.
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Horace Walpole continued his criticism.

He reiterated

that passage of this plan placed America on an equal footing
with the mother country.

This act provided full justice to

the colonials while exposing the faults of the administration.

In a final statement Walpole sunnned up the

sentiments of many of his supporters.

Al.1

immediate dread

of a French war and the impossibility of raisiug revenue
to maintain the British forces in the colonies had led
the court to support such a submissive project. 38
This barrage of sceptical and critical accusations
did not deter the dispatching of the bills to the colonies
on February 20, 1778.

While the British prepared the

Andromeda for its voyage to the colonies with the conciliatory measure, the French vessel, Sensible, received
provisions for its trip to America at Toulon.

Officials

in each country anxiously anticipated news of the arrival
of its vessel.

Since each ship carried the offerings of

its respective government, early arrival of the Andromeda
in New York might perhaps enhance the success of peace
negotiations. 39 Not until March 11, 1778--nineteen days
38walpole to Mason, February 18, 1778 and March 4,
1778, w. s. Lewis, Grover Cronin, Jr., and Charles Bennett
(ed.), Horace Walpole's Correspondence~ William Mason,
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1955), XXVIII,
357-58, 363, and 365. Hereafter cited as Walpole's.
Correspondence.
39van Doren, Secret History, PP• 65 and 87.
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after the Andromeda sailed--did George III sign the conciliatory bill into law. 40
Once the peace offer was on the high seas, only one
final detail remained.

The last section of North's measure

provided for the appointment of a diplomatic commission
to discuss the plan for peace with the colonials.

Since

individuals chosen would have the extremely complicated
and arduous task of obtaining a just settlement for both
parties, selection of men gifted in diplomacy was desirable
but difficult.
Before the Andromeda left England, the ministry had
chosen two persons to serve on the connnission.

Appointment

of the Commander-in-Chief of the British armed forces, Sir
William Howe, and his brother, British fleet commander,
Lord Richard Howe, gave the ministry two members in America
at the

outset.

Under orders of the ministry, the Howe

brothers prepared for arrival of other commission members
by arranging for the distribution of Lord North's plan
within the colonies.

Having been in the colonies for two

years, Lord North hoped the brothers would supply the
ing commissioners with useful information on colonial
attitudes.
4

Lord Cavendish believed the brothers to be

~ahon, History

!2.£. England, VI, 218.

remain-

41
honest, intelligent, and competent commanders. 41

Yet, he

doubted that their personal feelings would enable them to
finish "the business" in the colonies.

Having failed to

defeat the colonials, the Howe Brothers had grown
despondent and weary of war. 42

Both regretted having to

wage war in America, and both condemned die colonial
policies of George III.

Sir William Howe preferred peace
by negotiation rather than by armed force.4 3 A joint

mission of war and conciliation was nothing new to the Howe
brothers.

Two years before, in 1776, the brothers had

tried prosecuting the war and negotiating a peace at the
same time. 44
Circumstances, however, necessitated early resignation
of the Howe brothers from the commission.

They had served

in America for almost two years and desired to return home.
Failing to achieve a culmination of hostilities as yet,

41Lord Cavendish was an intimate friend and supporter
of Rockingham, Cavendish acted as the moderating force for
the Rockingham Whigs in Commons. Namier and Brooke,
Histo!:' of Parliament, II: 204; Van Doren, Secret History,
P• 52 •
.
42The Parliamentary Histo~ cf England ~ the

Earliest Period to the Year 180 (rondon: Printed-,,Y T. c.
Hansard, 1814), XVIII, I1.)9'.-i:iereafter cited as Hansard,
Parliamentary History.
43Brown, Empire

~

Independence, PP• 79-81.

44supra, PP• vi-viii; William B. W1!lcox, Portrait of
a General: Sir Hanry Clinton in the War o~ Indpendence
tNew York: A!rre A. Knopf, 1°964..,-;-p:-2"2'27
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their experiences confirmed to them that the American
people would again ridicule any attempted settlement by
the British.

With a Franco-American agreement at hand, a

conciliatory effort now seemed even more absurd to them.
Writing to North on February 18, 1778, Lady Howe, wife
of Admiral Richard Howe, claimed that the new peace
mission would eradicate the achievements of the Howes and
further humiliate the British leaders.45
Unknown to Lady Howe, the ministry had accepted
General William Howe's resignation on February 4, 1778,
The ministry also expected Lord Richard Howe to return
home with his brother.

In a February 4 dispatch to General

Howe, George Germain ordered Sir Henry Clinton to succeed
General Howe as Commander-in-Chief.

Due to

William Howe's

resignation, Clinton was to serve on the British commission
to America. 46
The ministry appointed General Clinton as Commanderin-Chief for several reasons.

Having resided in the

colonies since 1775, Clinton could provide the remaining
commissioners with information on important colonials.
45sir John Barrow, ~ Life of Richard, Earl Howe,
K. G., Admiral of the Fleet, and General o:t Marines (London:
John Murray, AloeriiiSrle street,1838), pp:- 1o2-o3.
46the King to Lord North, February 18, 1778,
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2195;
Willcox, Portrait .2E_ !! General, PP• 'Z'mr and 222.
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His dislike of ruthless tactics, moreover, made him more
acceptable to the .Americans.

He supported the purpose of

the conciliatory mission and advocated an end to the
conflict.

To the ministry Clinton seemed the only general

in the colonies with an untainted reputation.

Sir Guy

Carleton was still remembered by the ministry for the
failure of his New York invasion of 1776.

General John

Burgoyne, moreover, was still being held by the colonials.
Clinton's only

other immediate opposition was General

Charles Cornwallis on leave in England at the time.

Since

Cornwallis had been out maneuvered by Washington at Trenton
January 3, 1777, the ministry was unwilling to grant
Cornwallis full commana. 47
With arrival of the ministry's dispatch of February
4, Clinton assumed command on April 24, 1778.

On May 8,

he arrived in Philadelphia and took direct charge of the
British army.

On May 25, 1778, Sir William Howe sailed

for England, leaving his brother who had decided to remain
in the colonies until September.

Unwilling to negotiate

with Congresst however, Lord Richard Howe proved of little

47William B. Willcox (ed.), The American Rebellion,
.§..!.£ Henry Clinton's Narrative ££ His Campaign, 1775-1782,
~ !!!! Appendix of Original Documents (New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1954), pp. xlvi-xlvii,
xvi, and xxvii; Willcox, Protrait of a General, PP• 113
and 207.
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assistance during the conciliatory negotiations.

In

Harch, he received his replacement, Admiral James Gambier.
Unable to cormnand effectively at home, Gambier had been
sent to America to become fleet commander and port admiral
of New York. 48
Even before the remaining cormnissioners had left
England, the resigning of the Howes verified the suspicions
of some American leaders.

The English high command had

become disheartened at the possibility of failure of
conciliatory talks.

The loss of the brothers' support

lessened the bargaining power of the envoys from England,
for they knew, as well as any Britisher, the sentiments
of the colonials.

In selecting the remaining personnel, William Eden
believed that emissaries should possess certain qualif 1cations.

All should be members of Parliament.

The

commission should include a lawyer, a member of the
moderate Opposition, and an individual from Scotland.

If

no one else proved better suited for the position, Eden
agreed to join the commission himself.

John Hatsell, clerk

of the House of Commons, also mentioned prerequisites for

cor.IIllission members.

They must be men of character "in

48Barrow, Life of Richard, Earl Howe, PP• 102-03
and 116; Willcox, P"Ortrait of !!: Genera1-;p; 229.
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whom the People of both Countries may conf ide--Men that

have taken no decided part against the Americans."

His

list of proposed members included John Cavendish, William
Johnstone, George Grenville, and kichard Jackson. 4 9
On February 22, 1778, Frederick Howard, Earl
Carlisle, accepted his place upon the commission. 50

of
Even

though he was not quite thirty years of age and possessed
little political experience, his unblemished character and
ambitious nature impressed Eden.

Eden believed that Lord

Carlisle's practical manner would also prove useful.51
Carlisle was also a close friend of Charles James Fox, an
advocate of an independent

America.

His friendship with

Fox would hopefully make h~m acceptable to the colonials. 52
Eden also wasted little time contacting another
prospect, Richard Jackson.

Even though Eden and Jackson

differed on the authority granted the envoys, Eden regarded

49william Eden Minutes concerning choice of
commissioners, February 23, 1778 and John Hatsell Minutes
concerning choice of commissioners, February 23, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 374 and 375. William Eden's
Memoranda, February 17 to Narch 31, 1778, Historical
Manuscripts Commission, The Nanuscripts of the Earl of
Carlisle, Preserved ~ Castle Howard, Fi!teenth Report,
Appendix, Part VI (London: Her Iviajesty•s Stationery Office,
1897), p. 322. Hereafter cited as Carlisle MSS.
50rbid., p. 322.
51Brown, Empire £!': Independence, pp. 235 and 248-49.
52willcox, Portrait of .! General, P• 221.
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Jackson's membership an asset to the mission •. Jackson,
the solicitor to the Board of Trade, asserted that the emissaries• authorities should be specific; Mr. Eden favored a
concept of broad powers. 53
William Eden, who always claimed that he did not
covet a place on the peace mission, agreed nevertheless
on March 5 to serve as the final member. 54 Being one of
the architects of the conciliatory plan, the ministry
believed William Eden, only in his mid-thirties, would
benefit the commission with his more thorough knowledge of
the proposition. 55 As an under-secretary of state and
then Lord of Trade, Eden outwardly had supported the war
effort. 56 But he was as ambitious as Carlisle, and he
continuously sought avenues of advancement within the
ministry. 57 The peace commission was another such
opportunity.
Throughout March, connnission members expressed
53Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 263.
54william Eden Memoranda, February 17 to March 31,
1778, Carlisle MSS, P• 322.
55Namier and Brooke, History of Parliament, III,
375-76.
56nrown, Empire .2E Jndependence, P• 246.
57william Eden to Morton Eden (brother), March 6,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 390.
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confidence in each other and in the North Conciliatory Act
of 1778 in order to bolster the waning spirit of the
British.

William Eden considered Carlisle a man "well

disposed and very practicable. '1

Eden claimed that Jackson

was a "man of uncommon abilities • • • of great Fortitude,
and well beloved in the colonies."

Frederick Howard

expressed his feelings for the mission by proclaiming that
such an endeavor was the best means of ending the terrible
conflict.

He sincerely hoped that his youthfulness was not
a hindrance to his fellow negotiators. 58
During the remaining days of preparation, encouragement from numerous friends of the envoys continued.

With

Eden on the commission, for instance, Sir Joseph Yorke
predicted that

~Jnerica

with "open arms. 059

would certainly receive the members

This was perhaps an objective state-

ment, for during his service in Commons, Joseph Yorke had
remained aloof from all discussions of the peace offer. 60
Yet Mr. Yorke's objectivity perhaps led to an early
58 carlisle to Rev. Ekin, October, 1778, Carlisle
£12§., P• 377.
.
59 Bishop Landraff to William Eden, March 8, 1178
and Sir Joseph Yorke to William Eden, March 13, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 397 and 401.
60Yorke condoned no single faction within Commons;
he had no support for Rockingham and cared little for North.
Namier and Brooke, History £!. Parliament, III, 680.
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but false over optimism.

In reality, the peace endeavor

seemed doomed from the beginning.

On the evening of Harch

29, for example, Eden's conversation with Jackson tended
to establish the impression that the latter desired to
release himself from the Carlisle Conun.ission.

Jackson

also claimed that "it was idle and ruinous to go to war
with France • • • , that we should proceed immediately to
give Independence to the

Colonies.TT

Writing to North on

:t-iarch 30, Eden related the episode of the previous night.
:Mr. Jackson's connnents had convinced Eden that the fonner
intended to decline the forthcoming task.

Jackson, besides,

had maintained that he needed a month in order to discharge
his obligations~ 61
Carlisle, like Eden, therefore, was relieved to
ascertain Jackson's true feelings on the American situation
prior to th2 connnissioners' departure.

Such a person,

Carlisle believed, "would have driven us made with doubts
before we had got to Portsmouth.TT

Mr.

Jackson's short

tenure upon the Carlisle Commission thus came to an abrupt
end prior to actual negotiations.

62

6lwilliam Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, March 30,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, Nos. 411 and 412.
62carlisle to Kev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle
~' P• 378.
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Two weeks before the envoys were to leave for the
colonies, therefore, a third member to the Peace Commission
had to be found.
successor to

North claimed that the most likely

Jackson

WQS

Geor.ge Johnstone, the former

governor of West Florida.

As governor for several years

after 1763, he had had the opportunity to discover attitudes
of key individuals in the colonies. 63 He proved to be the
only civilian commissioner with firsthand experience in
dealing with the colonials.

The ministry also believed

that his continuous advocacy of American rights would be
an asset. 64
Johnstone, Eden, and Carlisle commonly endorsed
reconciliation as the only possible means of thwarting
military defeat.

But their genuine enthusiasm for a

termination of the strife failed to overcome their lack
of experience in the field of diplomacy.

They

were

largely chosen because no one else desired the difficult
task.

No English diplomat seemed willing to jeopardize

his reputation by presenting the colonials a plan which
failed to acknowledge America's demand for independence.

63King George to Lord North, March 3, 1778,
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2201.
64s. E. Morison (ed.), Sources and Documents
illustratinf the American Revolution li"6'4-1788 and the
Formation o the Federal Constitution--rGXford, ~ngland:
Clarendon Press, 1929), pp. 186-87.
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The offers to end taxation, to repeal all acts passed since
1763, to pardon those who renounced independence, and to
renew connnercial ties were drafted too late to achieve any
diplomatic settlement.

Only n desperate war-weary

ministry was willing to of fer reconciliation to America
in 1778.

CHAPTER

III

THE RESPONSE IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE, FROM MARCH
TO MAY, TO BRITAIN'S CONCILIATORY EFFORTS
Even though Lord North's Conciliatory Plan had
gained acceptance of Parliament, criticisms of the
proposal continued during the spring of 1778.

The British

commissioners expected condemnations from the French and
the colonial diplomats--Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane,
and Arthur Lee.

During the commissioners' preparations

for their voyage to .America on April 16, a lack of cohesion
within the ministry became apparent.

Lord Carlisle,

William Eden, and George Johnstone were soon to realize
that the ministry was also untrustworthy.

Even before the

commissioners had embarked for the colonies, their chance
for success had decreased with the disunity so prevalent
within the British ministry.
This lack of cohesion and trust within the.ministry
came to the fore again during March.

Ordered by George III,

52

George Germain, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs,
sent instructions to Sir Henry Clinton in America on
March Bt

These directives to the newly appointed commander

of British armies in America ordered continuation of
attacks within the

colonies~

William Eden on March 5

asked to see the instructions to Clinton, realizing that
strong military forces in America had important bearing
on the fate of any peace overtures. 1 Eden thus was glad
that the orders upheld the policy of maintaining the
offensive against the colonials~ 2
The monarch's instructions to Clinton, on March
21, 1778, proved Eden's hopes false.

Clinton was to abandon
Philadelphia and "to proceed with the whole to New York .. " 3
If New York became threatened or if the Carlisle Commission
failed,

the British garrison was to sail to Halifax, Nova
Scotia and to remain until a new strategy developedc 4
The reason for this change in policy was due to the
1Alan s. Brown, "The British Peace Offer of 1778:
A Study in Ministerial Confusion," Papers of the Michigan
Academy .2! Science, Arts, and Letters, XL U9m, 254.
2George Germain to General Henry Clinton, March 8,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1062.
3Proprietors of Estates of North Carolina to King
George, March 16, 1778, ~., No. 1066.
4william B. Willcox, "British Strategy in America,
1778," The Journal££, Modern History, XIX, 2 (June, 1947),
105.
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official announcement of the Franco-American treaties on
March 13.

The British considered it necessary to concentrate

their forces in order to thwart the French menace.

Five

thousand English troops were to be sent to the West Indies
to attack French held St. Lucia. 5 Three thousand more were
to be stationed at St. Augustine and Pensacola in the
Floridas. 6
Lord North knew of this policy change but failed
to inform the commissioners.

In a letter written March 13,

the monarch reiterated to the Lord Treasurer that it was a
"joke to think of keeping Pennsylvania."

To maintain

military security, the commission members were not trusted
with this information.

The failure to confide with the

envoys demonstrated the lack of cooperation and trust
within the government. 7
Lord North received much of the blame for this
inability to establish and maintain cohesion within the
government.

The over-all mistakes of the ministry

lessened

North's efficiency in handling his diplomatic responsibilities.a

The Opposition, led by Charles Fox, for

5willcox~ American Rebellion, P• 86.
6willcox, "British Strategy," P• 105.
7King George to Lord North, March 13, 1778, Fortescue,
Correspondence Bf. George III, IV, No. 2243.
8Brown, "British Peace Offer," P• 259.
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example, blamed North personally for the British failings
in foreign policy.

Mr. Fox claimed that the Lord Treasurer

was reluctant to provide the Peace Commission with the
power to grant independence.

Fox ridiculed the ministry

for believing that American domination of the maritime
world was inevitable.

America's potential resided in

cultivation of her vast territory.

Agriculture, so Fox

claimed, was the prime consideration of the .Americans,
with commerce and manufacturing a distant second.
Rockingham, Richmond, and Fox maintained that the reconciliation plan was totally inadequate. 9
Like the Opposition spokesmen, Israel Mauduit
proclaimed that the only way England was to regain Amari.ca' s
support was to grant the colonials their freedom.

Mauduit

wrote his handbill after learning of the Franco-American
Treaty of Alliance.

In this handbill dated March, 1778,

Mauduit maintained that a free .America might prevent an
Anglo-French clash.

If England continued to enforce her

will over the colonials, the latter might have to turn to
France for aid.

He ascertained that any remaining hope of

conquest by England was past. "America stands on high
9J. Wright (ed.), The Speeches~ the Right
Honourable Charles James Fox, in the House of Commons
{London: Longman, Hurst, Reis,oriiie; and Brawn, 1815),
I, 123-125.
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ground; France and England must now court her. n

The

colonies will never return "while we are striving with
them, so that the only chance we have of recovering some,
is to give up them a11 .. n 10
In this handbill Maurluit clearly reiterated British
fears of a European conflict.

The Duke of Richmond

attempted in Parliament at the same time to prevent this
possible turn of events.

Realizing that the French threat

was of more substance than any American menace, Richmond
on March 22 moved that Britain r.emove her forces from the
colonies as a preliminary to peace and eventual independence .11
The Opposition, however, attracted little support
on this motion.

The majority of the ministry were reluctant

to provide the colonies with their freedom.
deemed it more valuable to coax the

The ministry

colonials into the

realization that the French were more of a threat to their

lOisrael Mauduit was a pensioned writer for the
British goverrunent. On this occasion, however, he was
expressing his own sentiments, much to the chagrin of the
English ministry. Israel Mauduit, ~ Hand bill advocating
American Independence, inspiTed ~ the EngIISil Ministry and
written and published at London in Harch, 1778; Paul
Leicester Ford (ed.), "{Brooklyn,~ew York:-i:iIStorical
Printing Club, 1890), PP• 14-19.
11 aeorge Thomas, Earl of Albermarle, Memoirs .Q.f The
Marquis of Rockingham~ His Co:ntemporaries; With Original
Letters and Documents now First Published (London: Richard
Bentley,-i:852), II, 34Y:-
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safety than the British. 12

Under the terms of the concil-

iatory pl'"Oposal, the British envoys to America were
instructed to present the French as a designing people,
interested only in French advancement. 13
Constant and heated debate between the Opposition
and the ministry did nothing to aid the difficult tasks
of the Carlisle Commission.

Meetings of Fox, Eden, and

the Earl of Shelburne dl!ring March, therefore, discussed
14 D i
th e necess ity of a new mi nistry.
.
ur ng Marc h 1 Lord
North himself in a letter to George III also claimed that
the situation required "new men and able men.n

He

considered himself '1highly criminal" if he permitted his
interests to stand in the way of any means of rescuing
11

his King and country from the present impending ruin.n 15
The possibility of North's resignation provided an

opportunity for William Pitt, Lord Chatham, to beco~e Lord
Treasurer. 16 King George opposed a Chatham dominated
12navid Ramsay, A Risto~ of the American Revolution
(London: Printed for Jolin StocCiali,9l/93), II, 69 and 75.
l 3 van Doren, Secret History, P• 94.
l4nates of the meetings were March 15, 17, and 18.
Russell, 'Memorials and Correspondence of Fox, I, 180-81, 184
and 186.
l5Lord North to King George, March 17, 1778, Fortescue,
Correspondence of George .!!!.' IV, No. 2228.
l6w. Baring Pemberton, Lord North (London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1938), P• 2~
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ministry, believing him too independent-minded to be
manipula~ed.

But King George favored the inclusion of

Pitt an<l his followers as North's colleagues in the
ministry.

Unlike Fox, who accepted a post within the min-

istry, Chatham nevertheless refused to assume a minor
position.

Such qualified reessurance of support by George

III prompted North to remain in off ice and reaffirmed his
leadership. 17
With the ministerial situation thus settled for the
moment, Britain's reconciliation plan began to receive
criticism from American envoys in
American

~ranee.

Writing to the

Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 28, 1778,

the colonial envoys maintained that the sole purpose of the
peace offer was to divide and subjugate America.
that any British offer, if received at all,
condemned and dismissed by America. 18
England's endeavor to locate a

They urged

should be

middle ground for

negotiations with Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and
Arthur Lee verified America's demand for a comprehensive
proposal.

David Hartley, a political opponent of North,

corresponded unsuccessfully with Franklin throughout

~

17Mahon, History of England, VI, 224-25; Pemberton,
North, p. 281.
18wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 507-08.
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February and March, failing to ascertain the cost of
reconciliation.

~ranklin's

responses remained pessimistic

or noncommital. 19 As early as February 12, 1778, for
example, Franklin maintained that "when your Nation is
hiring all the Cut-Throats it can collect of all Countries
and Colours, to dest:roy us, 1.t is hard to persuade us not
to ask or accept of aid from any Power.n 20
Mr. Hartley was not alone in his desire to di.$uade
such American efforts for freedom.

Even though Franklin

continued rebuking British overtures, the French Anglophiles
were not discouraged.

These pro-British propagandists

claimed that once America gained its liberty the colonies
would eventually dominate the Western Hemisphere.

These

Frenchmen upheld England's views on freedom of speech)
religion, petition, press, and assembly.

The only

advantage of an independent America, so the Anglophiles
believed, was increased trade and commerce.

Louis XVI

was irritated by these men for supporting British

19George Herbert Guttridge, "David Hartleys- M. P.:
an Advocate
Conciliation 1774-1783," University of
California Publiat:ions in Hi~tory, XIV, 3 (October,""1926),

of

280-81.

~

20Franklin to David Hartley, February 12, 1778,
Albert Henry Smyth (ed.), The Writings££ Benjamin Franklin
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1906), VII, 101-02.
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policy. 21
Nothing that Hartley or the Anglophiles stated,
however, diverted either the French government or the
.American envoys from joining together in favor of an
alliance.

On March 5, 1778, the British ambassador to

France, Lord Stormont, related to Lord Weymouth, Secretary
of State for the Southern Department, that the Treaty of
Alliance was a reality.

Yet Weymouth refused to heed such

assertions at first. 22
On March 12, the French ambassador to England,
Noailles, presented copies of the Treaties of Alliance and
Commerce to Lord Weymouth.

These treaties clearly widened

the breach already existing between England and France.
The alliance which England had feared discouraged the
possibility of a successful English offer of peace.
2 1Among the different factions within the Anglophiles

were the philosophes. Led by Voltaire, they advocated
destruction of privileged minority, civil liberty, and
religious toleration. Another faction, the frondeur of
legal aristocracy, was interested in more power for their
own class. This group, however, had also supported popular
causes like ~educed taxation. Frances Acomb, Anglophobia
in France 1763-1789, An Essay in the Historx of Constitutionalism
and NaturaTISm (Durham, North CarOirna: nuke University Press,
I'9"50), pp. 3, 12-13, 15, and 76-77.
22navid Murray, Lord Stormont, was a shrewd Englishmen
in diplomatic affairs. During Count Vergennes' Secret
dealings with the American envoys in 1776-77, Stormont was
to prove "a thorn in the fleshn to Vergennes because of the
ambassador's inquires into the legality of such negotiations.
Perkins, France in the Revolution, PP• 49 and 541. Hansard,
Parliamentary HiSEorY> XX, 29.
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British agents in the colonies were to find it extremely
difficult to present a plan more beneficial to the colonies
than the French agreements.

With the official presentation

of the Franco-American agreement, diplomatic:relations were
As Lord Stonnont left Paris on March 16, Ambassador
Noailles paid his final resp~cts to the British court. 23
severed.

Although knowledge of the French-American compact
did not

d~ter

Hartley fr.om remaining in Passy during April,

the treaties jeopardized his chance for successf11l discussions.

Hartley's sojourn in France during April did lead

to a discussion with Count

Vergenn~s,

but Ver.gennes claimed

that France was conunitted to aid America regardless of
England's position.
defend her ally.

France would gladly take up anns to

Even if England agreed to end hostilities

and grant America independence, France would remain a
faithful ally of the Americans. 24
During Hartley's sojourn in Passy, the British
ministry dispatched William Pulteney to France to ascertain
if discussions with Franklin were still useless. 25 He

23corwin, French Policy, PP• 166-68.
24Guttridge, nnavid Hartley, M. P.," XIV, 282, and

287.
2 5Pulteney, a pamphleteer and a Whig in Parliament,
was a brother of George Johnstone, despite the discrepancies
in the last name. Van Doren, Secret History, P• 70;
Bancroft, History of United States, V, 192.

61

received an even more discouraging greeting from Franklin
26
than had Hartley.
Franklin stipulated that the British
conciliatory measure was totally unacceptable to his
countrymen.

Any proposition which implied, as did the

North plan, a dependent, colonial status was completely
unsatisfactory. 27 Their second meeting, March 29, was
also futile.

On March 30, Franklin wrote to Vergennes

that

since Parliament obviously believed in its power to
28
coerce America, peace was unattainable.
The various factions of the Opposition indirectly
countenanced these claims by Franklin in continuing their
condemnations of the North proposal.

Such discord within

the English ministry intensified confidence in Europe and
England for the American cause.

Chatham's endeavor to

undermine North's proposal actually enhanced the work of
the "militia diplomats" in France.

The Earl of Chatham

remained hostile to all deliberations which mentioned
independence. 29 Another faction of the Opposition, led
by the Duke of Richmond, Charles Lennox, favored the
26 smyth, Writings

.2.£

Franklin, VII, 124.

27Pitkin, Political !B5! Civil History, II, 47-48.
28smyth, Writings

.2.!:

29Bancroft, History

Franklin, VII, 43-46.

.2£

United States, V, 253.
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American viewpoint.

On April 7, when Richmond recommended

before Parliament full liberties for the colonies, Chatham
ridiculed him for such an assertion.30 Richmond then
prepared to lay before Parliament another proposal.

His

next bill, supported by David Hartley in Paris, urged only
the removal of British troops from America.

The bill, too,

generated little support.31
One faction of the Opposition, led by Richmond and
Charles James Fox, therefore, had advocated independence
for the colonies during the debates on the North plan in
Parliament.

Their views, however, did not coincide with

either Chatham's faction of the Opposition or the Tories
in Parliament.

With a majority in Parliament unwilling to

condone independence, Richmond's efforts in that direction
became useless.

Chatham's speech on April 7 before the

House of Lords finally terminated discussion for independence.

The revered Mr. Pitt rebuked all who upheld

American freedom at the cost of British honor.
the idea of a French invasion of England.

He scorned

To fight rather

than to retire and lose all of one's honor was Pitt's credo.

30Paul Allen, A History of the American Revolution;
Comprehending all the Principal""Events Both .!!! the Field
and in the Cabiiiit (Baltimore: William Wooddy, Jr. printer,
Ilf2'2), II, 170.
31Bancroft, History .2£ United States, V, 253.
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Richmond countered that it was best to avoid a war in
which America's allies were France and Spain.

Due to his

feebleness and ill health, Chatham was unable to respond.
He died soon after, a somewhat disillusioned advocate of
a closely regulated British colonial system. 32
These parliamentary meetings and Paris discussions
did nothing to thwart Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone in
their final preparations.

During this period of debate,

Carlisle at first remained home with a fever.

This pre-

vented his gathering information which would have proven
invaluable in the weeks to come.

But his greatest

unanswered question had been raised by the shift, unknown:
to him, in military strategy.

The ministry, as previously

noted, had ordered General Clinton to evacuate Philadelphia. 33
The commissioners wondered why they were to sail to New
York rather than to British controlled Philadelphia.

In

early April Carlisle inquired of George Germain, who
knew of the evacuation of Philadelphia, why the negotiators
were not to be sent there.

His only answer was that the

Pennsylvania city, which was nearer York, might "not by
.
34
your arrival be in our hands."
32Bancroft, History £.£United States, V, 254.
33supra, pp. 52-53.
34carlisle, MSS, p. 379.
Pennsylvania.

-

Congress met then at York,
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Even if Carlisle had discovered the ministry's
secret, he probably could not have persuaded North and
Germain to allow Clinton to remain in Philadelphia.

The

French menace in the Carribean had forced the ministry to
lessen its forces in America.

The ministry seemed willing

to save the British West Indies at the expense of its
conciliatory commission.

Eden, however, believed a strong

show of force by the British forces in America would
hasten negotiations for peace and thus alleviate the
necessity for troops in the Carribean.

Eden believed if

British forces retained Philadelphia then the conunission
could threaten destruction of the city in case their offers
were not accepted.

By evacUllting the city and not informing

the commissioners, the ministry was acknowledging the
futility of the mission.

These events continued to under-

mine what little hope existed for any successful conclusion
to the mission--even before its departure. 35
While Carlisle thus remained incapacitated, William
Eden appealed to the Treasury for
expenses of the mission.

t

6,225 to

offset the

Included within the list were

funds for obtaining wines, clothes, furniture, carriages,
and servants.

He asked for another t 400 per quarter as

an allowance for the envoys.

On April 10, John Robinson,

35van Doren, Secret HistoEt, p. 90; William Eden
Minute written on news of evacua on of Philadelphia, June
5, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 496.
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Secretary of the Treasuxy,

supplied Eden with t 2,000

of the t 6,000 he demanded.
Eden resumed his preparations by obtaining valuable
information designed to distinguish between American
supporters and adversaries. · Rev. John Vardill furnished
character sketches of several prominent gentlemen in
America. 36 Rev. Vardill, formerly of New York, spied upon
Americans in London on the promise from Eden that he would
be "regius professor of divinity" at King's College as soon
as the American rebellion subsided. 3 7 He considered
Governor Tryon of New York a man of integrity and a loyal
British subject.

Tryon's vainess, however, allowed him

to be duped by nevery flattering Imposter."

Joseph Gallowa:v

a Loyalist, was too useful to be neglected, even though his
hot temper was a disadvantage.

John Jay was difficult to

convince on any subject unless he held similar views.

One

of the more violent advocates for independence was Governor
William Livingston of New Jersey. 38

The minister closed

his remarks on a dubious note; there was not much hope of
success, he believed, unless England received the support

36w1111am Eden Proposal on Salary and Allowances to
Commissioners, April, 1778 and William Eden to Morton Eden,
April 9, 1778, Ibid., Nos. 421 and 432.
37Bancroft, History; .2£. United States, V, 61.
38Rev. John Vardill to William Eden, April 11, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 438.
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of Benjamin Franklin.39
In a similar vein Paul Wentworth, the British
agent, presented his list of the traits of several other
Americans to William Eden.

He claimed that John and

Samuel Adams were advocates £or complete independence.
Samuel was a polished negotiator, while John was cautious
and diligent.

Both Patrick Henry and Gouverneur Horris

were shrewd and enterprising politicians according to
Wentworth. 4o
On April 12, George III formally instructed his
emissaries, in a secret dispatch, to lay before the
Americans a copy of the Commission.

King George considered

that this item verified the sincerity of the English for
a reconciliation.

The commissioners were to announce an

end to taxation and a suspension of all acts since 1763. 41
The most unusual portion of this proclamation involved the
mission's dealings with Congress.

All discussions would

39Howard Swiggett, The Extraordina~ Nr. Morris
(New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., l 2);' p. 56.
4 0Paul ·wentworth, Minutes, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, V, No. 487.
4lareat Britain. Collection of papers, that have
been published at different times, reiations to the ~
proceedings of his majesty's commissioners,~.,~.,
etc. (New YorkT"James Rivington, 1778), George III
'IiiStructions to Commissioners, April 12, 1778, Evans
Bibliography, 15825, 20.
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be before representatives of Congress, and it would be
acknowledged as a legal, political entity by the British. 42
The monarch stipulated that the agents were not to make
any public appeal to the inhabitants of America unless
they failed in talks with Congress. 43
These instructions from George III granted the
same basic concessions promised the colonies in the North
plan.

The purpose of the royal statement was to furnish

the agents with certain key items which George III deemed
of singular importance.

His proclamation increased the

respectability and authority of the Carlisle Connnission.
According to the royal directive, no British forces were
to remain in America unless the colonies agreed.

No

change was to occur within any colonial charter without
the consent of the colonial assemblies.

England and

America were to handle the debt problem jointly.

Colonial

officials were to be chosen, if at all possible, from the
colonies.

The ministry would allow Congress to exist as

long as it did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of
Parliament.

44

If Congress aided the colonies in a

11

better

42 Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 268.
43

George III Instructions to Connnissioners, April
12, 1778, Carlisle !1.§.§., pp. 323-24.
4 4 Great Britain, Collection, George III Instructions
to Commissiofiers, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
20; Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 269.
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Management of the general Concern and Interests" of all,
then it was practical and acceptable. 45 If America agreed
to disband its legislature, however, the.colonies still
might be represented within the House of Conmions.46
King George's instructions also stated that
Parliament had been granted the right to abolish direct
taxation of the colonies.

The British assembly, however,

regarded it as only right that the colonials contribute
to the "Public Charge."

The royal statement stipulated

that these funds would come from truces on connnerce.

The

revenue would eventually be returned to the local colonial
governments and used for internal improvements.

The

Americans were to use British coinage in making their
payments to England.

Parliament nevertheless rejected the
idea of colonial coinage of money. 4 7
King George concluded his instructions with the

following statement:

If there should be a reasonable Prospect of bringing
the Treaty to a happy Conclusion, you commissioners
are not to lose so desirable an End, by breaking off
45 aeorge III Instructions to Commissioners, April
12, 1778, Carlisle£!§§., p. 331.
46Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 269.
47aeorge III Declaration to Commissioners, April
12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, pp. 326 and 332; Morison, Sources
and Documents, p. 2'02:°
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the Negotiation on the Adverse Party absolutely
insisting on some point which your own Judgement and
Discretion, you should be disposed, not to give up or
yield to, provided the same be short of open and
avowed Independence (except such Independence as
relates only to the Purpose of a Treaty). But in
such a Case you will suspend coming to any final
Resolution till
shall have received our further
Orders thereupon.

YZH

The proclamation clearly required the commissioners to
forward the issue of independence to Parliament.

The

envoys lacked authority to discuss this difference between
England and the colonies. 49
During the spring of 1778, therefore, numerous
people in England and France had expressed opinions as to
the usefulness of the North Conciliatory Plan.

Information

supplied by Paul Wentworth and John Vardill proved valuable
to the mission.

Much of the time, however, the mission was

confronted with criticism from Lord Chatham, the Duke of
Richmond, and Charles James Fox and with disunity-and
distrust in the ministry.

Such lack of unified purpose in

the ministry had provided the colonials with substantial
ammunition for attacks upon the Peace Commission, attacks
which came as America prepared to receive the conciliatory
offer.
48 ceorge III Instructions to Commissioners, April
12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, p. 333; Morison, Sources and
Documents, p. 203. Author's brackets.
49Ritcheson, British Politics, p. 270. The complete
instructions of King George III will be found in Appendix A.

CHAPTER IV
Al--iERICA PREPA.'IU:S FOR THE RECEPTION OF THE

CARLISLE COMMISSION, MARCH TO JUNE 1778
With the arrival of the Franco-American treaties
and copies of the North proposal in April, American
Loyalists faced anti-British forces in the greatest
confrontation yet.

1

Loyalist and anti-British propagan-

dists had constantly ridiculed each others beliefs.

As

early as June, 1776, for example, anti-British colonials
had demanded that Congress designate persons who supported
the British cause as traitors.

In November, 1777,

Congress, following colonial advice, advocated the
confiscation of Loyalist property. 2 Such hostility and
lThe pro-British Americans called themselves
Loyalists because of their support for England. The
Loyalists• enemies called them Tories, after their English
counterparts·-Lord North and his colleagues, Callahan,
Royal Raiders, p. 35. The term, Loyalist, however, will
be used herein to differentiate pro-British Americans
from the Tory group in England.
2Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, pp. 676-77.
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contempt, therefore, had existed between the American
factions for years prior to

the spring of 1778.

The revolutionary propagandist, Thomas Paine, summed
up completely the colonials' sentiments toward their
Loyalist foes.

Paine, in his pamphlets, criticized all

individuals who hindered the colonial drive for independence.
He claimed for .Americans the ability to surmount "a greater
variety and combination of difficulties" than any other
people during a comparable crisis.

Any Loyalist attempt

to block America's continued progress toward self-government retarded the individual's right of personal freedom.
Furthermore, without America's presence and toil there
would be "no such thing as freedom left throughout the
whole universe."3
The dispatches from France and England added to the
propagandists' material.

With documented material from

France and England the American propagandists' arguments
became more authoritative.

Loyalists and anti-British

colonials, who had readied their forces for weeks, struck
fast and hard.

Denunciations and critic isms from both·.

sides followed the arrival of the French and English

3The Political Writings of Thomas Paine, Secretary;

!£ the Committee of Foreign Afriirs !'!! die American

RevOIUtion (Charlestown, Massachusetts: Printed and
Published by George Davidson, 1842), I, 149. Hereafter
cited as Political Writings ~ Paine.
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documents.
The arrival of the British vessel Andromeda in New
York City on April 14 increased the Loyalists expectations.
The Andromeda had left England on February 20 with copies
of Lord North's Conciliatory Plan.

Loyalist Governor

William Tryon of New York was to publish the copies of
the North plan and distribute them throughout the colonies.
The Loyalists now believed they had specific points to
propose to Congress.

However, the arrival of Simeon Deane,

Silas Deane•s brother, aboard the Sensible with the FrancoAmerican Treaties of Alliance and Commerce and Amity
diminished the Loyalists' enthusiasm.

The French vessel

Sensible, having arrived off the .American continent on
April 13, had to sail further up the coast to Falmouth for
fear of capture by the British naval vessels.

Two weeks

after Governor Tryon had received copies of the North
plan, Simeon Deane, traveling overland, reached New York
City on May 2 on his way to York, Pennsylvania. 4
Under orders from the British ministry, Governor
Tryon sent copies of North's proposal to General Washington
and to the governors of the colonies. 5 In a propaganda

4Nathan R. Einhorn, "The Reception of The British
Peace Offer of 1778," Pennsylvania History, XVI, 3 (July,
1949), 192.
5Pitkin, Political ~ Civil History, II, 41.
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article of April 15, Tryon claimed that the war troubled
King George III.

Tryon believed that the colonials who

had caused the war must realize that America's only hope
was to reclaim allegiance to England.
conflict and to ignore

To continue the

Britain's offer for reconciliation

would only lead to more suffering and destruction.6

In a

letter to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut on April 17,
William Tryon requested that the former recommend that his
people read the material sent from England. 7
Six days later, Tryon received a harsh rebuttal
from Governor Trumbull.

The latter claimed that peace

must be negotiated between the supreme authorities in a
dispute and not by unauthorized persons. 8
only body in the colonies with such power.

Congress was the
This latest

peace attempt by the British, according to Trumbull, bore
"marks of an insidious design to disunite the people, and
6The New York Gazette and the Weekly Nercury, April
27, 1778-;- 7

H. Niles (ed.), Principles and Acts of the Revolution
in America: .£?.!:, !!! Attempt to Collectand Preserve some of
tEie Skeeches, Orations, and-Proceedings, with sketcnes-arur
Reiiiar s .2!! ~ and Things;-ana Other Fuait!Ve .2! Neglected'
Pieces, Belonging to the ReVOiutionary Period in the United
States; which, Hapj?Ily, Terminated in the EstaOiisnment of
their Liberties: with a View to Represent the Feelings tnat
Prevailed in the Wfiiiies Tra Tried Men SouIS;n to Exci tea
Love of FreedOiil," and Leacrtlle Peotleto Vigilance, as theCondition on WEiicllTt--rs-Granted Baltimore: Printecr-and
Published oy Williall10gden Niles, 1822), p. 210.
8:!',h! Boston Gazette .!ill! Country Journal, May 4, 1778.
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to lull us into a state of quietude, and negligence of the
necessary preparations for the approaching campaign." 9
Like Trumbull, the American military commander in
Rhode Island, Major John Sullivan, received copies of
Lord North's plan to be distributed to the inhabitants.
He explained that if the proposal had been offered prior
to the war or even prior to America's alliance with France
it would have been accepted with "sentiments of gratitude."

10

The late arrival of the conciliatory proposal plus the
cruelties inflicted by Britain clearly limited the chances
of a settlement.
John Henry, Jr., Samuel Chase, and Charles Carroll
expressed similar resentments.

On April 20, Maryland

congressional delegate Chase wrote to Maryland Governor
Thomas Johnson, Jr. concerning General Howe's transmittal
of several copies of "a Draught of a Bill to declare the
Intentions of Parliament" to officials in the colonies.
One opinion prevailed as to the purpose of these pamphlets
from William. Howe.

Chase believed that the majority of

delegates to the Continental Congress considered the
9Niles, Principles and ~ of Revolution, P• 211.

lOJared Sparks (ed.), Correseondence -2£ the American
Revolution; being Letters of Eminent Men to George Washington,
from the Time ££. his TakinSCommand ~ the Army ~ the !f!!2.
orllis PresICrenc~---rBoston: Little, Brown, and Company,
185"!); II, 114-l •
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intention of the English to "amuse us with a Prospect of
Peace and to relax our Preparations."

These gentlemen and

their countrymen, however, had "too much good sense to be
deceived."

Governor Johnson received further information

on April 20 from John Henry, Jr., congressional delegate
from Maryland.

The latter suggested to the governor of

Maryland that the North plan be read in the Maryland
assembly.

Hr. Henry feared that once the British offers

became law the effect would be equal to ten thousand fresh
British troops. 11 Along with delegates Chase and Henry,
Charles Carroll of Maryland warned Johnson about publishing
12
such inflannnatory prose.
Further consternation involving the English propositions was discernible from General Washington's correspondence.

As soon as he received copies of the North

Conciliatory Plan in April, he forwarded the copies to the
Congress at York, Pennsylvania on April 18.

In his accom-

panying letter to Henry Laurens, the connnander claimed that
the measures were
llEdnrund c. Burnett (ed.), Letters of Members of
the Continental Congress (Washington,D. c.:-Published-Oy
The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926), III, 178-80.
12Philip G. Davidson, TTWhig Propagandists of the
American Revolution,tt The .American Historical Review,
XXXIX, 3 (April, 1934), 448.
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founded in principles of the most wicked, diabolical
baseness, meant to poison the minds of the people and
detach the wavering, at least, from our cause. I
would submit it, • • • in all parts, and to expose,
in the most striking maneuver, the injustice,
delusion and fraud it contains.
In a private letter to John Banister, delegate from Virginia,
Washington regretfully admitted that the copy of the North
plan

he had received from General Howe was authentically
British. 13 Henry Laurens, President of the Second
Continental Congress, disagreed with Washington, believing
rather that the proposal had originated among Loyalists in
Philadelphia.

The South Carolinian Laurens claimed that

a legitimate peace offer from England would have included
14
the offer of independence.
Laurens and Washington commonly feared, however,
that the measures were designed to enlarge divisions within
the populace.

The British offers were published in an

endeavor to "ensnare the people by specious allurements of
Peace."

The one means of thwarting this effect lay in

maintaining the respectability of the army.

A strong army

13washington to Henry Laurens, April 18, 1778 and
April 20, 1778 and Washington to John Banister, April 21,
1778, John c. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of Georfe
Washington from the Original Manuscrift Sources 1745-789
(Washington: United States Printing O fice, 1933')";l{I,
276-78, 281, 284, and 290.
14Henry Laurens to James Duane, April 20, 1778,
Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 169-71 and footnote 171.
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would provide a better bargaining position.

To inspire

P.mericans with confidence and to quell the English efforts
for peace, the colonial army needed to be established on
a sounder basis,

Washington nevertheless explained to

Banister that it would be equally fatal for America if
Congress showed no interest whatever in the propositions.
The .American connnander concluded that the North measure
perhaps at least offered a respite from hostilities and
an opportunity to reorganize the armyo 15
Like Washington, several of the Virginia delegates-F. H. Lee, John Banister, and T. Adams--believed that the
goal of the British was to incapacitate the colonies from
within. 16 In a similar vein, Charles Carroll urged the
colonists to guard against "their [Britain's] insidious
offers on the one hand • • • and resist their warlike
efforts on the other."

Carroll believed that the peace

measures, which Governor Tryon had forwarded by way of
Philadelphia, indeed were dangerously authentic. 17
On April 20, a congressional committee of three

15washington to John Banister, April 21, 1778,
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, XI, 284, 287-89, and
292.
16virginia delegates to Patrick Henry, April 21,
1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 180-81.
17charles Carroll to Thomas Johnson, Jr., April 23,
1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 184. Author's
brackets.
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officially received the North plan. 18
New York, William H. Drayton

Gouverneur Morris of

of South Carolina, and Francis

Dana of Massachusetts were to prepare an appropriate answer
to the English offer. 19 The committee assembled and concluded that the propositions were insincere and unacceptable.
They reported to Congress that acceptance of the North
proposal would indirectly approve the right of English
taxation.

Parliament, although disclaiming the right of

taxing the colonies further, was not above reversing its
policy at any time, according to these delegates.

The

committee also criticized the section of the plan which
appointed a peace commission.

From the document and

instructions the committee concluded that Parliament
completely controlled those on the mission.

The congres•

sional committee, therefore, advocated caution in dealing
with the British envoys and fully agreed that the emissaries,
as instructed, should not discuss their task with noncongressional individuals. 20 Morris, Drayton, and Dana
reasoned that the bill was nonly an insidious design to

18Einhorn, "Reception of the British Peace Offer,"
p. 192.

19Pitkin, Political and Civil History) II, 41;
Burnett, Letters of Members-;-III, lvil, liv, and lx.
20worthington Chauncey Ford (ed.), Journals~ the
Continental Congress 1774-1789 (Washington: Government
Printing office, 19oar;-x,~.
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operate on the hopes and fears of the people, and to
create among them divisions and disaffection to the common
cause." 21
Having obtained agreement among themselves, the
congressional committee presented its findings to Congress
on April 22.
Upon the whole matter, the committee beg leave to
report it as their opinion, that, as the .Americans,
UnitEd in this arduous contest upon principles of
common interest, for the defence of common rights and
privileges; which union hath been cemented by common
calamities, and by mutual good offices and affection;
so the great cause for which they contend, and in
which all mankind are interested, must derive its
success from the continuance of that union; wherefore
any men, or body of men, who should presume to make
any separate or partial convention or agreement with
commissioners under the Crown of Great Britain, or
any of them, ought to be considered and treated as
open and avowed enemies of these United States.
And further, the committee beg leave to report it
as their opinion that these United States cannot,
with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with
any commissioners on the part of Great Britain, unless
they shall, as a preliminary thereto, either withdraw
their fleets and armies, or else, in positive and
express terms~ acknowledge the independence of the
said states.4~
Congres~

on April 22, readily sanctioned the report

of its connnittee and requested that the states raise their
21Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, with
Selections ~ .h!! Corresponctence and Miscellaneous Papers;
Detailing Events in the American Revolution, and in the
Political History-Of the United States (tioston: Gray and
Bowen, 1832), I, l'S4.--22Ford, Journals of Congress, X, 379.
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quota of troops and have their militia available.2 3

This

action required a considerable amount of resoluteness on
the part of Congress.

Having spent a harsh winter at

Valley Forge, the army lacked equipment and men.

Since

Simeon Deane did not a'lTive in New York until Nay 2,
definite news of the French treaties was non-existent.
The unwillingness of the delegates to accept anything
less than liberty or a removal of the enemy forces, however,
demonstrated their complete desire for independence.24
One influential individual, however, hoped that the
British offer would be taken seriously.

John Jay of New

York believed that the English ministry genuinely desired
a conclusion to

the conflict.

Moderation on the part of

the colonies was the best means by which
could be procured.

a~

armistice

He feared a ruined England if the two

countries failed to agree to a truce.

"The destruction of

Old England would hurt me; I wish it well: it afforded my
ancestors an asylum from persecution."

Although Jay

advocated moderation in all dealings, he was not a Loyalist
sympathizer. 25
23Pitkin, Political and Civil History, II, 42.
24 Einhorn, "Reception of the British Offer," P• 193.
25Henry P. Johnston (ed.), The Correspondence and
Public Papers of John Jay (New Yor~G. P. Putman's Sons,
1890), I, 179-'lfU.--:JOhn Jay, during 1778, was Justice of
the Court of New York. On December 10, 1778, Jay was
chosen President of the Continental Congress following the
resignation of Henry Laurens, Ibid., P• 184.

81

With increasingly firm knowledge of the eventual
arrival of a conciliatory committee, American Loyalists
also began to gather forces.

A

letter in the Pennsylvania

Evening Post April 20 expressed concern over further
disjunctions within the colonies.

It claimed that the

colonists were weary of the continuous blood-letting. 26
On May 4, the same paper expressed a firm wish for
beneficial discussions.

The paper stated that the English

proposals answered .America's request for an end to taxation.
The editorial exclaimed in harsh terms that "Congress
thought

~

~

to declare that America shall have no peace,

that she, shall not accept the

~

conditions originally

proposed by herself ••• , that the hopes of

~very

family

shall be dragged into the fieldtt to be slaughtered. 2 7
Issuing inflammatory statements, the Loyalists
proceeded to put further doubts into the minds of their.
countrymen.

Some less vehement Loyalists had never

expressed feelings too unfriendly toward the American
cause.

The more moderate Loyalist merchants in New York

City, for example, feared exposing themselves or their
businesses to abuse from the colonials by advocating British

26The Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia),
April 20,-U78.
2 7The Pennsylvania Evening ~, May 4, 1778.
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domination of America.

With the British, however, seemingly

willing to conclude hostilities, even the less vehement
Loyalists, wishing to enhance their own position with
England, began to adhere more to the sentiments of their
ardent compatriots. 28
The Loyalists, eager to gain more support from
dissatisfied colonials, spread propaganda throughout the
cclonies.

This material presented England as a beneficent

mother country under which the colonials generally had
freedom of worship and those men who owned fifty acres
had the right to vote.
collected the taxes.

Officials elected by the colonials
The New York Gazette proclaimed on

Nay 11 that America had abundant wealth, commerce, and
freedom under the former regime.

The

with a final plea to the militia.

To

arti~le

concluded

continue hostilities

was to weaken any chance to return to the former liberties
29
under a benevolent king.
Congress, however, remained confident that the
Tories could not undermine the .American position by appealing
to dissatisfied colonists.

The delegates awaited eagerly

2 8John Frederick Schroeder, Life and Times of

Washington: Containing a Particular--XCCoUiit of NatIOnal
Principles and Events, ind of Illustrious Men ~ the
Revolution (New York: Johnson, Fry, and Company, IDB), I,
688-89; Stevens, FacBimiles, XII, Nos. 1212 and 1226.
29The New York Gazette and the Weekly Mercury,
May 11, lm.- -
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the arrival of Simeon Deane and the French treaties.
Confirmation of complete French aid, they felt, would be
the one factor to best counteract Loyalist propaganda.
But even before the arrival of the Franco-American
agreements, the delegates had endorsed a position against
the mother country's propositions.

As a result, many

colonials praised Congress for not wavering during this
period of uncertainty. 30
On May 2, the delegates at York received the first
31
copies of the treaties from Deane.
As expected, they
contained a compact for uamity and connnerce" and an agreement for an "alliance."

Under the alliance clause America

was to aid France if England ever declared war on America's
ally. 32 France guaranteed to uphold American liberty and
not take advantage of its position.

33

In the words of the

treaty, the purpose of the alliance was "to maintain
effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence
30sparks, Life ~ Gouverneur Morris, I, 184.
31 rbid.

32The Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg, Virginia),
May 8, 1778. In fact, some people in England believed
war was inevitable. To Arthur Lee war between England and
France seemed certain. As early as March 19, 1778, Lee
had written to Henry Laurens proclaiming the inevitability
of war. Richard Henry Lee, Life of Arthur Lee (Boston:
Wells and Libby, Cou:t Street, 18!9°), II, 1'!9"=40.
33The Virginia Gazette, May, 1778.
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absolute and unlimited of the said united States, as·
well in matters of Gouvernement as of Commerce."

If war

were to cotmnence between France and England, "his Majesty
and the said united States" were to make it "a common
cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices •
• • , and their forces, ••• as becomes good and faithful
allies.n3 4
Louis XVI, in fact, claimed that his nation pledged
itself to "protect and defend all Vessels and the Effects
belonging to the Subjects, People or Inhabitants of the
said United States."

Louis promised to "restore to the

right owners, their agents or attornies all such Vessels
and Effects,"

seized within "his Jurisdiction.rr

Other

benefits within the treaty included the right of both
countries to trade with belligerents without fear of
harassment. 35 The Treaty of Amity and Cormnerce, moreover,
contained a clause stating France's disinclination toward
36
a monopolizing of American commerce.
Under both the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of
34G. Chinard (ed.), The Treaties£?!. 1778 and Allied
Documents (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, l~), P• 52.
35chinard, Treaties £!. !Zl§., PP• 27 and 40-41.
3 6Frank Moore, The Diary: of the American Revolution,
from NewspaKers and oriiina Documents (New York: Charles
Scribner, l 58),-YY, 99.
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.Amity and Commerce, France and America had mutual obliga-

tions.

America agreed to aid France if England and France

opened hostilities.

If war began, America and France

were to provide mutual assistance in developing tactical
and strategical plans.

Neither the French nor the

Americans were to make a separate truce or peace treaty
with England without consent of the other.
arms would be by mutual consent.

Laying down

The allies agreed to

acknowledge the boundaries and sovereignty of each others
possessions and territories.

Within the Treaty of .Amity

and Commerce, France and America could open commercial
ties with belligerents. 37
Having endorsed the Franco-American treaties,
Richard Henry Lee, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson May 3,
1778, maintained that two solutions remained to the British.
England could acknowledge American independence and
negotiate a treaty of connnerce with the colonies.

Following

the other alternative, Britain might allow the French to
continue a close commercial relationship with .America to
avoid a conflict between the two countries.

If Britain

followed the latter course, he believed that .America would
alone be confronted with the task of expelling the British
37Bemis, Diplomacy of £!!.!. American Revolution,
PP• 62-64.
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forces from North America.

In this case, if France proved
/

unable to grant substantial materiel and funds, .America
would be ruined. 38
The arrival of the treaties generated more Loyalist
condemnations of Congress, France, and the war.

Congress

received blame for attempting to "pacify the popular
alarm" by a colonial endorsement of the Bourbon agreements.
The Loyalists reiterated that the legislative body had no
legal right to prod Americans into associating with the
avowed enemy of Protestantism.

.Americans ran the risk

under the alliance policy of becoming slaves "under the
treacherous title of independence."

Loyalists argued that

this was another of the means Congress used "to overturn
the Protestant religion, and extinguish every spark, both
of civil and religious freedom.n 39
In the Royal Gazette James Rivington declared that
Congress was the cause of all the bloodshed and suffering.
Under North's plan England rescinded its claim of taxation,
yielding to the colonial demands.
however, wanted more.

An ungrateful America,

The article ended with a challenge

to the inhabitants of North America: resist the demands for
38James Curtis Ballagh (ed.), ~Letters .2£. Richard
~G~ry Lee (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912), I, 39539
Moore, Dia!}'

~f

American Revolution, II, 46·48.
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more forces and supplies requested by the revoluntionary
legislature. 40
Congressional delegates tolerated such Loyalist
criticism.

They found it much easier to endure this

castigation than to coerce the opposition and grant the
Loyalists further ammunition to launch more intensive
verbal barrages. 41
By means of letters, newspapers, and congressional
reports, the

ant~·British

colonials also provided information

of their own to minimize the efforts of their adversaries.
A cormnittee of Gouverneur Morris, Samuel Chase, and Richard
Henry Lee praised the consistent endurance of the war weary
Americans.

To insure a colonial victory, the people had
to be true to themselves and to their pledges. 42 The

independent-minded inhabitants also used newspapers and
private letters as propaganda vehicles.

Any item which

damaged the British cause was printed and circulated and
reprinted again•

The Virginia Gazette proclaimed that

Burgoyne's defeat undermined the British morally as well
as physically•

Once the conquest of General Howe was

complete, the British would be compelled to "acknowledge
40Royal Gazette, (New York City), June 3, 1778.
James Rivington was the publisher of this newspaper.
4 lsparks, Life ~ Gouverneur Morris, I, 185.
42~.
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our independence without a boggle. ,, 43

The._colonial

newspapers, however, admitted their difficulties in ousting
the British.
was necessary.

A single "manly" effort by the colonials
Newspaper articles guaranteed that all

mankind would ultimately acknowledge that the eviction
of tyranny was worth the cost. 44
The anti-British propagandists argued consistently
that France, as an ally, was legally and morally obligated
to defend .America from encroachment by the "connnon foe.u
If the French were slow in responding, then not only would
America be ruined but France as well.

To permit England

to retain her former possessions would lead, therefore,
to the eventual destruction of Louis' nation. 45
Many Americans believed that this propaganda--from
both sides--impafred chances of success not only for the
Carlisle Commission but for peace itself.

Congress wanted

the mission members to understand the colonial desire for
peace.

If the envoys would come with a proclamation of

independence, acceptance clearly was guaranteed.
wise, the British offer would be for nought.

Other-

Although,

independence was the American prerequisite for peace,

43The Virginia Gazette, May 1, 1778.
44The Boston Gazette and Country Journal, May 4, 1778.

-

-

45!.h.! Virginia Gazette, May 8, 1778.
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Congress yet acknowledged the importance of negotiations.
Congress, therefore, as a show of its willingness
for peace, issued the following resolution April 30:
Resolved - That notwithstanding the Unmerited
Injurious and Cruel Treatment the United States of
America have received from the hands of Great Britain,
they are ever desirous to put an end to the Calamities
of war; and not averse from entering into a Treaty for
peace and Conmerce between the two Countries for the
mutual Interest and Benefit of both, upon Terms not
Inconsistent with Freedom, Sovereignty and Independence
of these States, or with any Treaties that are or shall
be made with any fl~her Sovereign power, before such
Treaty be formed.
Once Congress had made its opinions officially
known, preparations for the Carlisle Commission seemed
complete.
submission.

Congress wanted peace but not at the cost of
The Loyalists, however, listened eagerly to

any British offer which might end their sufferings.

Waiting

with words of encouragement, they optimistically believed
that the commissioners' arrival would offset the influence
of the French-American treaties.
Yet the reception of the terms of the British offer
already foretold that the congressional reception of the
commission itself would not be warmhearted and sympathetic.
Peace, Congress believed, required British acknowledgement
of American independence.

Congress reasoned that the only

purpose of the North proposal and the coming of the envoys
46 Burnett, Letters .Qf. Members, III, 207.

91

was to seduce the inhabitants into returning to the fold.
A

wide range of emotions awaited to engulf the Carlisle

Commission as it concluded its final arrangements for the
April voyage.

CHAPTER V
THE JUNE NEGOTIATIONS
At the time of the arrival of Lord North's Conciliatory Plan in America on April 14, the Carlisle commission
members were concluding preparations for their voyage to
the colonies.

The commissioners--Lord Carlisle, William

Eden, and George Johnstone--hoped that the North proposal
had established a firm basis upon which to construct workable negotiations.

On their arrival in the colonies, the

envoys planned to correspond with Congress and General
Washington.

Under King George's instructions of April 12,

the commissioners had the authority to meet with representatives of the colonies only if Congress completely
refused the British overtures. 1
Lord Carlisle, who would dominate the mission,

lGreat Britain. Collection, King George to
Connnissioners, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
18.
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especially hoped that Britain's offer to end taxation,
repeal all acts of Parliament since 1763 pertaining to the
colonies, renew con:mercial ties, and provide pardons would
win back Congress. 2 To make the purpose of the mission
entirely clear to Congress, Carlisle summarized the
member's views.
To off er Peace to America upon terms honourable
and beneficial for her to embrace; to stay the hand
of slaughter and desolation; to apply effectual remedy
to every grievance, to quiet all anxiety upon such as
exist only in jealousy, prejudice, and apprehension;
to fix the happiness, security, and future welfare
of G. B. and her Colonies upon a firmer basis • • • ;
to cover again this extent of ocean with the united
commerce of both nations. • • • has induced our
country to invest us with powers too extensive to be
intrusted to individuals, but for the sacred purpose
of restoxing tranquility and stopping the effusion
of human blood.~
After weeks of planning and with best wishes from
}lorton Eden, William Eden's brother, for a fruitful voyage,
the Carlisle Peace Commission sailed from England aboard
the Trident on April 16. 4 Also aboard were William Eden's
wife, Eleanor, Dr. Adam Ferguson--the commission's
secretary--and Lord Cornwallis.

Ferguson, a close friend

2 carlisle minutes, June 1, 1778 and King George
to Commissioners, April 12, 1778, Carlisle MSS, pp. 326,
330-32, and 339.

3Carlisle minutes, June l, 1778, Carlisle~' P• 339.
'*Morton Eden to William Eden, April 8, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, IV, No. 429.
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of George Johnstone, was professor of moral philosophy at
Edinburgh University.

Cornwallis, having been on leave

in London, was returning as Clinton's second in conunand. 5
The voyage went by quickly with time spent in
playing cards, writing notes to friends and family, and
discussing the forthcoming negotiations.

Writing to his

wife on April 28, Lord Carlisle expressed confidence that
their stay in America would be no longer than one year.
If the mission failed, there was no reason to remain longer.
Even if the envoys were successful, it was "too unreasonable
a request to wish us to remain to arrange every possible
difficulty that may grow out of such a business.tr 6
Nothing of significance occurred during the first
five weeks of the voyage.
encountered a British

on

May 2 7, ·however 1 the Trident

and the report that Lord
Howe and Sir Henry Clinton were in Philadelphia. 7 Under
man~of-war

orders of March 21, 1778 from George Germain, Clinton had
been instructed to abandon Philadelphia and move his forces
to New York City. 8

The British ministry had failed to

inform the commissioners about the evacuation.

Believing

5van Doren, Secret History, P• 84.
6carlisle MSS, p. 334.
7Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, May 27, 1778, Carlisle
MSS, P• 335.
Bsupra, pp. 52-53.
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that the army in Philadelphia would provide a better
bargaining position, the British envoys ordered the
Trident's commander, Commodore John Elliot, to sail to
Philadelphia. 9
When the connnissioners arrived in the Pennsylvania
city June 6, Clinton was in the midst of preparations to
abandon the city.

Eden especially maintained that the

garrison in the city would be an

inducement to Congress
to deal more favorably with the connnission. 10 George

Germain and Lord North's failure to entrust the agents with
information on military strategy brought ridicule upon
themselves and lessened the effectiveness of England's
plenipotentiaries.

Lord Carlisle expressed his own reason

for the ministry's uninformative manner.

If Germain had

confided to the commissioners concerning the evacuation,
Carlisle believed that the envoys would not even have
gone on the mission due to loss of military support.

11

Now the remoteness of Clinton's troops would place the
British in a weaker bargaining position.

Eden and his

colleagues thus became less confident even before the

9Ritcheson, British Politics, P• 272; Van Doren,
Secret History, pp. 84-85.
lOEden's minutes, June 8, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles,

V, No. 496.
llcarlisle to
MSS, p. 341.

Lady Carlisle, June 14, 1778, Carlisle,
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talks began.1 2
Supporting the commissioners' condemnation of
ministerial policy were General Clinton and the Loyalist,
Joseph Galloway.

Clinton expressed anger at having to

abandon the city to the enemy.

Like the commissioners,

Clinton believed the mission's purpose was negated by
removal of the troops. 13 The most bitterly disappointed,
however, were the Loyalists like Galloway.

If possible

the Loyalists were to vacate their homes and move to New
York with the army.

The commissioners and Galloway disliked

leaving many who could not make the voyage.

Like Clinton

and the envoys, Galloway considered abandoning Philadelphia
a tactical blunder.

He believed giving up the city would
only prolong the war. 14
The commission members were further galled to learn
that Washington had known of the evacuation prior to themselves.

As early as May 19, 1778, General Washington had

suspected that Clinton was contemplating a transfer of
forces to New York City.

To Washington, moreover, it

12Ritcheson, British Politics, pp. 272-73.
13w111cox, Portrait .2£.. ~ General, p. 226.
14Julian P. Boyd, Anglo-American Union, Jose£h
Galloway's Plans to Preserve The British Empire 177 -1788
(Philadelphia: Un!Verslty of Pennsylvania Press,~1r:;-
P• 70; Van Doren, Secret History, p. 93; Van Alstyne,
Empire and Independence, P• 155.
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appeared that many of the families in the city were preparing to leave with the army. 15
To the commissioners the problems confronting their

mission seemed immense.

After accumulating all the data,

Carlisle sunnnarized these difficulties.

In addition to

evacuating Philadelphia, Carlisle reasoned that the FrancoAmerican treaties would be a hindrance.

The evacuation of

the Chesapeake Bay by all British vessels would weaken
Britain's position by allowing contraband goods to reach
the colonies that nruch easier. 16 The loss of Lord Richard
Howe, due to 111 health, hindered the commission. 17 Lad
Howe, however, agreed to aid his countrymen as long as he
18
remained in the colonies.
Even with all these difficulties, the envoys commenced
negotiations.

On June 7, George Johnstone, in violation

of ministerial orders secretly discussed with Joseph
Galloway the possibility of an imperial constitution.
15washington to Jeremiah Powell, President of the
Council of Massachusetts, Nay 19, 1778, Jared Sparks, The
Writings of George Washington; bding his correspondence,
addresses-;-~1essages, Selected an PUblIShed from the
Original Manuscri ts; with a Ll:Xe of the Aut:IiO'r; Notes, and
Illustrations Boston:lffiSselr;odI'Ome,-and Metcalf, andHillard, Gray and Company, 1834), V, 376.

p. 342.

16carlisle to Lord Gower, June, 1778, Carlisle, ~'

17Lord Howe to connnissioners, June 7, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, XI, No. 1099.
18van Doren, Secret History, P• 93.
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Johnstone claimed that England was willing to dispatch two
representatives to each of the colonial assemblies.

America,

in turn, was to provide one delegate to Parliament from each
colony.

The coI?mlissioner agreed to the abolishment of

taxation.

Parliament, however, would claim legislative

authority over all other issues.
would be the outcome.

A federal union of states

Galloway dismissed the suggestion

of a federal union as being almost an acknowledgement of
colonial freedom. 19
George Johnstone was to violate the commission's
instructions on several other occasions. 20 Under North's
plan the envoys were not to discuss Britain's offers with
any individuals until negotiations with Congress had been
concluded.

Johnstone undertook private discussions to

accelerate negotiations and possibly to bring the war to
an early conclusion. 21
At the opening of legitimate negotiations, Carlisle
and Eden were as unsuccessful as their colleague, Mr.
Johnstone.

On June 9, the envoys provided Dr. Adam Fergusoq

secretary to the commission, with a revised version of the
North Conciliatory Plan.

Without changing the plan, the

19Boyd, Anglo-American Union, P• 80.
20rnfra,pp. 105-109.
2lvan Doren, Secret History, P• 73.
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commissioners had incorporated within the proposal their
own hope for a rapid conclusion to

the conflict.

The

commissioners' message opened with an expression of hope
for the stoppage of "further Effusion of the Blood and
the Calamities of War."

It continued by claiming that

the British envoys "assure you Congress

of our most

earnest desire to Reestablish on the Basis of equal Freedom
and mutual Safety the tranquility of this once happy
Emp1re.n22
Concerning colonial taxation, the envoys were quite
explicit.

They acknowledged that taxation by Parliament

for the purpose of raising revenues within America had
proven unsatisfactory.

Under the peace proposal, the

only funds collected would be from the
commerce.

regulation of

These funds, moreover, would eventually be

returned for use in the colonies for internal improvements. 23

Britain's representatives also agreed, as

instructed, in an end to all hostilities.

No military

forces would be allowed to remain on American soil without
the consent of Congress.

Parliament would retain the right

to grant Americans a voice in British govermnent, depending

22commissioners to Henry Laurens, June 9, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1104. Author's brackets.
23commissioners to Henry Laurens, June 10, 1778,
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 9-10.

100

on the outcome of discussions. 24
The commissioners also expressed concern over the
Bourbon treaties.
Treaty of Alliance.

Carlisle urged Congress to reject the
The agents' letter to President

Laurens acclaimed the similarities in blood, religion,
and language between England and her wayward child. 25
France had made its of.fer in order to continue the war and
prevent a reconciliation.
But we trust that the inhabitants of North America,
connected with us by the nearest ties of consanguinity,
speaking the same language, interested in the preservation of similar institutions, remembering the
former happy intercourse of good offices, and forgetting recent animosities, will shrink from the
thought of becoming an assecion of force to our late
mutual enemies, and will prefer a firm, free, and
perpetual coalition with the Parent State~ to an
insincere and unnatural foreign alliance. 6
This appeal, the Englishmen believed, played on the
emotions and sympathies of the .American people.

In the

thinking of the agents, this maneuver was indispensable.
An

appeal to the heart was of greater value than an entreaty

to the mind or political interest.

Within the whole

manifesto, there was not a single hint that the conuuissioners
24conuuissioners to Henry Laurens, June 9, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1104.
25 Notes on letter of Commissioners to Congress,
June 9, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 497.
26 Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners to
Congress, June 9, 1778, Evans B1.hliography, 15825, 4.
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upheld independence.

To the British govermnent and its

1778 Commission an independent America was inconceivable.
The final words of the dispatch presented an attempt
at exonerating the British from any future troubles.

If after the time that May be necessary to consider
this communication, and transmit your answer, the horrors
and devastations of war should continue, we call God
and the world to witness, that the evils which must
follow are not to imputed to Great Britain; and we
cannot without the most real sorrow, anticipate the
prospect of calamiz~es which we feel the most ardent
desire to prevent.
The commissioners, in their dispatch to Congress,
explained to the delegates that either Philadelphia, New
York, or York was a suitable spot for a meeting.

After

British evacuation of Philadelphia, the commissioners
favored the New York site.

They felt more

from the vicinity of Washington's forces.

s~cure

away

The Americans

promised to provide safe conduct passes for those attending
such a gathering. 28
Washington, however, would not provide Dr. Ferguson
with a pass to travel to York.

Ferguson, therefore, left
29
.
the British proposals at Radnor on June 10.
Washington

27Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners to
Congress, June 9, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 4-5.
28_!lli., 4.

29 Henry Laurens to Horatio Gates, June 13, 1778,
Burnett, Letters ££Members, III, 289.
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considered the proposals unacceptable to a majority of the
American people and believed that without consent of
Congress he lacked authority to provide Ferguson with a
safe conduct pass.

30

The general forwarded the propositions to York on
31
Henry Laurens read the dispatches to Congress
June 13.
on the same day, despite the objections of Gouverneur
Morris, who opposed a reading because of English condemnations of the French and their king. 32 nue to this
opposition, Congress did postpone discussion of the envoys'
dispatch, first, until the fifteenth and then until the
sixteenth. 33
While Congress prepared to consider and criticize
the offer of the Carlisle Commission, evacuation of
Philadelphia temporarily ceased. 34

The British wanted to

know the outcome of the congressional discussions on the
North plan before leaving the city.

While waiting in

30Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: ~
Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), V, 6.
31Henry Laurens to Haratio Gates, June 13, 1778,
Burnett, Letters 2f. Members, III, 289.
32swiggett, Extraordinary ~· Morris, P• 55; Ford,
Journals of Congress, XI, 606.
33Burnett, Letters £.£.Members, III, 295.
34washington to General Horatio Gates, June 12,
1778, Fitzpatrick, Writings .2!, Washington, XII, 51.
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Philadelphia for the congressional response, Carlisle,
Eden, and Johnstone spent much time in correspondence to
acquaintances in America and to the British ministry.
The commissioners explained, for instance, in a letter to
George Germain on June 15, the costly mistake of leaving
Philadelphia.

The English troops were healthy and well

prepared for battle.
city.

Yet, the troops were to vacate the

The forced evacuation required the hastening of

correspondence between the English representatives and
Congress.

Even prior to the .Tune 15 letter, Eden had

urged Clinton to delay long enough for congressional
reaction.

When Eden learned that Clinton's orders allowed

no lengthy delay, he admitted the futility of the mission. 35
On June 16, Congress chose Samuel Adams of
Massachusetts, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, William
Henry Drayton of South Carolina, Gouverneur Morr.is of New
York, and John Witherspoon of New Jersey to receive the
British offer. 36 Both Witherspoon and Richard Henry Lee
drafted answers to the English during the meeting of the
committee.

Witherspoon urged Congress to remain loyal to

the French and reject all English pleadings for an end to

35Eden minutes, June 8, 1778 and Eden to Alexander
Wedderburn, June 18, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, V,
Nos. 1109, 496 and 500.
36
Supra, pp. 78-79.
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the Treaty of Alliance.

Lee upheld Witherspoon's views

and claimed that the legislature was always ready to discuss
a peaceful settlement once America obtained independence. 37
Richard Henry Lee, writing to Jefferson on June 16, maintained that the English offer was a combination of "fraud,
falsehood, insidious offers, and abuse of France."

The

committee members as a whole generally regarded the issue
highly offensive and encouraged congressional delegates
to disavow the British offers as totally inadequate. 38
Congress, on June 17, readily agreed with its
committee that peace would come only when George III
demonstrated a sincere desire to end hostilities.

"The

only solid proof of this disposition will be an acknowledgement of the independence of these states, or the withdr_awing (of

J his

fleets and armies. n

Henry Laurens

reiterated that the only reason for reading the British
plans was to stem the neffusion of human blood.u39
The commissioners, however, agreed not to allow
this news to stifle their efforts.

While these gentlemen

37John Witherspoon proposed letter to commissioners,
June 16, 1778, and Richard Henry Lee draft of letter to
commissioners, June 16, 1778, Burnett, Letters of Members,
III, liv, lxii, lx, lvii, lvi, and 296-97.
38Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry ~' I, 412 and
415.

39Henry Laurens to commissi?ners, June 17, 1778,
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 5-6. Author's brackets.
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awaited aboard the Trident in the Delaware River for the
evacuation of British troops from Philadelphia, Dr. Ferguson
issued a letter on behalf of the envoys.

The dispatch

called "upon those who have suffered • • • seriously to
consider the original cause of the present hostilities,
with the propositions we have made to remove them, and to
obviate all

further disputes." This was an impassioned

appeal to all Americans who were tired of war. 40
The envoys, despite instructions to negotiate only
with the whole Congress at first, were not above making
private overtures to influential colonials.

George Johnstone

became the most prolific commissioner engaged in such
41
personal negotiations.
He sought discussions during June
with Joseph Reed, a member of Congress from Pennsylvania
and former adjutant general in the Continental army.
Before the envoys had left England, Johnstone had also
written Dennis DeBerdt, Reed's brother-in-law, in America.
Anxious to heal the breach, Johnstone used DeBerdt to full
advantage.

DeBerdt's letter to Reed, for example, intro-

duced Johnstone as a man of peace working for the colonial
cause in Parliament. When Johnstone reached Philadelphia,
40creat Britain. Collection, Commissioners to
American people, June, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
6-8.
41supra, pp. 97-98.
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he wrote to Reed on June 9 hinting of a reward if he
cooperated with the envoys.

Reed received the letter at

Valley Forge and revealed its contents to Washington.
Johnstone never received Reed's answer after the commissioners boarded the Trident for New York on June 16.

But

Reed's correspondence gave no hope of continued communications on the subject of reconciliation anyway.

He

suggested rather that England rescind her "visionary
schemes for conquest" and enjoy the benefits derived from
a free America. 42
Reed was not the only delegate contacted by
Johnstone.

Mr~

Robert Morris, Henry Laurens, and Francis Dana

received similar lettP.rs from the British envoy.

Johnstone

chose Morris of Pennsylvania, chairman of the Congressional
Committee on Finance, because he had voted against the
Declaration of Independence in 1776.
was a moderate in his viewpoints. 43

He believed Morris
On June 16, the

emissary hinted to the Pennsylvanian that the one who aided
in the restoration of good feeling deserved every favor

afforded to him.

Honor would be

granted those who found

"the vessel in the storm and brought her safely to port."
42John F. Roche, Jose~h Reed, A Moderate in the
American Revolution {New Yor : Columbia University Press,

1957), PP• 133-36.

43van Doren, Secret History, P• 98.
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Morris ignored his supplication.44
President Laurens, unlike Morris, was quick to
rebuke Mr. Johnstone's letter of June 10.45 His June
14 reply observed that the true interest of England lay
in confirmation of America's independence.

Congress,

he believed, would never rescind its demand for a free and
46
independent nation.
In private correspondence to General
Horatio Gates on June 17, Laurens admitted that the agent's
demands, if "tendered some time ago, ••• there can be no
doubt but that the people of America would joyfully have
embraced" them. 47
In Johnstonets June 10 letter to Francis Dana, the
connnissioner claimed that Benjamin Franklin supported
several undisclosed points within the North proposal.
Although this was a misrepresentation of the facts, Johnstone
hoped that Franklin's name would lend prestige to his offer. 48
Since Johnstone could not and did not offer inde•
pendence, his June correspondence to the congressional

44wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 616-17.
45 President Laurens to George Johnstone, June 14,
1778, Carlisle MSS, P• 343.
46 Burnett, Letters .2f. Members, III, 292-93.
697-98.

47commager and Morris, Spirit~ 'Seventy-fil:!, PP•
48wharton, Revolutionary Correspondence, II, 811.
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delegates proved worthless.

On June 17, Congress delib•

erated upon the motion that all delegates place their
correspondence from the British envoys before Congress.
President Laurens objected, fearing increased congressional authority over individual freedom.

The motion was

never brought to a vote due mainly to President Laurens'
objection.

Laurens, however, did agree to provide William

Henry Drayton with Johnstone•s letters and a copy of his
own

reply for safekeeping.

The legislature then allowed

Drayton to collect all the Johnstone letters and to preserve
them. 49
Failing to obtain any encouraging information from
Morris, Laurens, and Dana, Mr. Johnstone contacted Mrs.
Elizabeth Graeme Ferguson, wife of Hugh Ferguson, the
British commissary of prisoners.

He met Mrs. Ferguson, a

relation of Secretary Adam Ferguson by marriage, at Charles
Stedman's home in Philadelphia on June 16.

On the day of

his departure, the British agent persuaded Mrs. Ferguson
to enlist Reed's support.

Mrs. Ferguson, an American, was

sympathetic to the American cause but agreed to send a
letter to Reed at Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
Johnstone, moreover*

She had told

that she might travel to Lancaster

49Henry Laurens to George Washington, June 18,
1778, Burnett, Letters££ Members, III, 302.

109

to plead her husband's cause before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Executive Council.

If she travelled to Lancaster,

Johnstone urged her to visit Joseph Reed.

Due to her

husband's pro-British beliefs, the council had summoned

him on the charge of treason.

He was a British subject,

however, and could not be legally tried by the .Americans
on that charge.

Hugh Ferguson escaped the wrath of the

Americans by travelling to New York with Clinton's
50
forces.
~lrs.

Ferguson succeeded in her mission by having

Reed meet her at Stedman's home on June 22.

Reed seemed

to be the correct choice to discuss a reconciliation.

He

treasured American and British unity and prior to the war
counseled for moderation.

Mrs. Ferguson explained that

Johnstone knew of Reed's past sentiments for an end to
the hostilit!es. 51 If he were to exert his influence in

~Ir.

hopes of ending the dispute, then a reward of
an office in the colonies were his.
unworthy of such awards. 52

t

10,000 and

Reed claimed he was

Reluctant to harm the lady's reputation, Reed failed
50Roche, Joselh ~, p. 138; Einhorn, "Reception of
the British Peace Of er, 11 p. 206; Van Doren, Secret Historx;,
P• 100.
51Roche, Joseph ~' PP• 138 and vii.
52 commager and Morris, Spirit££ 'Sevent)'•Six, II,

700.

110
to turn this information over to Congress until after the
Battle of Monrnouth. 53 While Reed was at Monmouth, the
congressional delegates requested that all letters received
by the delegates from the commissioners
Congress.

b~

placed before

Robert Morris and Francis Dana responded on

July 9 and 16 respectively.

Mr. Reed presented his letters

to Congress, meeting at Philadelphia July 18, but without
mention of Mrs. Ferguson. 54 Congress, on August 11,
declared that the connnissioners' letters and discussions
with Reed and other congressmen were an endeavor to bribe
the delegates and resolved never to acknowledge the corre55
spondence of George Johnstone.
While Johnstone's intrigues continued, the envoys
boarded the Trident on June 16.

Since

the Trident did not

sail from the Delaware River until June 28, Eden and Carlisle
passed the time by writing observations of their two week
stay in the colonies. 56 Carlisle, in not~s to his wife,
claimed that the evacuation of the army doomed the mission

53washington attacked Clinton on the latter's way to
New York on June 28. No advantage was gained by either
side. Approximately three hundred were killed in both
armies. Allen, History~ Revolution, II, 183.
54Roche, Joseph~, p. 138; Van Doren, Secret
History, P• 102.
55Ford, Jarnals of Congress, XI, 678.
56stevens, Facsimiles, IV, No. 372.
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from the beginning.

Clinton's forces, he thought, were

better trained than those of his adversary.

The British

army, while in Philadelphia, gave to the npeople of
property" a feeling of security.

The offers of the British

agents, believed Carlisle, satisfied these less independentminded Americans.

The loss of the army, however, forced

the representatives to expose all their offers at once.
In another letter Carlisle further reviewed the June
situation.
Our situation permitted none of the protracting
arts of negotiation; it was too nice and critical to
attempt any experiment, and we were all convinced
that we had no other part to take but at once to
display every concession and every inducement which
our country had empo~'red us with, to establish the
general tranquility.
William Eden, like Carlisle, ridiculed the ministry
for its duplicity.

The ministry openly had offered complete

support to the commission, while it secretly undermined
the envoys' position in America by not informing them of
the

evacuation~

."It is ••• cruel ••• to have been so

ill-used by those in whom I placed the most implicit
confidence.n

He expressed hope for better results in New

York but feared that they would return home unsuccessfu1. 58
57Carlisle to Lady Carlisle, June 21 to July 7,
1778 and Carlisle to Rev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle
MSS, PP• 345 and 381-82.
58william Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, June 18,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 500.
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While the representatives from England continued
their denunciations of the ministry in such correspondence,
American congressional delegates expressed their views of
the situation.

Delegate Thomas NcKean of Delaware, on

June 17, advised the President of the Council of Delaware,
Caesar Rodney, not to be enticed by the commissioners'
offers.

"Be upon your guard with regard to Letters from

the Enemy; they intend to seduce, corrupt and bribe by
59
every method possible."
Oliver Wolcott, delegate from
Connecticut, wrote to his close friend, George Wyllys,
advising him not to be persuaded by the British demands.
The purpose of the overtures were to prevent America's
ratification of the "French Treatyn and to divide colonial
thinking. 60
Praise for the French and the Treaty of Alliance,
interspersed with criticism of England, filled many of the
letters written by friends

of the revolution.

Governor

Patrick Henry of Virginia expressed America's gratitude
for the French intervention.

His June 18 letter to Richard

59The governor of a colony was usually restricted
by an executive council or council of state whf.ch was
appointed by the legislature. Barck and Lefler, Colonial
America, p. 581; Burnett, Letters ££ Members, III, J00-301.

60oliver Wolcott to George Wyllys, June20, 1778,
Collections of the Connecticut Historical Societx, Vol.
XXIII: The WYilXS-Papers, ~orrespondence and Documents
Chiefly of Descendants ~ QQ.y. George Wxltyi ££ Connecticut
(Hartford, Connecticut: Published by the Society, 1924),
PP• 460-61.
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Henry Lee conveyed hope for the def eat and ruin of
61
England.
The French, he believed were the only people
powerful enough to save the American cau~e.
new hope into the "unequal conflict." 62

France brought

Like Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee believed in
the necessity of a foreign war.

A

French and Spanish

threat to the British West Indies and North America was
inevitable.

A British war with all the Bourbon family

opened wide the opportunity for America to secure "peace
63
for a century."
Richard Henry Lee was not mistaken in expressing
his expectation of French intervention in the West Indies
and off the North
~Jnericans

.Ame~ican

coast.

Unknown to either the

or the British agents, the French fleet under

Admiral d'Estaing sailed from Toulon, France on April 13.
This fleet arrived off the coast of America on July 8,
with France's ambassador to America, Conrad Alexander
61H. R. Mcilwaine (ed.), Official Letters of the
Governors of the State .2£, Virgin~a, Vol. I: The Letters
of Patrick ~6)ry (Richmond, Virginia; Virginia State
tibrary, 19
, pp. 291-92.
62william Wirt Henry, Patrick Hen~: ~'
Correspondence and Speeches (New York: C arles Scribner's
Sons, 1891), I,--:sb3.
63Richard Henry Lee to Washington, June 24, 1778,
Richard Henry Lee, Grandson, Memoir of the 1!f! of Richard
Henry ~' .!!!£ His Correspondence with the Most Distinguished
Men in America and Europe, Illustrative-or tlieir Characters,
and 0£ the Even~of the American Revolution (Philadelphia:
H:-c:-carey and 1.L'ea;-1825), I, 21.
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G~rard. 64 Carlisle later admitted that leaving

the Delaware

River on June 28 enabled the commissioners to escape the
blockade of d'Estaing.

That, to him, was the only good
which came from British evacuation of Philadelphia. 65
After landing in New York on June 30, 1778, the
British emissaries found themselves in a worse position than
before their arrival in America.
now sailed off the coast.
its

denun~iations

A

hostile French fleet

A belligerent Congress continued

of the British mission.

Support from

American Loyalists and the British ministry alike had been
negligible.

Leaving Philadelphia, moreover., would not

result in prosperity for the commission during the remaining
summer months.

These months, in fact, would witness

t..~e

loss of one commissioner and the further decline in optimism
by the others.

64!>1ahon, History

.2f England, VI, 250.

65Carlisle to Rev. Ekins, October, 1778, Carlisle
MSS, P• 382.

CHAPTER

VI

THE SlWJ.J.ER NEGOTIATIONS: A DISAPPOINTMENT

The Carlisle Commission's efforts during June had
achieved nothing.

The American Congress enjoyed a further

advantage over the British envoys with the arrival of the
Franco-American treaties.

The commissioners, in a letter

to George Germain on July 5, 1778, wrote that the Treaty
of Alliance and the evacuation of Philadelphia together
"have so Elated the persons in Authority through the
Revolted Colonies" that peace remained further than ever
from realization. 1

But to counteract these misfortunes

the conmissioners planned to utilize every diplomatic
means at their disposal.

Carlisle claimed that the

emissaries were not ready to resign but would remain in
America with hope for success. 2
lstevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1115.
2carlisle to Lord Gower (Lady Carlisle's father),
July 17, 1778, Carlisle£!§.§, P• 349.
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The connnissioners' peace moves failed to intimidate
America's July 4 celebration.

In fact the festivities

seemed more impressive than ever.

Craters attacked compro-

mise and proclaimed independence.

One such American, David

Ramsay of South Carolina, claimed that the effect of
colonial freedom was to remove one quarter of the globe
from tyranny and oppression. 3

America's struggle, he

believed, "attracted the attention of all Europe to the
nature of civil liberty, and the right::1 of people."

There

existed no "shadow of liberty • • • when the single NO of
a king, 3,000 miles distant, was sufficient to repeal any
of our laws."

4

Another South Carolinian, William Henry

Drayton, also magnified British fears.

On July 9, 1278

he chastised the-envoys' offers, claiming that each British
suggestion was a ruse to seduce the American people. 5
Not all colonials, however, were as direct as
Drayton and Ramsay.

Samuel Adams, writing under the name

of "An American," was more subtle in his approach.

In a

3navidson, "Whig Propagandists," P• 50.

4Niles, Principles and Acts of the Revolution,
pp. 69-70. David l\.amsay, aI'ine orater and enthusiastic
patriot, later became an historian of the American
Revoiution. See his A Histor~ of the American Revolution,
2 vols. (London: Richard Grif in-aiiCrCompany), 1855.
5The Pennsylvania Packett
(Philaaerpliia), July 9, 1'7&.

2,! ~

General Advertiser
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letter to the British agents, he wonered whether England
was serious about wishing to end hostilities, 6 England
intended to monopolize the colonies' commerce.

Yet

America's interests, he believed, lay in trading with all
the world.

He sarcastically rebuked England for offering

America a place in Parliament.

America was appreciative

of the kind off er made to grant the colonies
a share in your sovereign; but really, gentlemen,
we have not the least inclination to accept of it.
He is not to our taste. • • • The blood of the
innocent is upon your, [England's] hands, and all
the waters of the ocean will not wash it away.I
Even after these latest displays of hostility, the
commissioners

remained alert for any colonial peace over-

Reaching New York June 30, they found time to pen a

tures.

reply to the congressional letter of June
from Congress stated, in part,
ready to

17. 8

The letter

that the delegates were

entertain discussions for a peace treaty when the

king of England demonstrated a sincere desire for peace.
England, moreover, was to remove all its forces and to
grant independence.9

The connnissioners' answer of July 11

6uAn American" to commissioners, July 16, 1778,
Harry Alonzo Cushing (ed.), The Writings of Samuel Adams
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Soii'S; 1908), IV~25.
7~.,

pp. 25, 28, 30, and 38.

Author's brackets.

Bsupra, p. 104.
9congress to commissioners, June 17, 1778, Ford,
Journals of Congress, XI, 701.
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reiterated Britain's acknowledgement of the colonials'
freedom, with certain reservations.

The letter insisted

that the commissioners had "no doubt of his M.:ij.esty' s
disposition to remove every subject of uneasiness from the
colonies."

Yet there were

11

circ'lllllstances of precaution

against our ancient enemies" which necessitated the
continuation of armed force in .America.

The envoys rejected

the right of Congress to enter into foreign alliances without the consent of each colonial legislature.

The agents

concluded their message by threatening to take the issues
directly to the people. 10
By mid-July, negotiations had not resolved American
and British differences.

The British envoys continued to

increase colonial wrath by doubting the authority of Congres.
The commissioners' threat to appeal to all the people not
only alienated Congress but also admitted the mission's
failure in normal negotiation.

The envoys did irreparable

harm to their mission by attempting to intimidate Congress.
Any congressional sympathy for the mission was lost.
On July 18, Congress discussed the British note and
considered the following resolutions proposed by Gouverneur
Morris.
lOGreat Britain. Collection, Commissioners to
Congress, July 11, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 23-25.
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Resolved that neither of the Commissioners • • ~
appear to be duly impowered either as an Ambassador,
11inister Plenipotentiary Resident or otherwise to
represent the King of Great Britain to these united
States.
Resolved that Congress can by no means hold any
Treaty with or answer any Proposition which may be
made by the Said Commissioners or either of them.
The Congress upheld Morris and agreed not to answer the
British envoys' letter.

11

Several delegates also expressed disapproval of the
commissioners and their offers in letters to friends and in
editorials.

Josiah Bartlett, writing to William Whipple

July 20, 1778, claimed that the British expressed no desire
for an end to hostilities.

Richard Henry Lee of Virginia

and John Penn of North Carolina expressed similar views in
letters to Thomas Jefferson and Governor Richard Caswell of
12
North Carolina, respectively.
Samuel Adams, writing in the Pennsylvania Evening

E.f?!!, insisted that Congress cared little whether England
acknowledged American liberty.

America was a free land.

The British feared French dominance of the colonies and

llareat Britain. Collection, In Congress, July 18,
1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 25; Burnett, Letters of
Members, III, 337-38; Ford, Journals of Congress, XI, 20!.
12Josiah Bartlett was a delegate to Congress from
New Hampshire. William Whipple, also of New Hampshire,
became a delegate in November, 1778. Richard Henry Lee to
Thomas Jefferson, July 20, 1778 and John Penn to Richard
Caswell, July 21, 1778, Burnett, Letters of Members, III,
340-42, 346, liv, and lv.
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therefore quartered troops in the colonies.

If France were

to invade England, he believed the latter's forces in
America would be of no value.

A second reason for England's

remaining in the colonies was to protect the Loyalists.
But Adams contended that England need not worry about her
American allies.

The less important Loyalists would receive

pardons, while the leaders would be tried.

This writer

insisted that the mother country had also found it almost
impossible to protect her commissioners.

He terminated

the article with a final criticism of the attempted bribes.
"But know, that those who have withstood your flattery, and
refused your bribes, despise your menaces.

Farwell.

When

you come with better principles, and on a better errand,
13
we shall be glad to meet you."
The commissioners, especially Mr. J 0 hnstone, were
ridiculed further in an article written July 27 but appearing
in the Providence Gazette of August 22.

The article claimed

that the attempted bribe of Joseph Reed was offensive enough
to make a "blush in hell."

It claimed that Johnstone's

fiasco decreased the opportunity for further negotiations.14
While Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone, awaited a

13The Pennsylvania Evening Post, July 23, 1778.
14The Providence Gazette and Country
August 22-;--1778.

Journal,
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response to their letter of July 11, they divided their
time between writing notes to friends and family in England
and recording their impressions for later ref ~rence.
Carlisle and Eden expressed concern over the blockading of
15
New York harbor by Count Estaing's fleet.
Carlisle, in
a private note to his wife, expressed frustration and
futility in remaining since Generals Washington and Gates
were near White Plains, New York.
fleet was outside the harbor.

Besides, the French

Carlisle, however, acknowl-

edged that since his opinion was but one among many, he
16
agreed to remain.
The military situation mentioned by Carlisle involved
cooperation of French and .American forces.

Washington

reported to General John Sullivan on July 17 the purpose
of Estaing's new operations.

The French fleet, which

arrived off Sandy Hook--gateway to New York harbor--July
13, was to cooperate with the American armies in the
execution of plans against the British.

The total number

of French vessels off Sandy Hook was twelve ships and four
frigates.

Although Estaing planned to enter New York

harbor and attack the British ships, the entrance proved
15william Eden to Alexander Wedderburn, July 19,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, V, No. 504.
16carlisle to Lady Carlisle, July 21, 1778,
Carlisle MSS, P• 357.
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too shallow for the larger French vessels.

Washington and

Estaing agreed, instead, to send the Gallic ships on an
expedition to Rhode Islanct. 17
The British situation improved slightly with the
sailing of Estaing's vessels from the mouth of New York
harbor on July 22, although Eden still eA'Pressed concern
that Clinton was to dispatch eight thousand of his troops
to the West Indies and Florida.
mission, he

The success of the peace

believed, depended upon the correct use of

British forces, and he wondered if troops for the Carribean
were necessary. 18
The 8,000 troops to be sent south were a portion of
the 25,997 available to Clinton in the sunnner of 1778.
Washington opposed Clinton with 16,000 and an additional
12,000. 19 Due to the French fleet's control of the sea
along the North I'\merican coast, Clinton had been afraid
to dispatch the 8,000 troops without support from the
blockaded British fleet in New York. 20

17washington to Major General Sullivan, July 17,
1778 and Washington to President of Congress, July 22, 1778,
Sparks, Writings £f Washington, VI, 6 and 9-10.
18 carlisle to Lady Carlisle, July 25, 1778, Carlisle
MSS, p. 358, William Eden Minutes, July 29, 1778, Stevens,
Faesimiles, V, No. 508.
19General Haratio Gates had 7,000 at White Plains,
while General John Sullivan's forces included 5,000 in Rhode
Island. Sir Henry Clinton's Dispatch, July 27, 1778,
Fortescue, Correspondence of George III, IV, No. 2397.

20rbid.
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The sailing of the French fleet to Rhode Island,
therefore, allowed Clinton time to prepare 8,000 of his
army for the voyage south.

Major General Jarr.es Grant

was to embark for St. Lucia with 5,000, while General
Archibald Campbell was to leave for Georgia and East
Florida with the remaining 3,ooo. 21 Prior to this Clinton
had been unable to follow Lord Germain's instructions of
March 21--to irmnediately dispatch 8,000 troops south-22
since he had lacked the vessels.
With Estaing's arrival
off New York's coast in July, 1778, General Clinton had
postponed troop departure.

On November 4, 1778, the

5,000 under General Grant would embark for St. Lucia. 23
With Estaing's fleet off Rhode Island, Lord Richard
Howe could finally take the offensive.

Word came to Lord

Howe, on July 30, that Admiral John Byron's British fleet
24
was nearing New York.
Admiral Byron's fleet provided
England with temporary control of the sea off North
America.

This maneuver, however, weakened England's

position in the English Channel, since no large fleet

2lwillcox, American Rebellion, pp. 105-106.
22 supra, pp. 52-53.
23willcox, "British Strategy," pp. 118-19.
24Ibid., p. 114. Admiral Byron was Carlisle's
nephew and good friend of Chaxles James Fox. Willcox,
Portrait of~ General, p.221.
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remained off the English coast. 25 Admiral Howe could not
wait for Byron's arrival for fear of losing Estaing's fleet.
Howe failed, however, to attack the French vessels due to
a severe storm which scattered both fleets. 26
During the summer the British seemed as ineffective
in military endeavors as in negotiation.
the British had achieved nothing.

On sea and land

Estaing•s vessels not

only had kept Lord Howe at bay but also had forced Clinton
to wait months before shipping his troops to the West
Indies.

This lack of troops hindered British plans for

early victory in the West Indies.

If one French fleet

could cause so much havoc with British strategy, the
Americans wondered what total French involvement could
achieve.

The Americans, moreover, noticed Britain's

inability to provide complete security for its commission.
The colonials reasoned that if England could not protect
its own commissioners how could it defend a whole continent.
With Admiral Byron's vessels nearing the coast, the
commissioners felt a little more secure.
entreaties for a settlement of the issues.

They resumed their
Adam Ferguson,

directed by the commission members, sent a note to Henry
25Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers~ Thomas
Jefferson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1950), II, 214.
2 6w111cox, Portrait of a General, p. 244; Barck and
Lefler, Colonial America, p:-6!2.
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Laurens requesting the release of General Burgoyne's forces.
Under the Saratoga Convention all troops of Burgoyne were
to be allowed to return to England.

The commissioners

demanded that the agreement signed by Burgoyne and General
Gates be upheld. 2 7 In a letter to the President of South
Carolina, Rawlins Lowndes, Laurens expressed his sentiments.
He disapproved release of the British army without
Parliament's ratification of the Saratoga Convention.
Laurens knew well that such acceptance would be almost
acknowledgement of American liberty. 28
This rebuttal only increased the envoys' fervor.
On August 26, they asked Congress, once more, to release
the troops. 29 Congress, following Laurens' advice, made

it clear on September 4 that the troops were not to be
released until Parliament ratified the agreement.
to obtain any progress, Clinton made a
September 19.

Failing

final plea on

The reply of Congress, signed by Secretary

Charles Thomson, closed the issue with the statement that
"the Congress of the united states

of .America make no

27Great Britain. Collection, Adam Ferguson on
behalf of commissioners to Henry Laurens, August 7, 1778,
Evans Bibliography, 15825, 26-27. The Saratoga Convention
was dated October 17, 1778. Barck and Lefler, Colonial
America, p. 626.
28Henry Laurens to Rawlins Lowndes, August 11, 1778,
Burnett, Letters .2.E, Members, III, 368-70.
29Ford, Journals of Congress, XII, 882.
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answer to insolent letters. n 30
The sunmer months permitted no respite from colonial
castigations.

Henry Laurens admitted to Washington that

he had penned notes to friends to convince them of the
corruptness of the commissioners.

As early as July 31,

1778, he believed that the English ministry would soon
acknowledge failure and recall the Carlisle Commission. 31
Like Henry Laurens,

Philip Freneau, the poet,

concluded that the envoys must leave America and "pass their
days in poverty and pain."
O'er Britain's isle a thousand woes impend,
Too weak to conquer, govern, or defend,
To liberty she holds pretended claim----The substance we enjoy, and they the name •• • •
Freneau extolled the Americans to rise up and right the
wrongs.
Americans! revenge your country's wrongs;
To you the honour of this deed belongs,
Your arms did once this sinking land sustain,
And saved those climes where Freedom yet must
reign----Your bleeding soil this ardent task demands,
Expel yon' thieves from these polluted lands
Expect no peace till haughty Britain yields. 32
30creat Britain. Collection, Congress, Resolution,
September 4, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 38-40.
31Henry Laurens to Washington, July 31, 1778,
Burnett, b_etter~ .2£ Members, III, 355-56.
32The title of the poem, written in August, 1778, is
"'America Independent' and Her Everlasting Deliverance from
British Tyranny and Oppression." Fred Lewis Pattee (ed.),
The Poems of Philip Freneau, Poet of the American Revolution
(Princeton-;-New Jersey: The University Library, 1902), I, 21
and 280-82. Freneau spent time in the West Indies serving as
the mate aboard a Captain Hanson's frigate, returning to
America in July, 1778. The poet remained in America until
1779 writing patriotic poems. ~., xxvi-xxviii.

127
Freneau•s poem was an

impassioned

rather than to the intellect.

appeal to the heart

It was to produce an over-

flow of emotion--hatred, sorrow, and anger--directed at
Britain and her commissioners.

If a contemptuous attitude

toward the commission could be maintained, the poem would
have served its purpose.
George Johnstone remained the central figure receiving
much of the criticism from the Americans.

On August 11,

Congress began its final discussions on the conduct of the
former governor of West Florida. 33 Congress studied the
letters of Johnstone to Joseph Reed and Richard Morris
written during the spring of 1778.

Once more Reed reviewed

his discussions with "a lady" in Philadelphia.

He mentioned
the bribe offered by this lady on behalf of Johnstone. 34
After several hours of deliberation,

a decision on August 11.

Cong~ess

reached

In the opinion of the delegates,

Johnstonets attempted bribe was a direct means '1 to corrupt
and bribe

the Congress of these united states of America."

The congress, furthermore, resolved:
That it is incompatable with the honour of Congress
to hold any manner of correspondence or intercourse
with said George Johnstone, Esq; especially to
negotiate with him upon affairs, 3~ which the cause of
liberty and virtue is interested.
33Ford, Journals .Qf. Congress, XI, 770.
34supra, pp.109-ID; Great Britain. Collection,
Congress, Minutes on August 11, 1778, Evans Bibliography,
15825, 29-30.
35~., 15825, 31.
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Of the members attending, sixteen voted against and eleven
voted in favor of the declaration.

The vote to bar further

discussions with Johnstone was indeed close, with influential
men like Elbridge Gerry and Francis Dana of Massachusetts
and Gouverneur Morris of New York voting against the
resolution. 36 The close vote seemed to verify that
numerous delegates wished not to of fend the English ministry
by outright condemnation of one of its representatives.
When the commissioners received news of the congressional action, Carlisle,
reply on August 26.

Eden, and Clinton penned a joint

They claimed no knowledge of Mr.

Johnstone's activities until the information appeared in
37
the July 21 issue of the Pennsylvania Packett.
Their
August 26 dispatch to Congress, however, was not a vindi•
cation of their colleague, who they felt needed no support.
In this dispatch to Congress, the remaining commissioners
stated Johnstone's opinions on reconciliation.

Paraphrasing

Johnstone, the envoys claimed
that the offers of great Britain were obviously
adopted to promote and establish the liberties, peace,
opulence, increase security and permanent happiness of
the inhabitants of this continent, and that those
blessings in an eq\lal degree were not to be expected
from ~ny other connexion or mode of government whatever. 38
36Ford, Journals of Congress, XI, 773-74.
37carlisle MSS, p. 361; Roche, Joseph Reed, P• 141.
38 Great Britain. Qollection, Declaration by
commissioners, August 26, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 35.
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Johnstone, however, needed no support from his
colleagues.

On

August 26, he personally answered his

congressional critics with sarcasm and ridicule.
not to be offended by the charges.

He claimed

It was a "mark of

distinction" to which he was "by no means entitled."

His

intention had always been to promote reconciliation and to cb
nothing to hinder it.

In keeping with that aim, he decided

to resign from the Carlisle Connnission and not to enter into
further negotiations.39
The resignation of Johnstone caused little interest
in Congress.

The Pennsylvania Packett even praised the

former governor for relinquishing his position.

In so

doing, the editors believed that he had improved his good
name. 40 But, in reality, Nr. Johnstone had caused more
mischief than good as a negotiator.

Because he incessantly

advocated a reconciliation, his illicit negotiations did not
trouble him.

Since his secret discussions had achieved

nothing, the only effect of his resignation was to lessen
further the commission's prestige.
resign during negotiations was

To have an emissary

not advantageous.

39creat Britain. Collection, Johnstone•s answer to
Congress, August 26, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 3233; Johnstone's answer to Congress, August 26, 1778,
Stevens Facsimiles, XI, No. 1132.
40The Pennsylvania Packett, September 17, 1778.
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At the time of George Johnstone•s resignation, a
diplomatic scheme engaged the other commissioners.

In

August John Berkenhout and John Temple reached New York
from England.

Berkenhout, a physician and friend of

Arthur Lee, was an agent for the Carlisle Commission. 41
He assumed the guise of a

British agent to Congress,

friendly to the American cause.

His associate, John

Temple--an American--had lived in England during much of
the war.

A Whig in political beliefs, he had volunteered

to aid the commissioners in America.

Fearing recognition,

Temple travelled to Boston and remained in seclusion for
the duration of the Carlisle Commission's stay. 42
While Temple prepared to depart New York, his
colleague, John-Berkenhout, remained active.

Agent

Berkenhout received t 300 from the army's secret service
funds for expenses.

43

Writing to Carlisle on August 20,

1778, Eden could not see any advantage in sending Berkenhout
to Philadelphia.

He believed it would hinder rather than

4 1Arthur Lee was a "militia diplomat" in Europe and
the brother of Richard Henry Lee.
42John Temple professed, in a letter to Samuel Adams
on August 23, his amity for America and desire to remain in
the colonies. Congress, however, suspected Temple of being
a British ~gent. He appeared before Congress during December
to defend himself on the charge of being a British agent.
After three weeks of discussions with Congress, Temple left
for England on December 20, 1778. Van Doren, Secret
History, pp. 78-79, 106, and 115-16.
43 van Doren, Secret History, P• 106.
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aid the commissioners.44

Yet Eden•s reservations did

not dissuade Mr. Berkenhout.

After obtaining a safe

conduct pass from American General William Maxwell, the
British agent reached Philadelphia on August 27.

Due to

his friendship with Arthur Lee and alleged support for
America, Richard Henry Lee cordially greeted him.
Berkenhout•s information from the British ministry included
instructions on discovering the beliefs of colonials like
Richard Henry Lee.
continued in his

He failed in this endeavor.

Berkenhout

role by promising to return to
England to present America's cause to Parliament. 45
sympath~tic

Congress discovered Berkenhout's true purpose as
an agent of the Carlisle Commission and brought him before

the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania on September

3.

Congress had learned through a London newspaper that

Berkenhout was an agent.

Imprisoned by the council, he

was parolled on September 14, and reached New York five
days later.
A

46

diary kept by Berkenhout provided a clue to his

beliefs and indicated the high cost of reconciliation.
assumed that bribery was one means of obtaining support

45van Doren, Secret History, PP• 106-107.
44carlisle MSS, p. 360.

46 rbid., pp.106-109.
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for his cause.

He also believed a well trained, provincial

army could easily destroy Washington's band of thieves
and vagrants.

His resentment of the American cause, the

Franco-American treaties, and Congress added additional
encumbrances to an already overburdened mission. 47
Carlisle and Eden had become further discouraged
during August and September with the continuing indifferent
attitude of the British ministry.

George Germain reminded

the envoys to be careful not to make any concessions contrary

to those in their instructions. 48

King George concluded

from the mission's early reports that negotiations seemed
useless, even a ttjoke."

To George III an evacuation of

all the colonies seemed imminent unless there was a concentrated British attack upon French forces.

With the

defeat of France, all resources then could be arr.ayed against
America. 49
George III, with more enthusiasm, however, invoked
the British agents on August 15 not to abandon the mission.
Any just settlement by the emissaries, which he believed
unlikely, would be confirmed completely by Parliament.so

47Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 141; Van Doren, Secret
History, PP• 109-10.
48George Germain to commissioners, August 5, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1124.
49King George to Lord North, August 12, 1778, Donne,
Correspondence of King George, II, 207.
50Lucas, Lord North, I, 285.
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Writing to Carlisle and Eden on September 2, Germain summed
up the opinions of King George and the ministry.

He urged

Carlisle and Eden to continue their present course.

The

mission was to remain in the colonies until . it exhausted
every means for peace.51
Ardent support came from mercantile interests in

New York City.

During August, several merchants penned a

letter to the commissioners expressing their hope for a
successful mission.

The motive for their interest lay in

the repeal of the Prohibitory Act of 1775-76.

This act had

f orbad cormnercial relations between the rebellious colonies

and the British Empire.

Under its provisions, the British

captured colonial vessels and confiscated their cargoes.
The act held the promise of open trade if any colony, town,
or port demonstrated its loyalty to England. 52 The New
York merchants claimed allegiance to England and promised
to trade only articles not needed by the British armed
forces. 53
Carlisle and Eden replied to the merchants on August
51stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1142.
52Barck and Lefler, Colonial America, p. 590.
53The merchants' list of goods included tobacco,
indigo, bees wax, flax seed, potash, lumber, dyewoods,
furs, and oils. Great Britain. Collection, Letter written
by merchants to commissioners, n. d., Evans Bibliography,
15825, 41-42.
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29. 54

They assured the Americans of their desire for

peace and an end to the embargo.

The commissioners

promised to restore trade at the conclusion of hostilities. 55
After more such promises of good faith, however,
Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton, in a declaration to the
merchants, agreed to suspend the Prohibitory Act for New
York harbor.

After September 26, New York merchants could

trade with England, Ireland, Newfoundland, Quebec, the
Floridas, and the British West Indies.5 6 The British
emissaries deemed it advisable--both as a political overture
and an economic measure--to remove valuable New York
merchandise into the mercantile circulation of the British
Empire.

Although the envoys failed to obtain a commercial

plan based upon more liberal principles, Carlisle and Eden
believed this limited change in policy necessary and
beneficial.

The new policy was to be enforced for three
57
months or tmtil the commissioners revoked it.

54stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1137.
55 Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners to New
York merchants, August 29, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 43.
56 Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners'
Declaration, September 17, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, 45.
57commissioners to George Germain, October 15, 1778
and Commissioners concerning trade of New York, September 26,
1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII and V, Nos. 1179 and 527. ·
Under this declaration, Andrew Elliott, Superintendent of
the Port cf New York, had the authority to license any
merchant, previously pardoned by the commissioners, to leave
New York and transport commerce to the aforementioned
colonies of the British Empire. Commissioners to Andrew
Elliot, September 26, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1166.
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During formulation of their September declaration,
the commissioners also reported to the ministry.

Their

correspondence mentioned little hope for completion of
their mission.

But even if diplomacy foundered, they

urged that England not relinquish its struggle.

Only the

French would gain from England's evacuation of the
colonies. 58 The commissioners concluded with a final
defense of Mr. Johnstone's actions.

His sincere desire

for a settlement had induced him to proceed on his own to
aid the mission in achieving peace.59 Mr. Johnstone had
left New York September 24 expressing hope for America's
return to the mother country. 60
Eden and Carlisle concluded their September letters
wit:h a criticism of Britain's military endeavors.

The French

fleet, as of September 21, was secure from British harassment.

The British fleets of Admiral Byron and Admiral

Gambier were content to allow the French to remain in
Boston harbor. 61

Eden and Carlisle contended that a British

58Ritcheson, British Politics, PP• 281-82.
59commissioners to George Germain, S~ptember 5, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, ZI, No. 1146.
60George Johnstone to Carlisle, September 24, 1778,
Carlisle ~' p. 369.
61Admir~l Gambier had become commander of Admiral
Howe's squadron on September 12, 1778. Carlisle to Rev.
Ekin, October, 1778, Garlisle MSS, P• 386.
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defeat of Estaing would be a double victory.

The Americans

would discover the inability of the French to remove the
British menace, and the French would receive a loss in
prestige.

The English, however, allowed the Gallic forces
to remain intact. 62 The commissioners believed a defeat

of the French would serve to renew the loss of prestige by
their mission.

The Englishmen grasped any prospect that

would improve their position.
The failings of British naval and land forces and
of the British ministry to bolster its mission led Carlisle
to admit the inevitability of collapse of his mission.

He

confided in his diary late in September that an English
victory lay only in the military humiliation of America.
Since America did not wish to return to the British Empire
peacefully, then the colonies must be made to suffer
destruction.

Due to the colonial agreements with France,

America must be further confronted with pain and hardship.63
Lack of success had obviously frustrated Carlisle
and Eden.

During the latter part of the sun:nner, their

correspondence contained increasing bitterness.

One of

the commissioners had been disgraced, the French fleet and

62Ibid.; commissioners to George Gennain, September
21, 1778, Carlisle £!.§..§., p. 386.
63carlisle Ninutes, September 29, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, V, No. 529.
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American forces were still active, and the prestige of
Congress continued to increase at the expense of the
Carlisle Commission.

Yet the envoys had one last alternative--

their October Nanif esto.

CHAPTER VII
PRESENTATION AND REJECTION OF THE
OCTOBER MANIFESTO, 1778
The summer of 1778 had failed to witness successful
peace negotiations or alleviation of the commission's
difficulties.

Secret negotiations by Mr. Johnstone, the

ineffective activity of Loyalists, and the lethargic
attitude of the British ministry handicapped the mission.
Neither a cessation of hostilities nor a signed concil·
iatory agreement existed between the adversaries.

But even

with the October Manifesto, a new and final peace overture,
the Carlisle Commission's ·problems increased.
Letters from North and Germain irritated the envoys
with increased criticisms of the mission.

Added to this

was the lack of Loyalist support for the emissaries.

The

evacuation of Philadelphia, arrests of numerous British
sympathizers, and inability of the commissioners to aid
Loyalists negated their trust in the mission.

For example,

Joseph Galloway, an avowed Loyalist, requested the release
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of several colleagues confined in a dungeon "by the usurped
Powers of Pennsylvania for High Treason."

Yet this October

2 request that the British emissaries intercede in behalf
of John Roberts, James Stevens, and Abraham Carlisle
failed.

1

The peace commissioners, Galloway believed, had

only raised futile hopes.

Carlisle and Eden were not to

be trusted; they talked only "political nonesense.n

Never-

theless, Galloway continued advocating compromise with
hopeless persistence.

The British agents in America had

failed him, but Galloway embarked for England in October,
1778, still anxious for reconciliation. 2
While other Americans assailed the mission as a
means to overthrow the colonial government, the Marquis
de Lafayette took it as a personal insult.

As

early as

September 24, 1778, Lafayette had related to Washington
that French honor was at stake. 3

Still the most prominent

Frenchman in America, Lafayette challenged Carlisle to an
October duel.

Washington reported to Estaing, on October

2, that the Marquis' challenge was a nfresh instance of
his sensibility for the honor of his Nation.n

Like Estaing

Washington cautioned the Frenchman to save himself for
1stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1170.
2Boyd, Anglo-American Union, P• 71.
3sparks, correspondence
II, 209.

.2.£

the American Revolution,
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"greater occasions.n 4
Carlisle, however, refused to accept the duel and
claimed. that he was not responsible to any individual for
his statements.

Lafayette had challenged him chiefly

because his name appeared at the head of the commission. 5
Carlisle claimed that he was "solely answerablen to his
country and king. 6

Lafayette later admitted that Carlisle

was right but believed he would have gained prestige by
risking his life fo~ the honor of France. 7
Following this brief diversion from official peace
efforts, the Carlisle Connnission tried nto head off a
humiliating failure for their mission" by issuing its final
8
appeal oo. October 3.
The purpose of the "Manifesto and
Proclamation" was to restate and clarify some of the points
previously mentioned.

The declaration warned the colonists

of further troubles if they continued to condone the war.
"i\nd we once more remind the members of the Congress that
they are responsible to their countrymen, to the world, and

41.Jashington to Lafayette, October 4, 1778, Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, XIII, 9, 12, and 19-20.
5charlemagne Tower, The Marquis
American Revolution with Some Account
France toward the Ware;! Y!i.dependence
Lippincott company-;-I'92'i>), II, 35.
6carl1sle to Lafayette, October
Fac&imiles, XI, No. 1175.

de

la Fayette in the

Of tne Attitude or-(Philadelphia: J:-B.

11, 1778, Stevens,

7Tower, Harguis de la Fayette, II, 35.

8Einhorn, "Reception of the British Peace C0tmnission,"
p. 2.09.
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to God, for the continuance of this war, and for all the
miseries with which it must be attended."

Carlisle claimed

Congress had no authority to reject the proposal for an
end to taxation without the colonial assemblies' approval.

9

The only taxation would be for the regulation of commerce.
and the duties obtained would be used by the colonies for
internal improvements. 10 This was meant to emphasize and
clarify the tax portion of the North Conciliatory Plan. 11
Since Congress had refused to cooperate, the envoys
believed an open appeal was the only alternative.

Although

the emissaries maintained that England denounced all attempts
at dividing the American people, the commissioners still
encouraged any person, including the military, to condemn
12
the war and return to the fold.
The offer of pardon
excluded judges and "officers of civil justice" who had

9Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners'
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
49; Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1172.
lOGreat Britain. Draught of a Bill for declaring the
intentions of the Parliament of Great Brrtain; concerning--the exercise-ot"the righf of liiiposing taxes wicliin his
ma-est ts colonies;' Prov nces, and Plantations in NorthAmerica Pniladelphia: Macdonalcrind Cameron, 1718), Evans
Bibliography, 15828.
llsupra, pp. 26-27.
12commissioners' Proclamation, October 3, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1172.
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executed persons loyal to England.13
If neither the Congress nor the people adhered to
these offers, "laws of self-preservation" would prescribe
British retaliation.

If the Americans rejected the proposals,

Britain would not be held responsible for the events to
follow.

14

.

After France entered the affair, the struggle

had become more than just a ttfamily quarrel."

Now, Britain

warned, America must suffer the consequences of such
alliance. 15

a~

The manifesto closed with a request that all civil
and military personnel aid nus

in the execution of this

our Manifesto and Proclamation and of all the matters herein
contained."

The commission promised to send copies, written

in English and German, to all the colonial assemblies and
to Congress.

This direct offer to the American people took

on the aspect of an ultimatum.

The offer of October 3
16
be accepted by November 11, 1778.

w~st

13others included were prisoners at the time of the
October Manifesto, and those who became prisoners after the
issuance of the document. Great Britain. Collection,
Commissioners' Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans
Bibliography, 15825, 50 and 53-54.
14Great Britain. Collection, Conmiissioners'
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
51-52.
15arown, Empire .2! Independence, PP• 284-85.
16Great Britain. Collection, Commissioners'
Proclamation, October 3, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825,
54-55.
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Before that time agents of the commissioners would
circulate copies of the proclamation under flags of truce.
Congress, however, considered this a violation of colonial
law and recommended that the agents be seized.17 Admiral
Gambier, the new commander-in-chief of British naval forces
in North America, nevertheless appointed vessels to carry
the documents and the agents to the various colonies. 18
The American response to this latest endeavor was
not long in coming.

William H. Drayton of

renewed previous colonial arguments.

South Carolina

The offers of England,

compared to France, were nil.

England had better "look at
home" before accusing France of any wrongdoing. 19 Another
colonial citizen

called the commissioners' attempt na

Begging performance.n20 The Pennsxlvania Evening~
paralleled the Packett in

its views.

The latest issuance

demonstrated the contempt which England maintained for
America. 21
Such adverse newspaper reactions, however, failed to
discourage the commissioners.

For the first time in many

17Pitkin, Political and Civil Historx, II, 58-59.
18commissioners to Admiral Gambier, October 3, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XI, No. 1173.
19~

Virginia Gazette, October 9, 1778.

20The Pennsylvania Packett, Octber 15, 1778.
21The Pennsylvania Evening f.2!!, October 16, 1778.
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weeks, the envoys expressed cautious optimism in their
October 15 letter to George Germain.

With a pardon for

treasonable acts, the Americans had the opportunity to
return to the favor of England.

Another purpose of the

proclamation was to end the insults and to disavow any
further expectations for concessions.

It would also

leave in the colonies "an Impression • • • of the
Benevolence" and good will of Great Britain.

The time

seemed most appropriate for this public appeal due to the
increasing disgust between France and America. 22
Almost before the British envoys concluded their
letter to Germain, a congressional committee reported its
action on the latest British offer.

This committee, composed

of Gouverneur Morris, William Duer, John Mathews, Richard
Henry Lee, and Elbridge Gerry, repeated that Congress, on
April 22, 1778, had already resolved that any persons who
made any agreement with the commissioners nought to be
considered Enemies of the United States."

The purpose of

the October declaration was merely to revive animosities
and encourage rebellion among the colonials.

Congress,

22 stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1178. Among reasons
for increased distrust between the allies was a recent
incident between General Sullivan and Count Estaing.
Sullivan blamed Estaing for failing to support him in an
attack on Newport, Rhode Island in August, 1778. The
attack never occurred due to Estaing's having to flee for
fear of capture by Howe's fleet. Barck and Lefler, Colonial
.t\merica, p. 632.
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therefore, would never honor the flags of truce*23
Despite these early colonial reactions, the
commission dispatched several agents with copies of the
"Manifesto and Proclamation."

On October 17, Governor

Patrick Henry of Virginia received the information from
Major Thomas Mathews, commander of Fort Henry.

The latter

reported that a British officer had arrived at the fort
with copies of the proclamation for the speaker of the
legislature, several officers in Virginia, and ministers
24
of the gospel.
British officer John Hay learned, however,
that the Virginia response regarded the dispatches as
"calculated to divide and mislead the good People of this
country.rr 25 The Virginia legislature resolved that Governor
Henry inform Mathews to order the British officer to leave
Virginia. 26
Some agents were not as fortunate as Hay.

Pilot

Welbank's sloop wrecked, and he found himself confined
2 3Ford, Journals of Congtess, XII, 1013 and 1015;
Congress Resolutions, October lb, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles,
XII, No. 1186. William Duer was a delegate from New York;
John Mathews was delegate from South Carolina; and Elbridge
Gerry was a delegate from Massachusetts. Burnett, Letters
.££.Members. III, lvi, lxi, and liv.
24Henry, Patrick Henry, I, 567.

25Report of John Hay, October 29, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, XII, No. 1198.
26Henry, Patrick Henry, I, 567.
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to a prison in Philadelphia.

Under a flag of truce Welbank

was to have travelled to Delaware to deliver a copy of the
manifesto to the assembly.

Another agent failed to reach

Annapolis, Maryland.

Adam Ferguson then had to personally
send a copy to Governor Thomas Johnson. 2 7
The physical difficulties encountered by British

agents and the rejection of the declaration provided anti•
British propagandists with more ammunition.

Thomas Paine,

in an October 20 letter to the commissioners, denounced the
offer as a "stupidity which conceals you from yourselves"
and "exposes you to • • • contempt."

He believed Britain's

attitude toward the Franco-American agreement was ridiculous.
France had provided America with a generous and noble treaty.
"In France, we have found an affectionate friend and faithful
ally:

in Britain nothing but tyranny, cruelty and infidelity."

Thomas Paine mentioned England's rejection of America's
petitions, her unjust laws, and her advocacy for war.
Britain disdained to offer independence as a means to peace.
Yet if England were to remain in existence, she had best now
ask for sustenance.

Paine completely summed up the colonial

philosophy in one sentence.

11

We now stand on higher ground,

and offer her peace; and the time will come when

sh~,

perhaps

27Adam Ferguson to Henry Laurens, October 26, 1778,
James Dick (Connnissar of Naval Prisoners) to John Beatty,
October 27, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1193 and
1194.
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in vain, will ask it from us.n 28
In a more sarcastic article on November 21, 1778,
Paine ridiculed the emissaries for not following their
instructions from England.
authorized them to

Their original commission had

conduct a peaceful settlement.

He

claimed that they had disavowed their instructions by
threatening America with total destruction.

Therefore,

to disobey the rules of their mission was treason.

It was

useless for the mother country to lay waste to the colonies
in order to harm France, for that would insure America's
/

need for further materiel and military aid from France.
"In short, had you cast about for a plan on purpose to enrich
your enemies you could not have hit upon a better.n29
Paine was too harsh in his condemnation of the British
manifesto.

The cormnissioners only threatened retaliation

and not total destruction if America rejected the October
Manifesto and continued receiving aid from France.
William Henry Drayton and David Ramsay, both of
South Carolina, were not above using propaganda.

Through

newspaper articles and speeches they helped to supplement
the writings of the more prolific propagandists like Pane.
28ncrisis :/f:IV," in Political Writings of Paine,
157-59, 161, and 164.
2 9ncrisis 1foVIl," in Political Writings .2f Paine,
r~ 183-84.
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The essays of Drayton, under the title of "An American,"
in the Pennsylvania Packett were well received.

Drayton

addressed his October essay to General Clinton, accusing
the British

of fraud in their dealings with the colonials.

Britain's recent tactics caused the colonials to denounce
as never before authority of England over America.30
Ramsay believed that the insincerity of the emissaries had
led to their failure.

The ineffectiveness of all British

proposals actually aided in creating a more complete unity
between France and America. 31
In addition to these enthusiastic spokesmen, other
leaders of colonial independence ridiculed Britain's latest
endeavor.

Washington, in a letter to his brother Samuel

claimed that the British declaration more than implied the
lack of human feelings within the commissioners.

In another

dispatch, Washington warned President Laurens that the
British effort was meant to awaken the worst fears of the
colonials.

The envoys needed no aid from America to

accelerate their certain "political death. 0

The general

informed Count Estaing that he believed the emissaries'

30philip Davidson, Propaganda and The American
Revolution 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill, North 'Carolina:
University o~ Nortfi'"""Carolina Press, 1941), p. 351;
Pennsylvania Packett, October, 1778.
31 Ramsay, History of Revolution, I, 80.
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declaration would be their last. 32

Like his fellow

Virginian, Richard Henry Lee was very vehement in his
criticism of the latest proposal.

Lee recommended that

all agents of the commissioners be seized and imprisoned
for so vile a mission.

He believed also that the flags of

truce must be ignored.33
Josiah Bartlett presented a more moderate estimate
of the situation than Richard Henry Lee.

The delegate

from New Hampshire claimed that as long as the mother
country had hope for an American submission the war would
continue.

England had to

realize that the colonies

endorsed the Franco-American alliance and the rejection
of the Carlisle Commission's proposals.

Bartlett thus

urged each colonial legislature to pass resolutions approving
the aforementioned points.

To demonstrate the colonies'

loyalty to Congress, an acknowledgement of its power to
make alliances, treaties, peace, and war was necessary.
Once the British realized this situation, England would
be in the position to rectify the differences of opinion.34
32washington to Samuel Washington, October 22, 1778,
Washington to President Laurens, October 23, 1778, and
Washington to Count Estaing, October 27, 1778, Fitzpatrick,
Writings .Qf Washington, XIII, 129-33 and 169-70.
33Richard Henry Lee to John Adams, Octber 29, 1778,
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry~' I, 447.
34Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon, October 27, 1778,
Burnett, Letters of Members, III, 466-67.
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Writing in the Virginia Gazette, one of Bartlett's
colleagues in Congress was vehement in his accusations.
"Americanus,n as he entitled himself, maintained that the
":t-lanifesto and Proclamationrr was the connnissioners' last,
dying attempt.

He dismissed its denunciations of Congress

as an effort to improve the English position.

The manifesto

stated that Congress lacked authority·in signing treaties.
"Americanus" disagreed by claiming that the still to be
ratified Articles of Confederation granted this power only
to Congress.

He was astonished by the envoys' approval

of a more brutal war, if America continued to refuse
England's declarations.

After three years of cruelty

America was to experience an even harsher conflict.

To

expect the colonies to support the British at this time
was ridiculous.

He further claimed that .Americe not only

had withstood England's armies but also had the power to
oppose her "artifices."

The writer insisted that if

England granted independence, harmony would reign.35
On October 30,
of "Americanus."

1778, Congress echoed the sentiments

The delegates unanimously condemned the

proclamation for having attempted to seduce the American
people.

.

The delegates appealed to individuals to join

35~ Virginia Gazette, October 30, 1778. "Americanusn
was either Gouverneur Morris or Samuel Adams according to
Sparks, ~ of Gouverneur t·1orris, I, 188.
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Congress against England.

If too few responded, then

devestation of the colonies was inevitable.36

Since

England had failed in military subjugation of the colonials,
she had resorted to bribery and deceit.

If England per-

sisted in this endeavor, Congress promised "such exemplary
vengeance as" to "deter others from a like conduct.n 37
Having anticipated disappointing results from their
final proclamation, Eden and Carlisle spent the few remaining
days of their mission completing preparations for departure.
Carlisle and Eden sent a note to Germain seeking explanations
for recent poor conmrunications with the ministry.

Their

September 21 letter had requested authority to embark for
England if nothing of consequence occurred to detain them.38
Due to the commissioners' continued, unprofitable venture,
they requested Admiral Gambier to book passage for them on
the Roebuck.

If there was no change in America reactions

by the end of November, England's peace envoys would say
39
farewell to America.
36 Niles, Principles and Acts of Revolution, pp. 476-77.
37congress Manifesto, October 30, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, XII, No. 1199.
38unknown to them at the time, Germain's reply had
already left that decision to them. Germain to commissioners,
November 4, 1778, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1206.

!!?.!.£.,

39carlisle and Eden to Germain, November 15, 1778,
No. 1213.
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With preparations completed, the envoys brought
their correspondence to

a close.

Their final dispatch

to Germain included an account of their October Manifesto.
They reported that a few to'tvns, like Hartford, Connecticut,
had printed the decree but with little favorable response.
Officials in New Jersey, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware.
ridiculed the copies.

No reports reached the commissioners

from Hassachusetts Bay, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New
York, Georgia, and the Carolinas.

The emissaries believed

that there were many people who condoned the British more
than the French, but fearing retaliation by othex colonials
they had not come forward.

Former governor of New Jersey,

William Franklin, reported this news to his friend Eden.
The commissioners took some comfort in this.

40

They feared

that a free America might demand payment for losses and
expenses incurred during the war.

Not even independence,

they warned, would mean an end to Great Britain's
dilemmas.

41

The emissaries concluded their final correspondence
to Germain with an account of their appointment of General
40
william Franklin was held by the Americano and
having been exchanged for John NcKinley, colonial president
of Delaware, returned to New York in October, 1778. Van
Doren, Secret Historx, p. 114.
41
Commissioners to Germain, November 16, 1778,
Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, No. 1215.
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Archibald Campbell as a governor and commander-in-chief.
In the first usage of such power granted to the commission
by the Bx·itish ministry, they had ordered Campbell to
quell the rebellion in Georgia, and if successful, to march
into South Carolina.

He was in command of that part of

General Clinton's forces assigned to the West Indies and
42
.
t.e
h
south em co 1 onies.
Seeing Congress without the necessary strength to
protect them, the people of Georgia would denounce the
American rebellion.

If the inhabitants failed to respond

and disregarded Campbell's authority, the commissioners
ordered him to abandon his mission.

This was a final exper-

iment to gain support within the colonies.

If the plan

succeeded in one section of the colonies, it had the
possibility of extending into other colonies.

Admitting

that it was a gamble, the envoys were not surprised when
43
Campbell's mission achieved only limited success.
After this failure to gain the support of any large
section of the population, there remained only one group
which openly sympathized with the emissaries.

The New

42 supra, p. 53 ; Willcox, American Rebellion, pp.
105-06.
43 commissioners to Archibald Campbell, November,
1778, Commissioners to Campbell, November 3, 1778, and
Commissioners to Germain, November 16, 1778, Stevens,
Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1202, 1205, and 1216.
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York City merchants and traders expressed
departure of Carlisle and William Eden.

regre~

at the

The sincerity of

their position was based upon what the British were able
to do for them.

In a petition to Carlisle and Eden, the

merchants' spokesman, William Walton, eA'Pressed gratitude
for allowing loyal New Yorkers commercial privileges. 44
Since September 26, 1778, more than t one million worth
of materiel had passed through the port.

The merchants

now asked for a renewal of the act and for complete importation of goods from all British ports.

On November 18,

the British agents granted the extension.

Any vessel with

licenses and legal clearance from any British port. had the
right to sail to New York and Rhode Island.

The envoys,

moreover, suspended the Prohibitory Act of 1775-1776 for
the port of New York.

Once the merchants obtained their

goals, they expressed hope that the unnatural alliance
with France would eventually unite the empire in an attempt
to nrender abortive a confederacy that threatens ruin to
the civil and religious llberty of mankind.11 45

44supra, pp. 133-34.
4 5Merchants and Traders of New York (by Wm. Walton)
to Commission Commissioners, November 14, 1778, Answer and
Proclamation of Commissioners, November 18, 1778, and
Inhabitants of New York to Commissioners, November 23,
177&, Stevens, Facsimiles, XII, Nos. 1212 and 1226.
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Yet the hopelessness of their situation finally
forced the emissaries to embark for England.

They realized

that Britain's offers for a settlement had failed to entice
the Congress or any large portion of the population.
Instead of weakening Congress, the envoys' six month
stay had enhanced its role and reputation. 46 On November

27, 1778, Carlisle and Eden embarked upon the Roebuck,
unsure of the effects of turmoil in Parliament caused by
their mission. 47
During November and December, Parliament spent
much of its time discussion Mr. Johnstone and the October
Manifesto.

On Johnstone's return to England, he appeared

before the House of Commons to def end his actions in America.
He denied to the legislators on November 26 that he ever
attempted to bribe Joseph Reed.

He believed rather that

the failure of Congress to have Reed reveal Mrs. Ferguson's
name further incriminated Reed and helped clear his own
reputation.

48

When Johnstone's speech reached America, Mrs.
46 willcox, Portrait of ~ General, p. 112.
47carlisle to Lady Carlisle, November 17, 1778,
Carlisle, l•iSS, p. 390; Van Doren, Secret History, p. 114;
Ritcheson,~itish Politics, p. 283.
48Roche, Joseph Reed, p. 142; Pitkin, Political and
Civil History, P• 56.
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Ferguson published her own account of the discussions in
February, 1779.

Furthermore, Reed vindicated himself by

publishing, in September, 1779, all the documents involved
49
The publication of all this material
in the issue.
failed to taint the repurtations of either Reed or Johnstone.
Mrs. Ferguson seemed the only one harmed by the publicity,
for her property was subsequently confiscated.

The .American

leaders, however, decided that she was merely indiscreet
rather than guilty of wrong doing.so
Mr. Johnstone, meanwhile, became a rabid supporter
of the Tory faction in Commons.

The Virginia Gazette

reported that Johnstone favored a complete military effort
by all British forces to gain a victory in .America. 51
Johnstone, who had never connnanded a vessel, was made
commodore of a squadron off the Portuguese coast in May,
1779. 52
George Johnstone's appearance before Parliament
was a small matter compared to the discussions ensuing
between the factions over the commissioners failure.

His

troubles, however, brought the plight of the mission into
49Pitkin, Political and Civil Historx, p. 56.
50 van Doren, Secret Historx, P• 104.
51The Virginia Gazette, February 12, 1779.
52van Doren, Secret Historx, p. 114.
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clearer perspective.

Charles James Fox expressed in

Commons the feelings of numerous Whigs by conderrning
Britain's actions toward America.

To Fox the failure in
war as well as in diplomacy seemed complete. 53 He insisted
that it was best to withdraw troops from North America and
laun.ch an extensive attack against France.

To destroy

France would be the best means of detaching America from
her ally. 54
Discussions among the various factions became more
intense with the presentation of the commissioners' "Manifesto
and Proclamation" of October 3.

Lord Rockingham raised

objections to this declaration on December 7, 1778.

He

claimed such a paper was too distasteful to be condoned.
It was "totally repugnant to every principle of christianity,
morality, and good policy."

Because of America's ties with

France and failure of reconciliation, England was now asked
to wage a savage war against her colonies.

To sanction a

harsh retaliation, as the manifesto urged, was barbaric.
The October Manifesto proved that all thoughts of affiliation
between the two countries was past.

Like Rockingham,

Richmond and the Earl of Shelburne agreed that the proclamation seemed to limit further opportunity for reunification
53Hammond, Charles James Fox, pp. 213-14.
54Russell, Memorials and Correspondence of Fox, I,
199.
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of England and America.

Shelburne insisted that the

American Congress was correct in condemning the final
offers. 55
There were those, however, who supported the October
off er of peace by threat of retaliation.
Suf~olk

The Earl of

felt Rockingham had misjudged the purpose of the

proclamation.

It only pointed out what the colonies might

expect if they persisted in tttheir unnatural alliance with
France."

Suffolk insisted that the motive behind this offer

was for self-preservation and not revenge.

The Earl of

Abingdon and Lord Chancellor Thurlow also rejected the
views of those who criticized the declaration.

To presume

that England would even now abandon her former possessions
with a number of its inhabitants supporting the British
56
crown was unthinkable.
Moreover, Carlisle, Eden, and Clinton received much
personal criticism for their actions.

Shelburne complained

that lack of success was due to generals, ministry, and
"ambassadors." Yet Earl· Gower, Carlisle's father-in•law,
claimed that no man was more willing to end the cruelties
and hostilities than his son-in-law.

The commissioners'

declaration held out a return to "tranquility."

It only

55Hansard, Parliamentary History, XX, 1-2, 4-5, 7,
17, and 30-32.
56 Ibid., pp. 8, 12, and 36-37.
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pointed out the risks the inhabitants ran if they failed
to heed England's pleadings.57
Even statements from family and close friends were
not abundant.

One Tory supporter, calling himself

"Philarethes," maintained that the envoys deserved the
highest praise.

He believed the envoys were honorable in

all their dealings.
war.

Congress was to blame for the continued

The emissaries had proposed every conciliatory offer

available to them. 58

But the envoys received only token

acclaim from Lord North and King George.

North only

connnended the envoys for their personal sacrifices.

Both

expressed regret at the failure of the mission and voiced
pleasure at the safe return of their countrymen.59
Carlisle and Eden were clearly disappointed by
British debate on failure of the mission and the cool
reception upon their return to England.

Neither Eden nor

Carlisle were in good spirits when they arrived at Plymouth
December 20, 1778.
of the voyage.

Eden was seasick and ill-tempered nruch

Carlisle.remained depressed.

The subsequent

rewards offered to Carlisle and Eden even failed to ease

57rbid., pp. 31 and 15-16.
58Moore, Diary of Revolution, II, 98-100.
59From the General Advertiser and :Morning Intelligencer,
November 27, 1778, arrived at Philadelphia, February 6, 1779,
Evans Bibliography, 15836; Lucas, Lord North, II, 63.
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their distress.

The latter refused to return to Commons in

February, not wishing to face an interrogation by his
former colleagues.

He requested rather that his wife be

appointed to an off ice at court and receive a pension of
t 600 a year.

Lord North and King George agreed.

The

British government in 1779 appointed Carlisle president of
the Board of Trade.

A year later he became Lord Lieutenant

of Ireland with Eden his chief secretary.60
These promised rewards, however, did not lessen the
commissioners' resentment.

Carlisle and Eden threatened to

reveal to the Brit.ish people the situation in America at
the time of their arrival. 61 They focused the blame for
failure of the mission on Germain and North. 62 The two
envoys insisted that they had adequately discharged their
duties.

They expected a lack of support from the Americans,

but not from the English ministry.

Realizing the intensity

of their resentment, North alked Eden not to publish the
commission's findings.

Although an.investigation would

surely embarrass the ministry and vindicate them, Carlisle
and Eden reluctantly agreed.

But it was many months before

60van Doren, Secret History, pp. 114-115; Lucas,
.!&.!!! North, II, 64.
61Brown, Empire .2,!: Independence, pp. 289·90.
62Namier and Btm>ke, History of Parliament, II, 376.
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the envoys' bitterness subsided. 63
Even the co11llllission's last resort, an open appeal
to the American people, had garnered little support.

By

autumn, 1778, a majority of the colonials, like Congress,
had condemned the cormnissioners' proposals for not offering
independence.

The Loyalists were either too frightened of

their adversaries or too discouraged to respond to the final
British pleadings.

Unable to persuade Congress to accept

their offers, the British envoys likewise had failed to
intimidate the anti-British colonials.

The Carlisle

Cormnission's return and reception in England ended six
months of frustration and disappointment in America.

63Brown, Empire or Independence, pp. 289-90;
Brown, "British Peace Otter," P• 259.

CONCLUSION
The British ministry's interest in reconciliation
was genuine.

For three years the British had waged an

ineffective war in America.
Burgoyne and an eventual

With defeat of General

Franc~-American

treaty, some in

the ministry were finally aroused from their lethargy and
began to condone the possibility of

reconciliation~

Dreading a Franco-American military and commercial treaty,
Lord Treasurer North commenced work on a plan to off set
such an alliance.
The initial interest in conciliation led Lord North
to present his plan to Parliament, believing it was the
only logical means for ending the war.
ministry, the plan was most liberal.

For a conservative
In offering freedom

from taxation, pardons for treasonous acts, and just
commercial ties, the ministry and George III advocated a
discontinuance of Britain's coercive policy.

Although

America had always been subject to England's complete
demands, by 1778 the British ministry realized that
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negotiations, King George and his ministers had undermined
the mission.

The British envoys always believed that

military force enhanced their bargaining position.

The

evacuation of troops from Philadelphia, however, demonstrated to the colonials the weakness of England's position
:i.n

~\merica.

In order to provide troops for the West Indies,

the British undermined the Carlisle Connnission and its
position in America.

To strengthen one strategic area at

the expense of another was a poor tactic.
The British government defended its action by reason
of military strategy and security.
than convincing.

But the defense is less

Alan S. Brown adequately summed up reasons

for English failure by stating that "only human shortsightedness can explain why the absurdity of trying to conciliate
while retreating" did not penetrate the minds of the
ministry. l

The commissioners expected a lack of support

from the Americans, but not from the English ministry.

The

order to evacuate Philadelphia, for which Carlisle and Eden
never forgave the ministry, diminished the chance for a
successful mission.
Failure to inform the commissioners of evacuation
was only a part of the reason for the commission's unproductive
endeavor.

Connnissioner George Johnstone's secret discussions

larown> TTBritish Peace Offer, 0 P• 259.
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and bribe attempt engendered colonial contempt for the
mission.

Colonial distrust for the commission also hampered

the presentation of the British October Manifesto.

This

direct appeal to the people failed to discredit Congress.
Instead of weakening Congress, the commissioners'. six
month sojourn had enhanced its role and reputation.
Furthermore, the lethargic attitude and lack of a unified
spirit within the English government hindered negotiations
by injecting pessimistic beliefs into the thinking of the
emissaries.

Even Lord North can be blamed for some of the

confusion surrounding the conciliatory plan.

Although he

advocated and developed a policy of reconciliation, North
doubted success and failed to provide enthusiastic support
for the commissioners.

Concern over his inability to

achieve a workable colonial policy had impeded his work as
Lord Treasurer.

In fact, he had offered to resign. 2

After taking into consideration the previous mentioned
points, the principal reason for the conciliatory plan's
ineffectiveness still lay in the ministry's reluctance to
offer independence.

Failing to understand the basic issue

of the war, the English ministry doomed the North Conciliatory Plan cf 1778 from its inception.

2Fortescue, Correspondence of George Ill, IV, Nos.

2179 and 2247.

APPENDIX A
GREAT BRITAIN.

COLLECTION OF PAPERS, THAT

HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AT DIFFERENT TiliES,

RELATING TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS
MAJESTY'S C0?-1MISSIONERS, ETC.,

ETC., ETC.
George III by the grace of God, Great-Britain,
France and Ireland, King, Defender, the Faith, to our
right trufty and right well-beloved coufin and counfellor,
Frederick, Earl of Carlisle, Knight of the moft ancient
Order of the Thitfle; our right trufty and well-beloved
Counfellor, Richard, Earl Vifcount Howe, of our Kingdom
of Ireland; our trufty and well-beloved Sir William Howe,
Knight of the moft honourable Order of the Bath, Lieutenant
feveral of our forces, feveral and Commander in Chief of
all and f ingular our forces employed or to be employed
within our colonies in North America, lying upon the
Atlantic Ocean, from Nova-Scotia on the North, to West
Florida on the South, both inclufive; William Eden, Efq.
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one of our Commiffioners for Trade and Plantations, and
George Johnstone, Efquire, Captain in our Royal Navy.
Greetings:
Whereas in and by our Commiffion and Letters Patent
under Our Great Seal of Great-Britain, bearing date on or
abot1t the fifth day of May, in the fixteenth year of our
reign, We did, out of our eameft defire, to deliver all
our fubjects and every part of the dominions belonging
to our crown, from the calamities of war, and to reftore
them to our protection and peace, nominate and oppoint our
right trufty and well-beloved coufin and counfellor,
Richard Lord Vifcount Howe, your Kingdom of Ireland, and
our trufty and well-beloved William Howe, Efq; now Sir
William Howe, Knight of the Bath, Major General of our
forces, and General of our forces in North America only,
and each of them jointly and feverally, to be our commiffioner and commiffioners, in that behalf to perform and
execute all the powers and authorities, in and by the said
connniffion and letter patent entrufted and committed to
them, and each of them, according to the tenor of fuch
letters patent, and of fuch further inftructions, as they
should from time to time receive, under our fignet and fign
manual, to have, hold, execute, and enjoy, the faid office
and place, offices and places, of our commissioner and
Commissioners, as therein mentioned with all rights,
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members and oppurtenances, thereunto belonging; together
with all and fingular the powers and authorities thereby
granting unto them, the f aid Lord Vif count Howe and General
William Howe, and each of them, for and during our will
and pleafure, and no longer in fuch manner and form, as
in and by our faid recited commiffion and letters patent,
relation being thereunto had, may, among divers other
things therein contained, more fully and at large appear.
And whereas, for the quieting and extinguifhing of divers
jealouf ies and apprehenf ions of danger to their liberties
and rights, which have alarmed many of our fubjects in
the colonies, provinces, and plantations of New Hampfhire,
Maffachufets Bay, Rhode Ifland, Connecticut, New York,
New Jerfey, Pennfylvania, with the three lower counties
on Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia; and for the fuller manifeftation
of our juft and gracious purpofes, and thofe of our
Parliament, to maintain and fecure all our fubjects in the
clear and perfect enjoyment of their liberties and rights:
It is in and by a certain act, made and paffed in this
prefent feffion of Parliament intituled, "an act to enable
his Majefty to appoint commiffioners, with fufficient powers
to treat, confult, and agree upon the means of quieting
the diforders now fubfifting in certain of the colonies,
plantations and provinces of North America," among other
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things enacted that it phace and may be lawful for his
Majefty, from time to time, by letters patent, under the
Great Feal of Great Britain to authorife and empower five
able fufficient persons, or any three of them, to do, and
perform fuch acts and things, and to ufe and exercife fuch
authorities and powers, as in the faid act a r e for that
purpose mentioned, provided and created.

And whereas, we

are eamef tly def irous to carry into full and perf ectiori
execution the feveral juf t and gracious purpofes above
mentioned:
Now know ye, that we have revoked and determined;
and by thef e prefents do revoke and determine our faid
recited connniffion and letters patent, and all and every
power, authority, claufe, article, and thing therein
contained.

And further know ye, that we repofing efpecial

truft and confidence in your wifdom, loyalty diligence,
and circumfpection in the management of the affairs to
be hereby committed to your charge, have nominated and
appointed, conftituted and affigned, and by their prefents
do nominate, appoint, conftitute and affign yo\l the £aid
Frederick, Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir
William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnstone, or any
three of you to be our commiffioners in that behalf, to
ufe and exercife all, and every the powers and authorities,
hereby intrufted and connnitted to you the faid Frederick
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Earl of carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe,
William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you, and
to so perform and execute all other matter and things
hereby enjoyned, and committed to your care, during our
will and pleasure, and no longer, according to the tenors
these our letters patent and of such further inftructions,
as you fhall from time to time receive under our fignet
or fign manual.
And it is our Royal Will and Pleafure, and we do
hereby authorife, empower, and require you the faid Frederick
Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe,
Sir William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you,
to treat, confult and agree with fuch body or bodies

politick and corporate or with fuch affembly or affemblies
of men, or with fuch perfon or perfons, as you the faid
Frederick Earl of Carlisle, kichard Vifcount Howe, Sir
William Howe, William Eden, George Johnftone, or any three
of you, fhall think fhall meet and fuff icient for that
purpofe, of, and concerning any grievances or complaints
of grievancies exif ting, or fuppofed to exif t in the
government of any of the colonies, provinces, or plantations
abovementioned refpectively, or in the laws and ftatutes
of this realm, refpecting them or any of them, or of and
concerning any aids or contributions to be furnif hed by
any of the faid colonies, provinces, or plantations
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refspectively, for the common defence of this realm, and
the cominions there unto belonging; and of and concerning
any other regulations, provifions, matters and things,
neceffary or convenient for the honor of us, and our
parliament, and for the common good of all our fubjects.
And it is our further will and pleafure, that every
regulation, provifion, matter or things, which fhall have
been agreed upon between you the faid Frederick Earl of
Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, William
Eden, George Johnftone, or any three of you, and fuch
perfons, or bodies politick as aforefaid, whom you or any
three of you fhall have judged fuff icient to enter into
fuch agreement, £hall be fully and diftinctly fet forth
in writing, and authenticated by the hands and feals of
you, or any three of you on one fide, and by fuch feals
and other fignatures on the other, as the occafion may
require, and as may be fuitable to the character and
authority of the body politic, or other perfon fo agreeing;
and fuch inftruments,

fo

authenticated, fhall be by you, or

any three of you, tranfmitted to one of our principal
Secretaries of State, in order to be laid before our
parliament, for the further and more perfect ratification
thereof, and until fuch ratification, no fuch regulation,
provif ion, matter or thing shall have any other force or
effect, or be carried further into execution, than is
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b.ereaf ter mentioned.

And we do hereby further authorife

and empower you the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle,
Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe, William Eden, and
George Johnstone, or any three of you, from time to time,
as you, or any three of you £hall judge convenient, to order
and proclaim a ceffation of hoftilities on the part of
our forces by fea or land for fuch time and under fuch
conditions, reftrictions, or other qualifications as in
your defcretion might be thought requifite, and fuch order
and proclamation to revoke and annue in the fame manner
and form, and it is our further will and pleafure, and
we do hereby require and connnand all our officers and
minifters, civil and military, and all other our loving
fubjects

wh~tfoever,

to obferve and obey all fuch

proclamations refpectively.

And we do hereby in furth

purfuance of the faid Act of Parliament, and of the
provif ions therein contained, authorife and empower you the
faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard V'ifcount Howe,
Sir William Howe, William Eden, George Johnstone, or any
three of you, by proclamation under your refpective hands
and feals, from time to time as you fhall fee convenient to
fufpend the operation and effect of a certain act of
Parliament, made and paff ed in the fixteenth year of our
reign, for prohibiting ell trade and intercourfe with
certain colonies and plantations therein named, and for the
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other purpofes therein alfo mentioned, or any of the
provifions or reftrictions therein contained, and therein
to fpecify, at what time and places refpectively, and with
what exceptions and reftrictions, and under what paffes and
clearances in lieu of thofe heretofore directed, by any
act or acts of Parliament, for regulating the trade, the
colonies and plantations, and faid fufpenfion £hall take
effect, and the faid fufpenfion and proclamation, in the
fame manner and form, to annul and revoke.
And we do hereby further authorif e and empower you
the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe,
Sir William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnstone, or
any three of you, from time to time, as you fhall judge
convenient to . fufpend in any places, and for any time
during the continuance of the faid firft recited act, the
operation and effect of any act, or acts of parliament,
which have paffed fince the tenth day of February, one
thoufand feven hundred and fixty•three, and which relate to
any of our Colonies, provinces, or plantations, abovementioned, in North America, fo far as the fame relate to
them or any of them, or the operation or effect of any
provif ion or other matter in fuch acts contained, fo far
as fuch claufes, provifions, or matters relate to any of
the faid colonies, provinces, or plantations.

And we do

hereby further authorif e and empower you the f aid Frederick

175
Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir William Howe,
William Eden, and George Johnftone, or any three of you,
to grant a pardon or pardons to any number of def cription
of perfons within the faid colonies, provinces, or planta•
tions: and we do hereby further authorife and empower you
the faid Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe,
Sir William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnftone, or
any three of you, in any of our colonies, provinces or
plantations, aforefaid, refpectively, wherein we have
ufually heretofore nominated and appointed a Governor to
nominate and appoint, from time to time, by any inftrument
under your hands and feals, or the hands and feals of any
three of you, a proper perfon to be the Governor and
Commander in Chief in and for fuch colony, province, or
plantation refpectively, to have, hold, and exercife the
f aid off ice of Governor and Commander in Chief in and for

fuch colony, province or plantation refpectively, with all
fuch powers and authorities as any Governor of fuch
province, heretofore appointed by us, might or could have
exercif ed in as full and ample manner and form, as if fuch
Governor and Commander in Chief had been nominated and
appointed by our letters patent or commiff ion, and for
that purpofe,

if need be, to revoke, annul, and make

void any commif f ion or letters patent heretofore granted
for appointing any fuch Governor and Commander in Chief:
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whereas by certain letters patent under our Great Seal,
bearing date on the twenty-ninth day of April, in the
fixteenth year of our reign, we have conftituted and
appointed you the faid Sir William Howe, to be General
and Commander in Chief of all and f ingular our forces
employed, or to be e mployed within our colonies in North
America, lying upon the Atlantic Ocean from Nova Scotia
on the North to Weft Florida on the South, both inclufive,
to have, hold exercife, and enjoy the faid office during
our will and pleafure,

and in cafe you the faid Sir

William Howe, fhould by death or any other manner be
difabled from

~~ercif ing

the faid command, it is our will

and pleafure therein expreffed, that the fame, with all
authorities, ,rights and privileges contained in that our
faid commiffion, fhall devolve on fuch officer bearing
our commiff ion, as fhould be next in rank to you the faid
Sir William Howe: and whereas
Sir Henry Clinton,

our trufty and well beloved

Knight of the Mof t honourable Order

of the Bath, Lieutenant General of our forces, and General
of our force in our army in America only, now actually
bears our commiff ion, and is next in rank to you the faid
Sir William Howe: Know it is our further will and pleafure,
and we do hereby ordain and appoint that whenever the f aid
command in the faid letters mentioned, fhall, in purfuance
theraf devolve upon the faid Sir Henry Clinton, all

and

every the powers and authorities hereby entrufted and
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commanded to you the faid Sir William Howe, fhall forth • • •
and determine, and the faid powers and authorities, and
every of them, fhall from thenceforth, be entrufted and
committed, and are hereby entrufted and committed to the
f aid Sir Henry Clinton, to ufe and excerife the fame powers

and authorities, and to do, perform, and execute all other
the matters and things as aforef aid, in as full and ample
extent and form, and no other, as you the faid Sir William
Howe are hereby authorifed to ufe and exercife, do perform
and execute the fame.
And we do hereby require and command all officers,
civil and military, and all others, our loving fubjects,
whatfoever, to be aiding and affifting unto you the faid
Frederick Earl of Carlifle, Richard Vifcount Howe, Sir
William Howe, William Eden, and George Johnftone, in the
execution of this our commiffion, and, of the powers and
authorities herein contained: Provided always, and we do
hereby declare and ordain, that the feveral offices,
powers and authorities, hereby granted, fhall ceafe,
determine and become utterly null and void, on the firft
day of June, which fhall be in the year of our Lord one
thoufand feven hundred and feventy-nine; although we
fhall not otherwif e in the mean time have revoked and
determined the fame.

In witness whereof we have caufed

thefe our letters to be made patent.

Witnefs ourfelf,
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at Weftminifter, this thirteenth day of April, in the
eighteenth year of our reign.
By the KING Himself.

l
YORK

1Great Britain. Collection £.£ Papers, that have ~
ublished at different times, relating £Q !h! troceecII'ngs of
is ma est-;;rs commissioners, etc., etc., etc. New York:
Jiiiies Rivington, 1 B , George III's instructions to commissioners, April 12, 1778, Evans Bibliography, 15825, pp. 15-22.

SIGNIFICANT DATES
December 7, 1777 - William Eden's conciliatory offer presented
to Lord North.
December 17, 1777 - Count de Vergennes promised to commence
treaty discussions with Benjamin Franklin.
January 18, 1778 - British agent Edward Bancroft learned
Vergennes had received rough draft of Franco-At.\merican
alliance.
February 4, 1778 - British ministry received General Howe's
resignation.
February 6, 1778 -

Franco-~.IIlerican

alliance signed.

February 17, 1778 - North Conciliatory Plan of 1778 presented
to House of Commons.
February 20 - 1778 sent to .America.

Cop~es

of North conciliatory legislation

February 22, 1778 • Lord Carlisle accepted position on
commission.
Narch 5, 1778 - William Eden accepted position on commission.
l-iarch 5, 1778 - Commons ratified North proposal.
March 11, 1778 - King George, after Lords approval, signed
the conciliatory legislation into law.
March 13, 1778 - French Ambassador Noailles presented to
Lord Weymouth copy of Franco-American alliance.

March 21, 1778 - King George instructions to General
Clinton.
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April 2, 1778 - George Johnstone accepted position on
commission.
April 12, 177& - King George instructions to commissioners.
April 14, 1778 - .Arrival of North proposal in lunerica.
April 16, 1778 - British commissioners leave England.
April 22, 1778 - Congress condemned North's proposal for
peace.
May 2, 1778 - Simeon Deane, with copies of Franco-1\merican
alliance, reached New York City.
June 6, 1778 - Commissioners arrived in Philadelphia.
June 7, 1778 - Commissioner George Johnstone secret discussion
with Loyalist Joseph Galloway.
June 13, 1778 - Commissioners' copy of the peace proposal
reached Congress.
June 16, 1778 - George Johnstone met with Nrs. Ferguson.
June 17, 1778 -' Congress refused to accept the commissioners'
offer.
June 22, 1778 - Joseph Reed met with l>irs. Ferguson.
June 28 - June 30, 1778 - Commissioners leave Delaware River
and reach New York City.
July 8, 1778 - Count Estaing's French fleet arrived off
.r:Uiierican coast.
J'uly 22, 1778 - Estaing's fleet abandoned blockade of New York
harbor.
August 26, 1778 - George Johnstone resigned from commission.
October 3, 1778 - Conunissioners offered their hanifesto and
Proclamation.
October 30, 1778 - Congress refused to accept the Manifesto
and Proclamation.
November 27, 1778 - Coxmnissioners embark for England.
December 20, 1778 • Commissioners reached England.
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